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Summary of the thesis   
 
This thesis explores and analyses the applicability and limitations of human rights law 
as it applies to transgender persons. As such limitations are most evident in a strictly 
sex segregated spaces, the thesis proposes a case study on detention to illustrate 
potential conflict between the binary models of the sexes, gender fluidity and 
application of international human rights law to those with transgender or non-binary 
gender identity. For this, the thesis reviews international human rights law sources, 
queer theory literature and transgender and non-binary gender studies. 
 
This research examines the issues of transgender and non-binary identities and their 
recognition in law, including developments in international human rights law and the 
recognition of transgender identities in human rights instruments. The thesis considers 
issues such as underlying principles of human rights, and substantive rights applicable 
to transgender persons while surveying the national jurisprudences to assemble and 
fully examine the available models of transgender recognition in law.  
 
The case study on detention analyzes the lived experiences of transgender prisoners 
and their life stories. It examines the international standards on the treatment of 
transgender prisoners and their human rights. The scope and applicable framework of 
protection is also discussed, considering the tension between binary nature of prisons 
and transgender persons’ non-binary gender. 
 
Overall, this thesis initiates a discussion about the binary/non-binary dichotomy in the 
prison context and asks a series of questions as to how transgender and non-binary 
gender identities can be accommodated in the prison context. It concludes with a 
number of recommendations for a deeper understanding of sex/gender and prison 
dichotomy both in theory and practice. The thesis also offers practical 
recommendations to international human rights mechanisms to provide specific 
guidelines on the application of human rights law to transgender and other non-binary 
gender prisoners.  
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Introduction  
 
In the spring of 2013, the world was shaken by the news that a US Army officer had 
leaked hundreds of thousands of classified documents to Wikileaks.1 Chelsea Elizabeth 
Manning – then known by the name on her birth certificate, Bradley Edward Manning – 
was found guilty of 20 counts, six of them under the Espionage Act.2 However, rather 
than her actions and convictions, it was her identity and its implications for her 
punishment that ensured that Chelsea Manning would be more than an overnight 
sensation.  
 
The day after her conviction in August 2013, Manning came out as transgender, 
becoming the world’s most famous transgender prisoner. On the Today morning talk 
show, she was quoted as saying, ‘As I transition into this next phase of my life, I want 
everyone to know the real me. I am Chelsea Manning. I am a female. Given the way that 
I feel, and have felt since childhood, I want to begin hormone therapy as soon as 
possible’.3  
 
Manning spent almost four years in prison before being pardoned by President Obama in 
January 2017 and finally released on 17 May 2017. The denial of gender expression, 
solitary confinement, continuous verbal and other abuse, and attempted suicides that 
characterized her time in prison encapsulate the struggle for protection under the law and 
the particular challenges that detention poses in cases of non-binary identity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Adam Gabbatt, ‘“I am Chelsea Manning” says jailed soldier formerly known as Bradley’, Guardian (New York, 22 August 2013). 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
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Not all societies recognize the term ‘transgender’ in law. However, gender fluidity and 
non-binary identities exist in most societies. In some countries, a third gender has been 
elevated to the level of protection in the law,4 and in others, terms such as hijra, waria or 
kathoey have been coined to refer to non-binary identities in relevant local contexts.5 
Regardless of the local terms for gender non-conforming people, the transgender 
community in most countries remains among the most invisible and marginalized groups 
and faces daily violence and abuse at the hands of both state and society. 
 
The lived experience of gender non-conforming people, including in prisons, was absent 
from research for a long time. Thus, the experiences of transgender people were not 
documented or studied as a specific discipline. Indeed, while more general aspects of 
gender and sex were part of wider feminist and later post-structural feminist and queer 
theories, studies within these theories had their specific purpose and did not instigate 
active mobilization for transgender citizenship and rights, based on either non-binary or 
transgender identities. 
 
The largely hidden and neglected development characterizes the standing of transgender 
studies today – somewhat reconciled with queer and feminist theories and in constant 
tension with the law. The notion of non-binary gender continues to unsettle the long 
established normative boundaries of sex and gender. Transgender persons do not fit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pant v Nepal, Writ No. 917 of the Year 2064 BS (2007 AD) (Nepal).; Also Khaki v Rawalpindi, Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2009, 
Petition No. 43/2009 (Pakistan). 
5  See for example, Vanja Hamzic, ‘The Case Of Queer Muslims: Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity In International Human 
Rights Law And Muslim Legal And Social Ethos’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review; Laura Grenfell, ‘Making Sex: Law's 
Narratives Of Sex, Gender And Identity’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies.; Boyce Bret, ‘Sexuality and Gender Identity under the Constitution 
of India’ (2015) 18 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice.  
3 
 
within the existing model of human rights law. The inherent limitations of the law and its 
binary character make it difficult for those outside the boundaries to fit in. Often, 
however, those limitations are ascribed to transgender people themselves and their 
inflexibility, inability and even unwillingness to comply with the structure of the law.  
 
The silence of international human rights law on lesbian, gay, bisexual, intersex and 
queer people (LGBTIQ) people mirrors the invisibility of people with non-conforming 
sexuality or gender, such as LGBTIQ people throughout history. This is not surprising 
when one considers that in the 1940s and 1950s, when many international human rights 
treaties still in force were being drafted, gay and lesbian people were criminalized in 
most parts of the world. This translated into their absence from the protection framework 
that was unfolding.6 Since the adoption of the international bill of rights in the 1950s and 
1960s, LGBTIQ persons have fought a long battle, resulting only in 2016 in the partial 
victory of a dedicated UN mandate – the Independent Expert on Discrimination based on 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (UN Independent Expert on SOGI).7 A decades-
long taboo on sexual orientation and gender identity debates within the UN was broken, 
but not without a struggle. Countries that remain hostile to LGBTIQ rights fought to the 
very end at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to block the creation of the 
mandate, including using their leverage to restrict financial support for the mandate.8  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Holning Lau, ‘Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality of International Human Rights Law’ (2004), 71 The University 
of Chicago Law Review.  
7 UNHRC Res 32/2 (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/2. 
8 ILGA and ARC International, ‘Compilation of The Adoption of The 2016 SOGI Resolution' (ILGA and ARC International 2016) 
<http://ilga.org/downloads/SOGI_Resolution_Vote_compilation.pdf> accessed 11 December 2016.; Also, Munira Ali, Lorna 
McGregor, Daragh Murray, Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, Sir Nigel Rodley, Clara Sandoval, Ahmed Shaheed, 'SOGI Mandate Passes 
Third Committee Hurdle' <https://www.ejiltalk.org/sogi-mandate-passes-third-committee-hurdle/> accessed 9 December 2016. 
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Sexual orientation and gender identity rights continue to be a divisive theme for many 
states, as was demonstrated during the appointment process. Some 76 states that 
criminalize LGBTIQ people in law and practice continue to actively oppose the 
development of international human rights law to protect LGBTIQ persons. Such 
opposition to LGBTIQ people’s rights has retarded the process of sexual orientation and 
gender identity norm emergence within the international sphere and created a void, or a 
virtual absence of protection under the framework of human rights law, leaving LGBTIQ 
people unprotected and exposed to violence with impunity.  
 
Some understanding and protection have been developed in relation to lesbian and gay 
identities, but the current normative landscape constructed by states is not well suited to 
people with non-binary gender identities. A one-size-fits-all approach has not worked for 
transgender people. First, such an approach categorizes transgender people as part of a 
‘sexual minority’ and disregards specific aspects of transgender identity. Second, the 
invisibility of transgender and non-binary genders results in the absence of protection 
mechanisms in the law. Third, and most importantly, the one-size-fits-all often does not 
provide for gender recognition in law. Moreover, such an approach lacks linkages 
between recognition of protection and recognition in law, which has clear negative 
implications for transgender communities. This thesis analyses the challenges posed by 
both these protection frames and explores the possibility of a combined approach. 
Without such an approach (and without their meaningful participation in policy design), 
transgender people remain particularly vulnerable to violence, both in society and on the 
part of the state.  
5 
 
 
Transgender people can be particularly vulnerable in a context where gender-binary 
norms are forcefully imposed, and safeguards are either absent or limited for the 
protection of non-binary gender persons. Detention is such a context. 
 
Limitations of international human rights law, including its applicability in protecting 
transgender persons, are well illustrated in the story of Chelsea Manning, which neatly 
captures the multifaceted challenges faced by transgender and non-binary people in 
prisons. Manning’s experience in detention, briefly described above, encapsulates the 
theoretical and practical challenges faced by transgender and non-binary people in 
prisons. Her case further magnifies the limitations of human rights law in its application 
in the prison context.  
 
This thesis seeks to understand the ways in which transgender rights protection in society 
in general has been/is/can be applied, theoretically and practically, in relation to 
detention.   
 
The core question of this thesis is how human rights law applies – or how international 
human rights law has been applied – to the protection of transgender persons, particularly 
when they are detained, and the limitations of the existing frames of protection. To 
address that question, this thesis will focus first on understanding the international human 
rights protection mechanisms for transgender people. It will also analyse specific rights 
of transgender persons under international human rights law, reviewing the available 
6 
 
literature on the issue. The thesis will also discuss the prison context as a space, with a 
clear demonstration of non-binary genders transgressing strict binary models of sex 
(male, female.) By concentrating on transgender persons, this thesis will attempt to 
challenge the heteronormative nature of prisons and the penal environment’s rigidity in 
accommodating fluid genders.  
  
This thesis will examine the issues of sex and gender and their biological/social 
constructions, including through the lenses of queer theory and international human 
rights law; legal models of transgender recognition; and the application of international 
human rights law through each of these models. It will also study the progression of 
transgender rights in international human rights law and its application to the prison 
context and will provide critical analysis on the issue. It will consider the rights to which 
transgender persons are entitled, both in society and in prisons, to allow comparative 
analysis.  
 
The historical and theoretical context is provided in this thesis by an analysis of 
transgender theory, as well as the legal theoretical framework on the rights of transgender 
persons, practices of gender legal recognition and philosophies of sex and gender 
comprehension in prison settings. The scope and interplay of the applicable legal 
frameworks are also discussed in relation to prisoners’ rights broadly and specifically 
focusing on transgender prisoners’ rights. 
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This thesis proposes a framework for answering legal questions about transgender 
persons in society and in prisons in particular, identifying a series of cross-cutting 
factors. It examines the existing frames of protection in society and prisons and 
juxtaposes them. The paper concludes with possible explanations for some of the trends 
towards the recognition of ever-greater rights of transgender prisoners.   
 
Transgender identities and law 
 
Legal gender recognition of those who identify with an opposite or non-binary gender 
has been the most contested feature of queer theory. The emergence of ‘transgenderism’ 
and ‘transsexualism’ as political identities has demonstrated the apparent paradox of 
building (fixed) identity upon the impossibility of any (fixed) identity.9 It is indeed in this 
context that two theories on gender emerged: the essentialist theory, which suggests that 
the gender assigned at birth is biological and cannot be changed, pointing to the 
immutability of sex; and the social constructionist theory, which suggests that gender is a 
socially constructed category and may be different from the biologically assigned sex.10  
 
Throughout the short history of transgender theory and studies, different models of 
transgender citizenship have been adopted. These models have provided a framework in 
which transgender and other non-binary people have been able to access their human 
rights and freedoms, albeit with limitations. The biological, medical and gender self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Michele Grigolo, ‘Sexualities And The ECHR: Introducing The Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 14 (5) European Journal of 
International Law. 
10 Matthew Gayle, ‘Female By Operation Of Law: Feminist Jurisprudence And The Legal Imposition Of Sex’ (2006) 12 William and 
Mary Journal of  Women and  Law, 737.  
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determination models that are available in different societies provide different levels of 
protection in the law and remain debated in the theory for their apparent limitations. The 
first two in particular – the biological and medical models of transgender recognition – 
are largely based on the sex-versus-gender discourse, whereas the third category – the 
gender self-determination model of transgender recognition – very much focuses on the 
perceived gender of the individual concerned.  
 
The biological model suggests that gender should be determined by a person’s biology.11 
This means that a person’s sex and gender are identical and any variation from those 
established norms would be understood as unnatural and deviant.12 Similarly, the medical 
model seeks strict conformity with biological sex and the only way it allows a deviation 
is to define gender non-conformity as a condition that should be treated through medical 
science.13 Once the sex is corrected, the medical model aligns itself with the biological 
model, in that sex and gender become identical again. From the perspective of the 
protection of transgender rights, the biological model fundamentally disregards the 
transgender concept, as it considers gender-crossing fraudulent and improper 
behaviour.14 On the other hand, the medical model accepts transgression, but captures 
such a possibility under the medical deviance framework through which legal redress for 
transgender persons is made possible. Furthermore, the medical model allowed medical 
science to become heavily involved in the legal decision-making with regards to 
changing and legally recognising persons’ newly acquired genital organs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All ER 33. 
12 James J. Hughes, ‘Beyond The Medical Model Of Gender Dysphoria To Morphological Self-Determination’ [2006] Lahey Clinic 
Medical Ethics Journal. 
13 Chapter 2. 
14 Chapter 2. 
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Supporters of the medical model argue that this model has helped transgender persons 
from an early stage to acquire social acceptance.15 For a long time, it was also understood 
as the only way through which transgender persons could access human rights. This 
assumption developed an over-reliance on medical evidence for the recognition of 
transgender citizenship and encouraged activism against such interference.16 The 10th 
and most recent version of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) contains a code for 
‘gender identity disorder’ that includes concepts of ‘transsexualism’, dual-role 
transvestism, other gender identity disorders, and gender incongruence.17 Because the 
term ‘disorder’ is at the centre of the classification, the ICD-10 has been challenged by 
transgender groups18 and some human rights mechanisms have been pulling away from 
supporting the model too.19 
 
A third model is an alternative to both the biological and the medical models – a way of 
recognising non-binary identities. This model allows the ‘self-determination’ of a gender. 
This model is also referred to as a ‘reformist’ model that aspires to reform old notions of 
sex and gender through which transgender citizenship can be realized.20 Under the 
‘reformist’ model, ‘gender is recognized as a fundamental aspect of human life, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Hughes (n 12). 
16 See for example Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (eds), The Transgender Studies Reader (1st edn, Taylor and Francis 2006). 
Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, and Shannon Price Minter (eds), Transgender Rights (University of Minnesota Press 2006). 
17 Drescher J, Cohen-Kettenis P, Winter S. ‘Minding the body: situating gender identity diagnoses in the ICD-11’ [2012] Int Rev 
Psychiatry, 24(6).  
18 Transgender Europe, ‘Position on the revision of the ICD 10’ (2013) TGEU; Also, World Health Organization, ‘The ICD-10 
Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders Diagnostic criteria for research’ (1993) World Health Organization.  
19 See for example A.P., Garson et Nicot v France App no 79885/12, 52471/13 et 52596/13 (ECtHR 6 April 2017).; Also Jens T. 
Theilen, ‘Depathologisation of Transgenderism and International Human Rights Law’ [2014] 14 Human Rights Law Review 1–16 
20 Andrew N. Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies Of Law (Cavendish Publishing 2002) 57. 
10 
 
every person has the capacity and inherent right to control’. 21  The gender self-
determination model aspires to rely on the basic acceptance and recognition of what its 
advocates assert is the essence of a human being – dignity and personhood. 
 
Historically, the first two models – biological and medical – of transgender recognition 
have been widely employed in the legal context, including in legislation and court 
decisions. The third model, on the other hand, is emplematic of constant tension between 
the law and the queer understanding of gender. Law (by nature), as understood in queer 
theory, requires the use of rigid forms of identity or fixed categories, while gender, being 
socially constructed, undermines the rigid foundation of the law. Nevertheless, recent 
legal developments in a few countries have shown judicial and legal policy 
advancements in recognising the gender self-determination model. Legal reforms 
undertaken in countries including Argentina, Denmark, Malta and Ireland, among others, 
have provided an opportunity for transgender people to have their gender legally 
recognized without medical intervention.22 The ‘third gender’ has also been recognized 
by the Supreme Court of Nepal, which, founding its reasoning on international human 
rights law and jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, concluded the ‘third gender’ had a 
right to be recognized in law.23  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Hughes (n 12). 
22 Transgender Europe, ‘Argentina’S Gender Identity Law As Approved By The Senate Of Argentina’ (2012) 
<http://tgeu.org/argentina-gender-identity-law/> accessed 10 August 2015.; Amnesty International, 'Denmark Takes Key Step 
Towards Destigmatizing Transgender People' (2016) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/denmark-transgender-
decision/> accessed 19 October 2016.;  Transgender Europe, 'Malta Adopts Ground-Breaking Trans And Intersex Law' (2015) 
<http://tgeu.org/malta-adopts-ground-breaking-trans-intersex-law/> accessed 3 May 2015.; Transgender Equality Network Ireland, 
'Legal Gender Recognition In Ireland' (2016) <http://www.teni.ie/page.aspx?contentid=586> accessed 9 December 2016. 
23 Pant v Nepal (n 4) 
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Transgender rights and prisons 
 
While it is important to recognize the limitations, one should also acknowledge the 
progress made on the recognition of SOGI rights internationally through soft-law 
mechanisms. Indeed, the appointment of the UN mandate holder on SOGI marks a key 
shift in international human rights law towards LGBTIQ people generally, representing 
the worldwide recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity rights. Shifting 
attitudes towards transgender people are also evident through the progress in countries’ 
legal reforms that include gender self-determination as a key priority and attempts to 
eradicate discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity by 
adopting laws against discrimination.  
 
Similar debates, however, have yet to be intensified in the context of prisons, where, 
although some progress has been made, the area remains under-researched. The general 
protection framework has over the last few years developed safeguard mechanisms for 
LGBTIQ prisoners, but progress in this area and the application of human rights law has 
been slower due to difficulties associated with prison policies and governance generally. 
 
Indeed, broadly speaking, the expansion in the recognition of transgender identities has 
had very little impact on the way prison systems treat transgender prisoners in individual 
countries. In fact, the way in which transgender prisoners are treated is determined by 
how they are treated and protected in the law of that particular society. A brief survey of 
policies shows that even in countries where the gender self-determination model has been 
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adopted, similar policy changes have not been incorporated into the prison context. This 
means that even if some countries have managed to bring queer theory and law together 
for the protection of transgender persons, in the prison context this still proves 
challenging. In particular, issues of transgender prisoners’ housing and access to basic 
rights, including the means of gender expression, the right to health and freedom from ill-
treatment. remain debated. It is clear that even where a gender-determination model is 
adopted at national level, a degree of confusion is still common among authorities over 
how to treat transgender individuals in society, but it is heightened by prison policies, 
structures and institutions that further marginalize those already in situations of 
vulnerability.  
 
International human rights law provides a rich jurisprudence on the issues of the 
detention of men, women and children. The core human rights instruments of the UN, as 
well as regional standards from Africa, the Americas and Europe, also provide broad 
opportunities for the protection of human rights of people in detention. In Asian and 
Islamic texts on human rights, protection mechanisms are also legislated. There is now a 
more robust system of international monitoring mechanisms over prisons too (the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT), the Sub-committee for 
the Prevention of Torture (SPT), the European Committee on the Prevention of Torture 
(CPT)), in some cases linked with national-level mechanisms (the National Preventative 
Mechanism (NPM)). However, in addition to other limitations inherent in such 
mechanisms, almost all the instruments refer to the binary model of the sexes (men 
versus women), leaving the concept of gender under-explored. (One such example is 
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indeed the inclusion of gender as opposed to traditional term ‘sex’ in the list of non-
discrimination grounds). International human rights law does not yet offer sufficient 
guidance for non-binary genders in the prison context. In fact, prisons are among the only 
environment where where international human rights law becomes unable to extend the 
protection mechanisms beyond the binary systems. The resulting greater invisibility of 
transgender people, including prisoners, contributes to an absence of data and general 
knowledge on sexual diversity in the prison context, making the ‘sexual minorities’ 
group even more vulnerable to the effects of ignorance, including violence, expressed 
both in law and in practice. 
 
Establishing international legal norms is an extensive process that requires complex 
approaches not only from individual countries and alliances of countries, but also from 
the affected and interested groups themselves. Making changes to already established 
norms has proved particularly challenging in the context of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. The LGBTIQ community is small, isolated, fragile and under threat almost by 
definition. The history of the development of international human rights law shows the 
immense difficulty of negotiating human rights treaties with the member states of the UN 
or other regional inter-governmental organizations. While it is not the purpose of this 
research to propose any specific standard on the SOGI rights in society and prisons, it is 
very much aimed at understanding and reflecting on the protection frameworks, both in 
society and in places of detention. The case of transgender rights is a good example to 
demonstrate the limitations of international human rights law and the amendments 
needed to enable it to accommodate non-binary identities. Hence an analysis of the 
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concept of gender in the social sciences, detention and international law will be provided.  
 
Terminology used in this thesis 
 
This thesis surveys literature from different time periods, from the beginning of the 20th 
century to present day. During this period, covering almost a century, terms and 
references in relation to transgender people have developed and changed drastically. 
Terms that were pivotal and illustrated breakthroughs in the medical or sociological 
sciences in the early 20th century are now considered stigmatising and out-dated, and 
new terms have been introduced to more accurately reflect gender identity or expression. 
Even during the lifetime of this thesis, which commenced in 2013, there has been a 
dramatic shift in the application of terms in queer theory, transgender studies and, most 
importantly, in international human rights law. The field of transgender studies is rather 
dynamic, with its philosophy of embracing the diversity of identities and self-perception 
of gender. Fixed terms can, and do, constrain people to categories, which may prevent 
them from moving across identities and genders. Hence, the terms in the field are living 
and evolving on a regular basis.  
 
To accurately reflect the developments in the fields of queer and transgender theory and 
human rights law, this thesis employs a number of terms. While not all societies around 
the world recognize the term ‘transgender’, the literature has shown a rich culture of ‘the 
other’ gender. This thesis does not intend to analyse all variations of non-binary gender, 
but it does examine the terms that have accompanied the progression of transgender 
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identities in the context of international human rights law. This thesis will provide the 
historical background of the terms ‘transsexual’ and ‘transgender’, as well as the current 
discourse on non-binary identities. In this thesis, terms such as ‘transgender’ and ‘non-
binary gender’ will be used to describe gender non-conforming people. In places where 
term ‘transsexual’ is used, it either expresses the view of the original author or refers to 
the period of time when that term was actively used (i.e. the period of the biological and 
medical models of gender recognition in law). In those cases, the term ‘transsexual’ will 
be used in quotation marks.   
 
This thesis examines gender identity and transgender people’s rights. It therefore mainly 
analyses the theories around gender identity and recognition. It does not specifically 
discuss sexual orientation or sexuality in the rights context. However, due to the 
intrinsically intertwined nature of the concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity, 
the thesis will make reference to sexual orientation when necessary and as relevant for 
the thesis. For historical reasons, sexual orientation has progressed much further than 
gender-identity rights. Therefore, the thesis will only refer to sexual orientation when 
relevant in the context of gender identity. Sexual orientation is understood to refer to 
‘each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and 
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or 
more than one gender.’24 While gender identity is understood to refer to ‘each person’s 
deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not 
correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Yogyakarta Principles - Principles On The Application Of International Human Rights Law In Relation To Sexual Orientation And 
Gender Identity (‘Yogyakarta Principles’, 2006) <http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en> accessed 11 January 2014. 
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(which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by 
medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, 
speech and mannerisms.’25 When mentioned together, ‘sexual orientation and gender 
identity’ will be referred to as ‘SOGI’ rights. 
 
The term ‘gender non-conforming’ will be used to refer to people whose gender 
expression is different from conventional expectations of masculinity and femininity.26 
Not all gender non-conforming people identify as transgender; nor are all transgender 
people gender non-conforming. Terms such as ‘gender-queer’, ‘gender-fluid’ and ‘non-
binary’ describe a person who identifies not with the male/female binary but somewhere 
outside or between.27 Those terms will be used to describe non-conformity and non-
congruence with the imposed binary framework of sex and gender.  
 
Other terms referring to individuals will be also used. These include ‘lesbians’ – women 
who sexually, physically and romantically feel attracted to individuals of the same 
gender;28 ‘gay’ – men who sexually, physically and romantically feel attracted to 
individuals of the same gender;29 ‘bisexual’ – individuals who sexually, physically and 
romantically feel attracted to individuals of more than one gender;30 and ‘transgender’ – 
an umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ibid. 
26 GLAAD Media Reference Guide - Transgender' (GLAAD, 2017) <http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender> accessed 16 
September 2016. 
27 ibid. 
28 Yogyakarta Principles, 2006.  
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
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what is typically associated with the sex they were assigned at birth.31 People under the 
‘transgender’ umbrella may describe themselves using one or more of a wide variety of 
terms, including ‘transgender’.32 Though this thesis does not focus on intersex people, it 
will make references to them in some places; therefore, it is important to stipulate that 
intersex people are those born with physical sex characteristics that do not fit medical 
norms for female or male bodies or, as defined earlier, ‘Intersex people are born with 
physical, hormonal or genetic features that are neither wholly female nor wholly male; or 
a combination of female and male; or neither female nor male’.33 Another such term used 
in the thesis, though does not specifically focus on it, is ‘queer’, which is used in two 
ways. One is to refer to people who are not heterosexual. The other refers to those who 
do not see themselves as belonging to the socially accepted binary categories of sexual 
orientation and gender identity; rather, queer people see both the spectrum and identities 
as fluid.34 To save space, abbreviations will also be used: LGBTIQ – for ‘lesbian, gay, 
transgender, bisexual, intersex and queer’ – when referring to individuals’ rights, and 
SOGI – for ‘sexual orientation or gender identity’ – when referring to those rights in law. 
This thesis also employs term ‘sexual minority’ or ‘sexual minorities’ referring a 
collective group of LGBTIQ groups. This term is used in places where literature is vague 
about specific identities of the various groups. The presumption in those cases is made 
that literature or standards apply to all ‘sexual minorities’.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 ibid. 
32 ‘GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender’ (note 26). 
33 Munira Ali, Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray, Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, Sir Nigel Rodley, Clara Sandoval, Ahmed Shaheed (n 8). 
34 ARC International, IBAHRI, ILGA, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity And Expression, And Sex Characteristics At The 
Universal Periodic Review’ (ARC International, IBAHRI, ILGA 2016). 
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Different legal terms are also used to reflect different types of detention, including police 
arrest, military, immigration, psychiatric, criminal justice (a category that includes police 
detention, pre-trial, remand) and post-trial detention. Each of these legal terms has a 
specific meaning and individuals who fall under each category enjoy specific rights. In 
this thesis, when referring to ‘prisons’, ‘criminal justice detention’, ‘closed spaces’ or 
‘institutions’, these are to be understood only as places where individuals are housed 
after conviction, and consequently ‘prisoner’ or ‘detainee’ to persons who are serving 
sentences. Despite many similarities between prisons and some of the other institutions 
mentioned above, this thesis does not analyse any other closed institutions, but only 
prisons as defined above. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
Part I of the thesis, consisting of the first two chapters, addresses theoretical questions on 
queer theory and the law. Chapter One surveys the concept of transgender as an 
identitarian and political phenomenon. It focuses on understanding the positioning of 
transgender theory and its origins and relations with wider queer and feminist theories. 
This chapter also provides an analysis of sexual diversity in the prison context and an 
understanding of transgender and queer concept in prisons. The two main stages of 
transgender analysis – deviance theory and invisibility – are described to lay the ground 
for a discussion of sexuality in prisons.  
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Chapter Two addresses the question of transgender recognition in law. It explores the 
variations of the concept of transgender citizenship in policy and law and analyses three 
models of legal recognition of transgender identities: first, the application of transgender 
theory to law resulting in the biological model; second, the relationship between medical 
science, transgender theory and the law, forming the model of medical recognition of 
transgender identity; and third and most recently, the gender self-determination model 
adopted thus far by a handful of countries. The gender self-determination model 
challenges strict binary identities (i.e., the other two models) and creates a space in which 
travel through fixed genders is a possibility. Chapter Two will offer further analysis of 
gender self-determination and its harmonization with the law.  
 
Part II of the thesis, comprising Chapters Three and Four, continues to analyse 
transgender citizenship and states' obligation to provide access to rights and freedoms on 
an equal basis. Chapter Three asks whether there are or should be specific rights for 
transgender persons and, if so, what rights, or whether instead principles of human rights 
are the core upon which the protection of transgender persons should be based. Chapter 
Three takes the obligation of respect for human dignity, equality and non-discrimination 
as the gateway to consideration of a wide range of rights for transgender persons, 
including the right to privacy, medical care and the right to be recognized before the law.  
 
Chapter Four surveys international human rights law, focusing on UN jurisprudence and 
regional human rights mechanisms (where progress has been made in advancing human 
rights law in relation to transgender rights), in order to understand the relationship 
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between transgender rights and international human rights law. It examines the journey 
towards wider SOGI rights within the UN human rights mechanisms and suggests that 
these rights are inherently part of the international human rights framework. The chapter 
analyses the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) debates on the recent SOGI norm 
making. Four resolutions adopted by the Council and the appointment of the UN mandate 
holder on discrimination on the basis of SOGI will also be analysed. 
 
Chapters Five and Six, which constitute Part III of the thesis, examine the concepts of 
transgender and other non-binary identities in the prison context. Chapter Five will 
provide a narrative analysis of the lived experiences of transgender prisoners, and it seeks 
to position transgender and non-binary persons (as the principal group of people 
undermining the binary model of the sexes) in prison. Significant consideration here is 
given to the standards for treatment of prisoners and how they are applied to transgender 
prisoners. This chapter will offer an overview of the journey of transgender prisoners, 
from entering a prison through their struggles during their incarceration, to demonstrate 
contemporary manifestations of their lived experiences, change that has occurred over 
time, and the impact of that change on the rights of transgender prisoners.  
 
Chapter Six of the thesis is the principal part of the case study, which demonstrates a 
constant tension between non-binary identities and binary structures, laws and systems. 
While the first four chapters set the theoretical and legal context around transgender 
citizenship, Chapter Six attempts to apply that analysis to international human rights law, 
treatment of prisoners and detention. It argues that the advancement in the recognition of 
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gender self-determination in the law on the one hand, and the advancement of prison 
reforms on the other, have had a limited impact on the global prison policy-making 
process in the context of transgender prisoners. This chapter analyses existing alternative 
frames of transgender rights protection and examines whether the same frames are 
applicable to the prison context. It further examines the available options in which non-
binary identities are dealt with in modern prison policies and examines transgender 
prisoners and situations of vulnerability. Chapter Six ends with the conclusion that, 
although protection frames might be similar in society and prisons if gender self-
determination means a constant transgression of the heteronormative axis of sex, the 
realization of self-determination in the prison context is currently impossible, which also 
means that the right to gender self-determination in prison is indeed questionable. This, 
however, does not minimize or render infeasible the important need for the underlying 
principles of human rights law to be applied to transgender prisoners.   
 
This thesis concludes by suggesting several explanations for the trend in recent history 
towards the recognition of rights for transgender prisoners and their treatment. Among 
the questions identified for further study are (1) whether the development in general 
human rights law in recognising SOGI rights has been matched by corresponding 
changes in the area of prison policies and, most importantly, in state practices, and (2) 
whether the development of the law will maintain this progressive trajectory in the 
future. 
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PART ONE 
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Chapter I  
Transgender and Non-binary Identities 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Throughout history, transgender identity has been shunted around and cut through with a 
surgical scalpel. Rejection of non-binary identities, criminalization of wider ‘sexual 
minority’ groups and pathologization of transgender people have influenced transgender 
theory as it is understood today. While the concept of transgender identity has grown 
gradually in multiple disciplines, including sociological, feminist, medical and legal 
theories, it only started to form into a theory in its own right towards the end of the 20th 
century. Indeed, the fluidity of gender has existed in many cultures and societies over the 
centuries; however, capturing such fluidity within the framework of a specific term or 
concept has been a challenge for many researchers and authors.35  
 
In post-structuralist theory, the binary gender identifier has been mostly examined in the 
context of transgender people,36 commonly identified as a group that transgresses gender 
and sex categories. The view held by social constructionists on gender largely opposes 
the essentialist view of transgenderism. Namely, the social constructionists suggest that 
gender is a socially constructed category and may be different from the biologically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See for example, Gilbert Herdt (Ed), Third Sex, Third Genders: Beyond Sexual Dimorphis, in culture and History (Published by 
Zone Books 1996). 
36 James McGrath, ‘Are you a Boy or a Girl?  Show me your real ID’ (2009) 9 Nevada Law Journal. 
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assigned sex,37 whereas the essentialist view holds that the gender assigned at birth is 
biological and cannot be changed.38  
 
While such long-held view on the immutability of sex has affected legal and policy 
developments for decades, feminist, queer and, lately, transgender theories have been 
attempting to unpack the concepts of gender and sex. Transgender theory in particular 
has been interested in understanding non-binary gender identities through the lived 
experiences of transgender individuals. Such experiences play a crucial role in this thesis 
as it examines the application of international human rights to transgender persons and 
the limitations of the law itself in doing so. 
 
This chapter provides an examination of the foundations of sex and gender. In particular, 
it explores the binary character of law and sex in feminist and post-structural feminist 
theories. These theories indeed pioneered transgender research throughout the second 
half of the 20th century. Therefore, understanding the conundrum of the different terms, 
their origins and the influence of transgender studies development will serve as an 
introduction to the wider analysis of the application of international human rights law to 
non-binary identities. While the chapter does not focus on the concept of 
heteronormativity, it argues that ‘heteronormative gendering of spaces creates a kind of 
gender tyranny that regulates gender non-conformists and especially transgendered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Susan Hurley ’Sex and the social construction of gender: can feminism and evolutionary psychology be reconciled?’ in Jude 
Browne (Eds.) The future of gender (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
38 Wendy O’Brien, ‘Can International Human Rights Law Accommodate Bodily Diversity?’ (2015) 15 (1) Human Rights Law 
Review. 
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people.’39 Judith Butler’s ‘performativity theory’ is further employed to illustrate how 
fluidity of genders upset fixed gender categories. Examination of these categories is 
important as the thesis continues to build and provides further analysis on the limitations 
of the law, not only in recognising transgender citizenship, but also in providing access to 
the enjoyment of their rights and freedoms.  
 
This chapter offers a discussion of the relationship between transgender studies and 
feminist and queer theories. While acknowledging the tension introduced by non-binary 
categories for fixed identities, this chapter seeks common ground between those 
disciplines. This effort proves difficult, however, as the chapter evolves. For example, if 
non-binary identities are fluid, it means they oppose any kind of fixed categories. This 
can further mean that transgender or non-binary identities by nature undermine any 
identity, and specifically feminist studies, which are grounded in fixed categories. These 
tensions are discussed and analysed with a view to providing an understanding of the 
limitations of theory, which may or may not have had an impact on the establishment of 
the specific laws and protection guarantees for non-binary groups. 
 
An absence of theory on gender identity throughout the 20th century has meant that other 
disciplines, such as criminal justice, also have not paid much attention to issues of gender 
identity in the prison context. Any deviation from the sex assigned at birth, as well as 
same-sex sexual contact among consenting adults, was considered a criminal act in most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Petra L. Doan, Why Question Planning Assumptios and Practices About Queer Spaces  in Petra L. Doan (Eds) Queerying Planning: 
Challenging Heteronormative Assumptions and Reframing Planning Practice (Taylor & Francis Group, 2011.; Also, Petra L. 
Doan, The tyranny of gendered spaces – reflections from beyond the gender dichotomy (2010), 17:5, 635-654 Gender, Place & 
Culture. 
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countries throughout the first half of the 20th century. Therefore, little or no progress was 
made in studying same-sex or gender variations in the prison context. To illustrate this 
neglect, this chapter will outline the invisibility and deviant phases of transgender 
prisoners. It will provide an analysis of prison sexuality. It is hoped that such a study will 
set a solid theoretical ground for illustrating the boundaries of the law when it comes to 
its application to non-binary gender identities both in society and in prison. 
 
2. Transsexualism and Transgenderism as Identitarian Categories 
 
Transgender, transsexual, transvestite, trans*, gay drag, butch lesbian, queer, native 
American berdache, Indian hijra, Indonesian waria, Thai kathoey, Brazilian travesti, 
Arabian xanith, Polynesian mahu, Maori whakawahine and others, all refer to individuals 
who violate imposed binary gender and sex systems.40 These different terms signify 
cultural particularities within which non-binary gender persons live. Over the years, a 
greater congruence has been sought to develop a single term that would capture the 
experiences of all people with variant gender. This and the next chapter show, however, 
that such attempts have failed and that capturing gender variance within a single identity 
has been impossible, particularly from a legal perspective. 41  Indeed, transgender 
identities capture the varying experiences that people have in reflecting transgender 
embodiment. This can be a space created by three, four or more gender lines. Among 
many independent or unpredictably related gender categories is a model of gender in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Paisley  Currah, ‘Gender Pluralism under the Transgender Umbrella’ in ‘Transgender rights’, Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, 
Shannon Price Minter (Eds.), ‘Transgender rights’ (The University of Minnesota Press, 2006) 16. 
41 ibid. 
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which each gender term has its own axis in space.42 That was the view of Eve Sedgwick, 
who inspired other writers by describing gender variance as a ‘gender galaxy’.43  
 
Notwithstanding such variance of gender in different societies, terms such as 
‘transsexual’ and ‘transgender’ have played an important role in advancing non-binary 
gender to date. The two terms formed at different stages in the historical journey of 
gender incongruence, with specific meanings in their context. A quick study of both 
concepts is necessary to situate both terms within this thesis. A common feature will 
nevertheless be identified between these terms to build the later problematization of the 
transgender identity concept.  
 
2.1. The history of the ‘transsexualism’  
 
The term ‘transsexual’ was coined by a medical professional in the early 1950s. Historic 
records show that Dr Harry Benjamin, a physician and endocrinologist from New York, 
US, in 1953 gave the name ‘transsexual’ to a problem he called ‘gender confusion’.44 
Benjamin described the ‘transsexual’s’ situation as ‘seemingly ineradicable and an 
intensely painful conviction held by certain men and women that their physical and 
emotional makeup had been mismatched and that they are somehow women trapped in 
men’s bodies or vice versa’.45 In order to match the ‘emotional makeup’ of one’s 
understanding of gender to one’s sex, the term ‘transsexual’ was used to refer to those 
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requesting a sex change. Over time, the term ‘transsexual’ was used not just to refer to 
those who changed their biologically assigned sex but also to distinguish them from 
transvestites, who merely cross-dressed. 46  This differentiation was significant for 
Benjamin, who argued that his patients ‘were miserable in their original assigned 
genders’.47 Benjamin further argued that, by altering their bodies with hormones and 
surgery, he was allowing them to live as members of the other sex, hence ‘helping the 
transsexual community’.48 In his view, if a person with ‘gender confusion’ syndrome did 
not wish to undergo surgical sex change, he or she was not a true ‘transsexual’.49  
 
Various theorists offered definitions of ‘transsexual’ indicating that ‘transsexuals’ are 
persons with one anatomical sex, yet have an overwhelming belief that they are 
representatives of the opposite sex.50 A male ‘transsexual’ expresses that belief as being 
‘a woman trapped in a male body’ and a female ‘transsexual’ as being ‘a man trapped in 
a female body’.51 Accordingly, the ‘transsexual’ is a person in whom there is an 
incongruence between the anatomical sex and gender. Transgender theorists, such as 
Susan Stryker, also offer similar definitions of ‘transsexual’.52 Stryker, while explaining 
the differences between the terms, writes that ‘a transvestite was somebody who 
episodically changed into the clothes of the so-called “other sex”, and a “transsexual” 
was somebody who permanently changed genitals in order to claim membership in a 
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gender other than the one assigned at birth’.53  
 
The concept of ‘transsexuality’ was further developed and researched by German 
sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld,54 who in 1931 allegedly conducted the first reported sex-
change operation and attempted to explain the phenomenon.55 Despite this, sex change 
procedures were not widely known until Christine (George) Jorgensen’s much-publicized 
surgery in Denmark in 1952.56 Jorgensen’s case became one of the first recorded sex-
change cases in history.57 Despite such individual cases sporadically reported in the first 
half of 20th century, the concept of gender and sex remained largely underdeveloped.  
 
Nevertheless, these cases brought the idea of sex change into the public eye. As surgical 
interventions became more common, the focus shifted towards treatment, or rather to 
correcting the ‘physical error’ of transgender people who, as Benjamin described,58were 
‘trapped in the wrong body’. ‘Treating’ people through medical intervention (such as 
hormone therapy and surgery) turned ‘transsexuality’ into a medical condition, which 
could only be treated through medical intervention. The early terms of ‘transsexual’ and 
‘transsexualism’ retained the ‘intermediate sex’ connotations, as they specifically related 
to biological sex change.59 They pointed to a state of being in between two sexes.60 This 
is indeed interesting and indicative, because in the early literature, the term ‘transgender’ 
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is absent, which indicates firstly that the concept of gender was not developed by 
feminist theorists and, more importantly, that the term ‘transsexuality’ was a concern for 
the medical community, which was ‘correcting’ gender non-conformity by offering 
surgical sex change.  
 
Forcing people into the framework of ‘transsexuality’ meant that people were ‘corrected’ 
in order to ‘disappear’ and blend into heteronormative society either as men or as 
women.61 Early 20th-century literature shows that those who underwent sex-change 
surgery were trained to fit into a new identity – not as a trans-person or as non-binary, 
but as a man or a woman, a heteronormative category.62 Describing that oppressive 
aspect of early medical treatment in the USA, activists noted:  
transsexuals are encouraged to lie about their transsexual status. They are to 
define themselves as men or women, not transsexual men and women. 
Individuals are encouraged to invent personal histories on their chosen genders; 
female-to-male transsexuals, for example should speak about their lives as little 
boys.63  
 
The isolation of the term ‘transsexual’ within medical science gave way to a 
‘transsexual’ identity invented by medical professionals. This had a profoundly negative 
impact on transgender people, who were trapped in the ‘heterosexist legacy’, resulting in 
outrage in the transgender community.  
 
With the introduction of fixed sex categories and genders, term such as 
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‘heteronormativity’ and ‘heteronorm’ emerged. In literature, heteronormativity is 
understood as a discourse where women and men are seen as polar opposites, and whose 
characteristics exclude each other.64 At the same time, ‘heterosexual matrix, gender and 
heteronormativity work to construct men and women as two distinct classes of people.’65 
In this thesis, the concept of heteronormativity is used to demonstrate how sexualities 
and gender identities are expressed, organized and structured that does not necessarily fit 
the normative sex and gender systems.66 
 
The establishment of an identity-based movement for rights claims will be discussed 
further in Chapters One and Two. What is important to highlight here is that even today 
the term ‘transsexual’ remains strictly embodied in medical literature. ‘Transsexuals’ 
who had changed their sex were thus forced to blend into one or other of the sexes and 
did not have much basis on which to mobilize, let alone demand political rights and 
freedoms. This proved problematic, however, as many transgender people did not 
necessarily wish to identify themselves as heterosexual men or women, but rather wanted 
to express themselves in a preferred gender. Incensed at the forceful attempt to position 
transgender persons as strictly heterosexual men or women, transgender commentator 
Whittle has countered that ‘a trans person might be a butch, or a camp, a transgender or a 
transsexual, a male to female or female to male or a cross-dresser; they might in some 
parts of the world consider themselves a lady boy, katoey, or even the reclaimed Maori 
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identities whakawahine or wakatane’.67 What this meant is that over time, the term 
‘transsexual’ became associated with oppression and medical interference, with strict 
connotations of wanting to belong to the other sex. This, however, seemed far from the 
truth of the actual lives of transgender people, who only wanted to live in their desired 
gender, without much external intervention. As the ‘oppression’ against ‘transsexuals’ 
continued in the medical establishment, members of the transgender community started 
to develop identity terms that opposed medical interference. Soon, ‘transgender’ became 
a grassroots term, a term of empowerment and political activism.68 As Stryker defines it, 
‘a transgender was somebody who permanently changed social gender through the 
public presentation of self, without recourse to genital transformation’. 69  Such a 
definition creates further differences that go beyond the ‘transsexual’ and ‘transgender’ 
concepts and will be discussed below. Before focusing on that issue, however, it is 
important to understand the emergence of ‘transgender’ as a concept and an identity.  
 
2.2. The history of transgender identity 
 
The emergence of the term ‘transgender’ can be linked to the development of the concept 
of gender as a social construct, detaching sex and gender as identical and established 
binary categories. The concept of transgender has remained an evolving one in 
sociological, anthropological, feminist and legal literature.70 And, as it evolves, the 
definition of transgender seeks to encompass gender queer, cross-dressers, and 
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‘transsexuals,’71 celebrating all transgender persons who by any means transgress binary 
gender norms.72 Such a varied definition of transgender is closely linked to the notion of 
‘gender queer’ which rejects the binary gender system, thus freely mixing and matching 
gendered behaviours and characteristics associated with men and women.73  
 
Though the term ‘transgender’ was first used in the 1980s by Virginia Prince, a Southern 
Californian advocate for freedom of gender expression, its meaning as a political 
identitarian umbrella term came from a pamphlet by Leslie Feinberg, ‘Transgender 
Liberation: A Movement Whose Time has Come’.74 The term has since been used as an 
overarching term to describe people who, in one way or another, cross or transcend sex 
and gender boundaries, whether or not they undergo a medical sex change. Having 
emerged through the transgender community itself, the term has carried a political 
meaning of liberation for the transgender movement. In the words of Stryker, the term 
‘transgender’ is a ‘pangender’ umbrella ‘encompassing transsexuals, drag queens, 
butches, hermaphrodites, cross-dressers, masculine women, effeminate men, sissies, 
tomboys, and anybody else willing to be interpolated by the term who felt compelled to 
answer the call to mobilization.’75 The term ‘transgender’ has evolved to refer to all 
identities or practices that cross over or move between or otherwise question socially 
constructed sex/gender boundaries.76 Such a definition accommodates persons with any 
gender identity and provides a flexible understanding of one’s gender. It is probably the 
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reason why popular advocacy literature uses the term ‘transgender’ as an ‘umbrella term 
to describe people who ... have gender identities, expressions, or behaviours not 
traditionally associated with their birth sex’.77  
 
Despite the comprehensive social nature of the definition of ‘transgender’, critics argue 
that, while useful in many contexts, the term lacks inclusiveness and is imprecise in some 
cases.78 This could be especially true in legal theory, in which the fluid nature of the term 
has been contested.79 Others also argue that, although progressive, the definition of 
transgender remains controversial and needs more clarity in order to provide full 
enjoyment of human rights and freedoms via international human rights law and gender 
identity.80 Whether the absence of standards on the protection of the rights of transgender 
people is due to an unclear definition of ‘transgender’ or gender identity is discussed in 
the next two chapters.  
 
As the term evolved, some transgender authors started to argue that ‘transgender’ had 
become a burden with its ‘share of hurdles’81 or that the term was now a huge and 
imprecise container for gender identities.82 The term included any possible variation of 
gender, as well as sexual identities. Such a widening of the definition itself had an impact 
on some transgender writers, who argued that broadening the definition might have 
weakened the transgender identity, ‘especially when transgender rights become identical 
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to transsexual rights, if not the same’.83 In the absence of legal recognition of these 
identities, such a division created a further divide in the transgender community, 
indicating further dissidence among queer and transgender activists and theorists.  
 
For example, Riki Wilchins argues that much of the advocacy for transgender rights has 
focused on hate crimes against ‘transsexuals’, access to hormones and surgery, name-
change laws, insurance reimbursement and changes to birth certificates.84 Wilchins 
argues that under the banner of ‘transgender’, advocates and activists have focused 
mostly on human rights challenges that are less associated with gender, and more about a 
fixed categorization of the sexes.85 And indeed, in a society where rights belong to 
identities, having an identity is important for transgender people too, in order to claim 
political status and human rights. But Wilchins does not stop there. She further argues 
that gender identity, because it is a fixed identity, ignores gender expression.86 Wilchins's 
point reveals the tension within LGBTIQ groups at that time. What is important from her 
argument, however, is the clear difference that existed in the understanding of 
‘transsexual’ and transgender persons based on identity categories. Hence, gender 
expression as it is understood now was not associated with a ‘clean’ identity, which was 
trying to fit within heteronormative societal structures. Indeed, that artificial 
differentiation between categories proved counter-productive for community 
mobilization aimed at achieving recognition in law. 
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And if ‘gender identity’ tends to privilege notions of a clear, coherent and unitary 
identity over conceptions of blurred identifications87, then the dominant dualist model of 
gender identity in most societies is at odds with social research documenting ‘third 
genders’.88 Moreover, some authors also note that gender identity, unless a ‘transsexual’ 
person is post-operative, remains biologically based. 89  This claim can serve as a 
justification for refusing recognition of a person's gender identity without surgical sex 
change.  
 
Indeed, the term ‘transgender’ emerged to counter-balance the impact of the application 
of medical science to gender-variant people, forcing them to conform to the 
heteronormative categories of gender. At the same time, the concept of ‘transgender’ still 
implies some kind of identity, association with either of the two genders or sexes –hence 
the criticism from scholars who hold the view that the fluid nature of transgender means 
no static identities.90  
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2.3. The emerging identities of non-binary gender  
 
Over the years, strict gender norms have yielded to a relaxation of gender boundaries, to 
meet the needs of all transgender persons. Even more so, it allows gender plurality, in 
which, as argued by Surya Monro, post-structuralism can be utilized to understand the 
construction of gender and analyse social structure.91 Gender self-determination, argues 
Monro, calls for a social structuring based on the principles of equality, diversity and the 
right to self-determination.92 Building on Monro’s arguments, Stephen Whittle notes that 
‘the presumption that has been made by most academic writers in the area is that I and 
people like me are demanding that we be legally recognized in the gender role in which 
we live’.93 Whittle challenges the construction of gender and applies Kate Bornstein to 
his analysis of the concept of gender fluidity. He asserts that there are rules to gender but 
that rules can be broken; ambiguity does exist and how we provide for that ambiguity 
matters; and that even more than ambiguity, there is fluidity.94 Further citing Bornstein, 
Whittle claims that gender fluidity recognizes no borders or rules of gender, and that 
fluidity provides for any number of genders.95 Thus, he concludes, to be fluid in one’s 
gender challenges the oppressive process of gender and the power processes that use 
gender to maintain power structures.96  
 
Indeed, as Bornstein argues, the transgender person as a gender outlaw calls into question 
the gendered system on which people and societies base major aspects of their lives. 
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Bornstein offers a view of real-life gender fluidity: a refusal to be categorized by the 
limited gender roles that are imposed, however without willingness to be invisible.97 
What does this mean in today’s legal culture? Here, Bornstein rejects the idea of a third 
sex, and instead seeks to create a third space, a space outside of gender.98 Here, the 
problems with the legal construct or, more specifically, with heteronomativity, begin. 
Whittle challenges the law by asking ‘is there any reason whatsoever to have a gendered 
basis to law?’99 He acknowledges the need for acknowledgment of ‘sex’ in certain 
circumstances through law, but argues that this is not dependent upon how that people 
identify or portray their gender.100 Whittle seeks to employ a gender self-determination 
argument that could challenge the theoretical institutionalization of the heteronormativity 
of both concepts – sex and gender. He goes further in his criticism on the function of the 
law, in particular as it relates to transgender people, and notes that the vision of the law is 
to provide a fair and just context in which people can simply live. However, he has 
observed, the function of ‘placing socially responsible citizens outside a legal framework 
continues to illustrate that the law continues to be an antiquated, moralistic tool based 
upon conservative understandings that lack vision’.101  
 
Whittle’s reasoning is influenced by post-structuralist theory and queer analysis of 
gender. Yet, what is important in his writings is the deconstruction of the law from a 
gender perspective. He takes a specific position to criticize the function of the law in the 
context of the protection of transgender citizenship and argues that, as it stands, the law 
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does not provide such a space. Indeed, Whittle’s analysis of a deconstruction of the law 
to allow space for gender self-determination and gender fluidity is widely supported by 
transgender legal scholars. Dean Spade, for example, has argued: 
attorneys working for trans equality have to skate this delicate line, de-
medicalizing legal approaches to gender identity where we can, educating medical 
providers on how to provide medical services to gender transgressive people in 
ways that respect and encourage individual expression rather than conformity to 
binary gender, and also fighting for increased access to medical care for all 
people.102 
 
Here, Spade, who practises law as well as working in academia, attempts to strike a fine 
balance between what is in the best interest of the client at a particular time and how to 
move forward in advocating for a gender self-determination model. 
 
Like Spade and Whittle, Monro also calls for a space for gender in legal discourse. This 
in fact resonates with Bornstein’s idea of a space outside gender categories, but most 
importantly goes beyond structures and categories of identities to allow for a non-binary 
understanding of gender – an understanding that most severely challenges the binary 
character of the law. In discussing gender pluralism, Monro analyses mainstream models 
of citizenship to argue that in order to obtain rights and freedoms for gender-variant 
people, these models of citizenship can be an important catalyst. Monro further borrows 
Turner and Hamilton’s definition of citizenship, noting, ‘Citizenship can be defined as a 
collection of rights and duties determining socio-political membership, and providing 
access to resources and benefits.’103 She then employs examples of citizenship such as 
(1) civic republicanism, (2) liberalism and (3) communitarianism to develop various 
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models of transgender citizenship. 104  Monro is well aware of the limitations and 
difficulties that each of these models of citizenship carry for developing models of 
transgender citizenship given the limitations of mainstream approaches, in particular the 
overall tendency to place in the foreground certain types of (non-transgender) subjects 
and to overlook structural change that would support equality.105  
 
Monro further analyses Plummer’s notion of intimate citizenship, as well as Evan’s 
sexual citizenship with its emphasis on self-determination and its concern with multiple, 
overlapping discourses relevant to transgender citizenships, and states that equality and 
gender self-determination are the most important elements for achieving transgender 
citizenship.106 These aspects are crucial to understanding the various frames offered by 
international human rights law. 
 
Transgender studies have evolved in a most dynamic way. Fixed identities have been 
countered by fluid identities, while binary gender norms have been challenged by non-
binary gender identities. Not much academic contribution has been made so far to situate 
such identities in the ‘transsexual’/transgender dichotomy. However, it is largely 
understood that non-binary identities oppose categorization of gender and seek respect 
for gender fluidity. In contemporary social and cultural theory, the notion of ‘identity’ as 
complete and straightforward is challenged not only in transgender, queer and feminist 
studies, but also in other disciplines. For example, Matthew Waites, in his critique of 
gender identity and sexual orientation, relies on Stuart Hall’s arguments to focus on 
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processes of ‘identification’ rather than ‘identity’ in order to grasp the always-incomplete 
process of relating subjectivity to social identity through a process he calls 
‘articulation.’107 This echoes Butler’s argument with regards to the discursive formation 
of gender identities. As Butler famously stated, ‘identity is performatively constituted by 
the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results,’108 – meaning that, despite the final 
result of such performativity (i.e. that the gender is real), this outcome is only possible 
due to the power that is exercised through discourse.109 
 
This chapter attempts to provide an analysis of the post-structuralist theory of gender and 
its application to transgender studies. The effort aims to provide a better understanding of 
the transgender and ‘transsexual’ dichotomy, their origins in feminist and queer theory 
and relations with those disciplines, which have determined the current state of the 
international protection framework for transgender people’s rights. 
 
3. Post-Structuralism: Understanding Transgender Through the Prism of Queer 
Theory 
 
Teresa de Lauretis first advocated the term ‘queer’ in 1991, and she charged it with the 
responsibility of countering the masculinist bias latent in that naturalized and seemingly 
gender-sensitive phrase, ‘lesbian and gay’.110 Since then, queer theory has developed 
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through the writings of Butler, Sedgwick and others who have fiercely challenged 
feminist theorists over the subjects of gender and sexuality.  
 
The first seeds of queer theory can be found in postmodernism and post-structuralism, 
which developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Postmodernist and post-structuralist concepts 
are regarded as something after, something beyond what has already been experienced or 
accomplished. 111  To avoid ambiguity, early structuralist theorists, such as Louis 
Althusser, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan and Ferninand de Saussure, laid the 
groundwork for the post-structuralist context. Reacting to the structuralism, Michel 
Foucault deeply engaged with post-structuralism theory to denaturalise the dominant 
understandings of sexual identity.112 Foucault, in his work The History of Sexuality, 
developed a theory of sexual discourse based on the argument that such discourse 
decides what is acceptable and unacceptable.113 Foucault further argued that sexual 
discourse generates the belief that heterosexuality and homosexuality are the only 
options, in which one is acceptable and the other unacceptable. He further argued that 
individuals are subject to regulatory practices (discursively constituted), and mainly 
defined by medical parameters (positing itself as a science, medicine holds dominance 
over knowledge).114 Foucault showed how sexology as a medical science affected the 
construction of novel subjectivities through what he called typologization and 
interiorization. 115  Considering homosexuality as one of the forms of sexuality, he 
asserted, ‘it [homosexuality] was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of 
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interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul’.116 Foucault’s point about subjectivity 
and medical science is important in the context of transsexuality and medical science, 
which will be discussed in Chapter Two. However, what is important to highlight here is 
Foucault’s wider project on power, in which he attempts to unpack the relationships 
between socially constructed subjects and social institutions. In such work, he argues that 
sexuality (socially constructed through discourse) is a disciplinary technique that 
provides power.117  
 
Indeed, postmodernism and post-structuralism are organized around destabilization 
through deconstruction.118 And it is evident that in order for feminists to fight against 
fixed categories, they needed both deconstruction and reconstruction, destabilizing 
meaning.119 It was Jacques Derrida, the French philosopher and post-structural theorist, 
who introduced the new practice called deconstruction, to help accomplish decentring.120 
This marked a new era of postmodernism and post-structuralism in which gender was 
defined as a system of meanings and symbols, along with the rules, privileges and 
punishments pertaining to their use for power and sexuality (masculinity and femininity, 
strength and vulnerability, action and passivity, dominance and submission).121  
 
Foucault’s concept of repressive power in discursive regimes of truth, and Derrida’s 
theory of deconstruction and notions of iterability, may have been the starting point for 
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Butler to start developing the concept of gender performativity.122 In fact, Butler, who is 
regarded as one of the founders of queer theory, writes that the term ‘queer’ 'will be 
revised, dispelled, rendered obsolete to the extent that it yields to the demands which 
resist the term precisely because of the exclusions by which it is mobilized.’123 In other 
words, the term ‘queer’ is constantly revised by yielding to demands that resist the term. 
Building on social constructionism and the deconstruction of bodies offered by Foucault 
and Derrida, Butler asserts that queer theory promotes the self as an alternative to wider 
social interaction.124 She argues that ‘if the term queer is to be a site of a collective 
contestation, the point of departure for a set of historical reflections and future 
imaginings, it will have no remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but 
always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of 
urgent and expanding political purposes’125. Some authors also argue that ‘queer’ 
describes those gestures or analytical models that dramatize incoherencies in the 
allegedly stable relations between chromosomal sex [sex as a fixed category], gender 
[social construction] and sexual desire [sexual orientation].126 
 
For David Halperin, like Butler, queer is a way of pointing ahead without knowing for 
certain what to point at. Halperin describes queer as a horizon of possibility whose 
precise extent and heterogenous scope cannot in principle be delimited in advance. He 
further explains that queer is always an identity under construction, a site of permanent 
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becoming: ‘utopic in its negativity, curving endlessly toward a realisation that its 
realisation remains impossible’127. Despite his fascination with queer theory, Halperin 
contended that it [queer theory] had no ‘essence’.128 In his book Saint Foucault: Towards 
a Gay Hagiography, he wrote ‘queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, 
the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. 
It is an identity without an essence’129 that does not designate a class of already 
objectified pathologies or perversions.130 Relying on Warner, he also remarks that 
fundamental indeterminacy makes queer a difficult object of study. Queer remains an 
ever ambiguous, always relational, ‘largely intuitive and half-articulate theory’.131 Alan 
McKee, however, contends that ‘queer is not an entirely empty signifier. It does have 
meanings and positional claims that are shared and recognized’.132 
 
3.1. Gender performativity theory 
 
Developing and building on what Foucault started, Butler notes that by defining 
heterosexuality and homosexuality on the grounds of sexual attraction for one or the 
other sex, sexual orientation and sex/gender positions become inextricably intertwined.133 
Butler rejected essentialist notions of sexual determination, arguing instead that bodies 
are forcibly produced through discourse.134 For a better understanding of the sociological 
structure of SOGI, she divided critics into two categories, essentialists and 
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constructionists:135 essentialists being those who adhere strictly to the biological sex 
binary, and constructionists those who argue that gender is a socially constructed 
category that is fluid in nature.136 
 
Butler argued that heterosexuality is naturalized by the performative repetition of 
normative gender identities. She has asserted that any ‘gender is the repeated stylization 
of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal 
over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.’137 In her 
initial publication ,Gender Trouble, Butler built on the repetitiveness of the performance 
of gender to argue gender as a performative category. She wrote, ‘the cultural matrix 
through which gender identity has become intelligible requires that certain kinds of 
“identities” cannot “exist” – that is, those in which gender does not follow from sex and 
those in which the practices of desire do not “follow” from either sex or gender.’138 
Butler rejects the authenticity of gender, stating that there is no ‘core’ that produces the 
reassuring signs of gender. She articulates that instead ‘there is no gender identity behind 
the expressions of gender’ and that ‘[i]dentity is performatively constituted by the very 
“expressions” that are said to be its results’.139 Here Butler differentiates between the 
expression, or performance of gender, and performativity of gender. To argue for the 
performative nature of gender, she employs the example of drag, when the performance 
of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender 
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that is being performed.140 She outlines three contingent dimensions of significant 
corporeality: anatomical sex, gender identity and gender performance.141 On the latter 
she writes ‘in imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender 
itself’.142  
 
The concept of gender performativity has encountered severe criticism from feminist 
authors. It seems, however, that many critics misread the concept. Critics of 
constructionism included Epstein, who argued that ‘constructionism has no theory of the 
intrapsychic and is unable to specify the ways in which desire comes to be structured 
over the course of people’s lives’.143 
 
Elizabeth Grosz disputed gender performativity on the grounds that ‘gender must be 
understood as a kind of overlay on a pre-established foundation of sex’.144 When 
commenting on gender, Grosz conceptualizes it in a way that has positioned gender and 
sex in a spherical relationship with each other, and suggests that Butler's account of 
performativity should have focused on the instability of sex, to make the performativity 
project stronger. She further adds: ‘the force of her [Butler’s] already powerful 
arguments would I believe be strengthened if, instead of the play generated by a term 
somehow beyond the dimension of sex itself, in the order of gender, she focused on the 
instabilities of sex itself, of bodies themselves’.145 
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It is true that Butler does not focus on distinguishing sex and gender. Instead, as 
Annamarie Jagose highlights, she prioritizes gender. However, Butler does not [as Grosz 
suggests] mobilize it in opposition to a more foundational sense of sex. On the contrary, 
Butler explicitly questions such a reification of sex: if the immutable character of sex is 
contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; 
indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction 
between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.146 
 
The gender performativity project met with criticism not only from feminist theorists, but 
also from transgender scholars and activists such as Susan Stryker and Paisley Currah. 
Stryker, for example, noted that there is a possibility for a misconception that ‘trans 
people who often suffered a great deal to actualize for others the reality of their gender 
identities, the idea that gender was just a game of sorts, with a wardrobe full of possible 
gender costumes to be put on or taken off at will, felt galling’.147 However, she aligned 
herself with the performativity project Butler developed and stated, ‘the implication of 
this argument is that transgender genders are as real as any others, and they are achieved 
in the same fundamental way’.148 While commenting on the gender performativity 
concept, Currah also noted that the relation between sex and gender is reversed: 
biological sex characteristics are cast as aspects of gender and largely mutable ones.149 It 
is also often misunderstood that it is gender identity, and often even expressions of 
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gender identity, that is described as unchangeable, set and formed at an early age.150  
 
To clear up the confusion over the understanding of performativity theory, Butler 
returned to it later in Undoing Gender, to argue that gender and sexuality are too often 
perceived as isolated subjects for study – gender as a feminist subject, and sexuality as a 
matter for queer theory.151 For Butler, such a categorization should not take place, as 
gender cannot be reducible to hierarchical heterosexuality.152 To support her argument, 
Butler cites that gender is internally unstable and transgendered lives are evidence of 
such a breakdown. Any line that causally creates a distinction between sexuality and 
gender is artificial and cannot withstand the fluid nature of transgressive genders.153 Such 
contextualization of gender attracted more criticism from both feminist and queer 
theorists, with many stating that situating sexuality within the feminist movement 
seemed uncharacteristic for the movement due to the connotation that the term 
‘sexuality’ carried. The next few sections will examine the relationship between these 
concepts. 
 
3.2 Queer theory and feminism 
 
The queer project encountered immense criticism, mostly from feminist authors. Despite 
this, the historical circumstances in which the term has evolved have maintained its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 ibid. 
151 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (Routledge 2004) 2-16 
152 ibid 53. 
153 ibid 54. 
50 
 
affiliation with anti-homophobic politics.154 Feminist scholars such as Rosalind Pollack 
Petchesky argued that feminism should be understood as a theoretical revolution in terms 
of how words such as art, culture, woman, subjectivity, politics and so forth are 
understood. But feminism does not imply a unified field of theory, political position or 
perspective.155 In fact, feminism as a way of liberation is open to various projects of 
critical theory, although maybe with not much capacity to provide space for those 
theories to progress. Rubin opposed this idea, arguing that feminism does not have a 
capacity to subject sexuality as its own and instead called for more fundamental studies 
of sexualities.156  
 
Gayle Rubin analysed the social construction of sex hierarchies and the consequent 
demonizing of non-normative sexualities. 157  In her writings, Rubin concluded that 
‘gender affects the operation of the sexual system, and the sexual system has had gender-
specific manifestations’.158 Indeed, that effort to bring clarity between feminism and 
queer studies – and even more, to consider queer theory as a principal ground for 
sexuality studies – was aimed at clarifying that to expect feminism to theorize sexuality 
is to disadvantage both: feminist conceptual tools were developed to detect and analyse 
gender-based hierarchies. Rubin noted that, as issues become less those of gender and 
more those of sexuality, feminist analysis becomes misleading and often irrelevant; 
feminist thought simply lacks angles of vision that can fully encompass the social 
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organization of sexuality.159 Similarly, Sedgwick distinguished these two categories, 
indicating that a critique of sexual oppression could only enrich feminism. Sedgwick 
argued that ‘there is always at least the potential for an analytic distance between gender 
and sexuality’;160 hence, the ‘ultimate definitional appeal in any gender-based analysis 
must necessarily be to the diacritical frontier between different genders’.161 Sedgwick 
argued that queer theory mostly employs denaturalization as its primary strategy. It 
confounds the categories that license sexual normativity; it differs from its predecessor 
by avoiding the delusion that its project is to uncover or invent some free, natural and 
primordial sexuality.162  
 
Biddy Martin suggests that instead of separating the two, they should be linked. The 
queer examinations of feminism are mutually productive, though she warns about being 
cautious on the occasions when ‘anti-foundational celebrations of queerness rely on their 
own projections of fixity, constraint, or subjection onto a fixed ground, often onto 
feminism or the female body, in relation to which queer sexualities become figural, 
performative, playful, and fun’. 163  Butler similarly emphasizes the distinctive but 
dynamically interactive character of gender and sexuality when she writes, ‘surely it is as 
unacceptable to insist that relations of sexual subordination determine gender position as 
it is to separate radically forms of sexuality from the workings of gender norms’.164  
 
Queer theory has encountered strong criticism. This has come largely from feminist 
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writers, some of whose arguments are analysed above. Others have also commented that 
if the point of queer critique is to develop critical frameworks that can disrupt and rewrite 
the countless ways the human potential for sensual pleasure is socially produced as sex, 
then maybe there needs to be a way to address the historicity of pleasure in all of its 
complexity, including its relation to gender.165  
 
In criticising queer theory, Max Kirsch argues that queerness has no inherent historical or 
social context. Therefore, he argues, the question should be asked to whom it belongs 
and what it represents. 166  Kirsch misses the point that all queer authors widely 
acknowledge, which is queer theory’s fundamental roots in feminist and postmodern, 
post-structural theory. Instead he continues criticising ‘queer’ as being produced by 
social relations, hence containing only the attributes of existing social relations.167 He 
believes that ‘queer’ attempts to dissolve sexuality and annuls the basis for sexual 
identity, precluding a confrontation with a morality that dictates sexual correctness, 
affirming some practices while stigmatizing others.168 Here again, it seems that Kirsch 
employs moral imperatives to argue for sexual correctness [which he seems to advocate] 
and claims that queer affirms stigmatizing practices. However, he fails to explain what 
these stigmatizing practices are and who are the victims of stigmatization. Despite this, 
Kirsch carries on criticising it for its ignorance of the reproductive rights community.169 
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Counter to Kirsch’s claims, queer theory suggests that any study of sexuality must be 
attentive to the feminist analysis within which queer studies, as well as gender and 
sexuality studies, originated. Nevertheless, some authors still accuse queer theorists of 
undermining the feminist project. For example, Sheila Jeffreys insists that the imperative 
to separate the analytical axis of sex from that of gender amounts to an indifference and 
imperviousness to feminism. Moreover, she argues that a call to study gender and 
sexuality as distinct but ‘inextricable’ categories does not establish ‘the study of sexuality 
[as] a field of inquiry quite separate from and impervious to feminist theory’.170  
 
In her 1980 essay ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’, radical feminist 
Adrienne Rich highlighted the socially and economically constructed nature of 
heterosexuality and denaturalized heterosexual relations. Rich drew a link between 
heterosexuality as a social institution and the oppression of women, challenging the 
assumption that most women are innately heterosexual. She suggested that 
heterosexuality may not be a preference at all, but something that has had to be imposed, 
managed, organized, propagandized and maintained by force. 171  Rich’s critique, 
however, focused on challenging binaries as restricting our ability to determine the 
meaning and place of sexuality. She argued, ‘we have been stalled in a maze of false 
dichotomies which prevents our apprehending the institution of heterosexuality as a 
whole: “good” versus “bad” marriages; “marriage for love” versus arranged marriage, 
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“liberated” sex versus prostitution; heterosexual intercourse versus rape; Liebeschmerz 
versus humiliation and dependency’.172  
 
3.3. Feminist theory and transgender  
 
Feminist theory has long established the ethical and legal basis for gender equality. 
Scholars also argue that feminist theory would establish inclusion of transgender persons 
in non-discrimination legislation.173 However, as transgender critics note, transgender 
protection under existing standards of gender equality legislation has failed because 
transgender people are seen as ‘examples of sexual deviants, in the same way that 
homosexuals were cast as gender inverts’.174 The marginalization of transgender persons 
within the feminism movement was particularly due to the so-called Trans-Exclusionary 
Radical Feminists (TERFs), who openly and aggressively acted against transgender 
women, further reinforcing the essentialist theory of sex and gender.175 While TERFs 
were a fraction of a group of radical feminists, their antagonism and radical standing 
against transgender persons has had a lasting effect on how the transgender community 
was integrated into the wider feminist movement (in particular, the second and third 
wave). For example, David Evans comments that feminist hostility to the transvestite is 
obviously a matter of the gender directions of both, respectively, away and towards the 
conventionally feminine. Evans adopts Sue O’Sullivan’s argument and notes that the 
‘transvestite separates [feminine] symbols from the woman and incorporates them into 
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his [transvestite’s] personality. Thus the transvestite uses feminine symbols to liberate 
himself from his sex-role stereotype, just as the feminist uses masculine symbols to 
liberate herself’. 176  Other transgender theorists also comment on the conflict. In 
supporting the queer theorists, Sandy Stone also calls the feminist resistance to queer 
theory ‘the rage of radical feminist theories’.177 Stone’s The Empire Strikes Back: A 
Posttranssexual Manifesto was very much a response to the feminist resistance to 
emerging transgender studies and in particular authors like Janice Raymond, who had 
publicly decried transgender people in The Transsexual Empire.178 
 
Major criticism from feminist groups revolved around the question of whether feminist 
efforts to end the marginalization, exploitation and oppression of all women would be 
extended to trans women as well. In this regard, transgender activists and scholars largely 
saw themselves as a bridge between the feminist and the lesbian, gay and bisexual 
movement. Some authors even argued that the aim of the transgender rights movement 
should be to go beyond the term ‘gender’ in order to close the significant chaos created 
by the institutional separation between LGB and women’s rights advocacy.179 While 
commenting on transgender relationships with other identity groups, Currah noted that, 
due to their alienation from feminists, the transgender movement became more affiliated 
with the LGB movement, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.180  
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While a radical wing of feminists saw transgender (women's) identity as a threat to the 
essentialist agenda they were pursuing to focus on the body in order to combat violence 
against women, wider groups of feminists were more welcoming. This is particularly true 
of the writings of second-wave feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir, who famously 
stated, ‘one is not born but becomes a woman,’ fundamentally questioning the 
essentialist theory of sex and gender. 181  More recently, Ken Plummer in Sexual 
Citizenship reports that there are people within the transgender movement ‘who celebrate 
the core features of gender (they do not see themselves as ‘trans’; they really are the 
other gender), while others delight in the ambiguities of gender – of gender blending and 
gender performance’.182 For Plummer, such fluidity of gender causes problems for 
‘categories, boundaries and identities’, but for transgender people, Plummer argues, 
‘gender is absolutely not a fixed identity and thus cannot have any citizenship rights 
attached to it, unless we regard gender as some kind of “trans-identity” with rights and 
obligations now attaching to shifting identities’.183 Plummer asserts that rights are 
attached to identities, and good citizenship is a formula in which people fit within 
heteronormative boundaries (male or female).184 And indeed, he asks, ‘how to deal with 
those who would transgress ideals of good citizenship? Transgressors do not want to fit 
in and be part of the civic order. They want to violate borders and boundaries. They do 
not wish to be normal.’185  
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It is evident that the questions Plummer poses are broader and exceed the theoretical 
conundrum between radical feminist groups and the wider feminist and transgender 
movements. In particular, Diane Richardson notes, ‘globally we are witnessing gay and 
lesbian movements (and sometimes bi, sometimes transgender) that demand equal rights 
with heterosexuals.’186  
 
Overall, the feminist movement has been at the core of queer theory and has thus helped 
to advance SOGI rights, as will be seen in Chapters Three and Four of the thesis. The 
intersectionality between feminist and transgender studies is further explored through 
queer studies (developed by third-wave feminists). Indeed, in a majority of contemporary 
writings, transgender persons (in particular, transgender women) are better integrated 
within mainstream feminism.187 In this regard, some authors argue that feminism has a 
‘specific content that relates to transsexuals’ but that the theory of feminism is applicable 
to all women.188 
 
Feminism and its relationship with transgender studies is a vast topic and encompasses 
many different areas of studies, particularly in relation to the lived experiences of women 
and transgender persons and their intersections. What is important to highlight in the 
context of this thesis, however, is that, as Butler noted, feminism has been part of the 
new social movements that challenge normative restrictions on gender and sexuality. 
With the emergence of ‘new gender politics’, encompassing feminist, queer, antiracist, 
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trans, and intersex groups, the feminist movement has come share much common ground 
in terms of overall political goals.189 More will be said on the interactions between queer 
theory and transgender studies below. 
 
3.4. Queer theory and transgender studies 
 
Queer theory undoubtedly did emerge through feminism, but, as noted above, some 
factions of the feminist movement were not ready to accommodate gender variance 
specifically as it related to transgender people. As Jagose noted, queer theory has focused 
on mismatches between sex, gender and desire and predominantly focused on gay 
concerns.190 In recent years, however, Jagose has argued that ‘queer’ became an umbrella 
term for a coalition of culturally marginal sexual self-identifications. Queer has also lent 
itself to being described in a nascent theoretical model, which has developed out of more 
traditional lesbian and gay studies.191 In Queer Theory, Jagose concludes that the queer 
agenda is indeed marked by a refusal to naturalize the interworkings of gender and desire 
to the extent that the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ do. But this is not to say that queer is 
committed to the extinction of those marginalized groups.192 Quite the opposite: in its 
broadest usages queer describes not only lesbian and gay, but also – and not exhaustively 
– ‘transsexual’, transgender and bisexual individuals.193  
 
Queer theory, while largely focusing on the social construction of gender and questioning 
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the conditions in which opposing genders are produced, has also become a major element 
of so-called ‘third-wave’ feminism, which studies the deconstruction and 
intersectionality between other areas of study.194 Both deconstruction and intersectional 
analysis are important tools for transgender studies and have been widely incorporated 
into the analysis of transgender lived experiences. This relates in particular to 
transgender persons from racial minority, class and poor economic backgrounds. 
Transgender persons from those backgrounds have been more vulnerable to social 
exclusion and discrimination, as well as violence. 195  Tools of deconstruction and 
intersectionality allow analysis of intersecting identities and related systems of social 
power or discrimination.196  
 
In fact, queer theory has been understood to be the most welcoming academic space for 
transgender and other ‘sexual minorities’ since its emergence. Some criticism, however, 
was made at the early stages of development, which reflected disagreements over 
identities, mirroring conflicts between essentialists and social constructionists. For 
example, the transgender activist and scholar Viviane Namaste criticized ‘queer theory’ 
(mainly focusing on gender identity) for generating ‘erasure and contempt for transsexual 
people.’197 She writes that ‘queer theory’ has shown very little concern for those who 
identify and live as drag queens, ‘transsexual’ and/or transgender.198 There seems to be a 
missed opportunity here, as Namaste might be misunderstanding the notion of queer, 
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arguing that even though it [queer theory] focuses on liberation in the transgression of 
gender codes, it does not address abuse and violations experienced by ‘transsexual’ 
individuals.199 She further asserts that transgender persons represent the dominant and 
more privileged group whose theoretical and political perspectives are based on a 
gay/lesbian queer framework that is anathema to most ‘transsexuals’.200 In her view, ‘the 
majority of transsexuals do not make sense of their lives in lesbian/gay terms, and they 
have little interest in questions of identity or in the cultural analysis of gender.’201 In Sex 
Change, Social Change, Namaste claims to be ‘taking a controversial stand against queer 
readings of transsexuality and against the focus on identity that has been important to 
queer, feminist, and even some transgender theorists’.202  Thus, queer and/or trans 
feminist theorists such as Butler, Halberstam, Bornstein and Stone might be accused of 
misappropriating ‘transsexual’ identities and using them as tools to serve their own 
projects of criticising the sex/gender binary. In fact, Butler was regarded an ‘elitist 
theorist’ who was unwilling to concern herself with what happens outside the 
academy.203  
 
Some other critics, such as Phillips, argued that queer theory attempts to represent not 
only gays and lesbians, but also transgenderists and even heterosexuals as ‘straight-
identified queers’, etc.204 They further argue that it has the effect not only of effacing the 
specific political identities, needs and agendas of these various groups, but, in doing so, 
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queer has produced a new closet, as any specific self-identification as either gay or 
lesbian (predicated upon same-sex practices) is disavowed.205  
 
As queer becomes a ‘zone of possibilities’ always inflected by a sense of potentiality,206 
it gradually starts focusing on topics such as cross-dressing, hermaphroditism, gender 
ambiguity and gender corrective surgery.207 This indeed makes transgender a direct 
subject of queer theory.208 However, questions as to why transgender people emerged as 
a visible self-identified constituency at a particular point in queer history remain 
debated.209 Despite this, it seems that ‘T’ has finally made it into the ‘alphabet soup’ to 
produce LGBTIQ. 210  Theorists and activists also underline the importance of 
inclusiveness, with Matt Coles, a leading gay activist and attorney in the US, 
commenting,  
to be sure, there are differences between gay people and transgendered people; but our 
commonalities far outweigh our differences; often it is nearly impossible to distinguish 
between discrimination based on gender identity (transgender) and sexual orientation 
(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual), because so much of it turns on ideas of how men and women 
should act.’211  
 
In the words of Riki Wilchins, ‘saying the transgender movement is not part of the gay 
movement is like saying water is not part of the earth’.212  
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Debates over what benefits queer theory offers and whether it is best placed to subject 
transgender persons and communities to its scrutiny seem long over. Queer theory has 
played an enormous role in establishing sexuality and identity as separate categories and 
influenced the formulation of SOGI – a formula that is commonly used in modern 
academic and practical work, particularly in the law. What further role queer theory can 
play in advancing SOGI rights remains to be seen as these rights advance further. Further 
investigation needs to take place as to how queer theory applies in the context of single-
sex closed spaces, in particular in prisons. 
 
4. Transgender Studies and Prison Theory 
 
The invisibility of transgender people throughout 20th-century feminist and queer studies 
meant that disciplines such as prison studies also neglected the problem. Recent research 
reports that the study of sexuality in prisons has been mostly dismissed, inadequately 
investigated, and/or negatively portrayed. 213  Consequently, the extant literature on 
prisoners’ sexuality is incomplete.214 Writing in the late 1990s, Nic Groombridge also 
noted that almost no mention of lesbians had been made in the feminist criminology 
writings up to that point [he counted two].215  
 
From a criminology perspective, the literature on ‘sexual minorities’ in prison can be 
divided into two stages – deviance and invisibility. Each of these stages deserves further 
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investigation. For the purposes of this thesis, however, only a brief summary is provided 
on these themes. Current developments in queer criminology are highlighted below to 
show the progress made to incorporate transgender and other LGBIQ prisoners' lived 
experiences into criminology, and prison theory in particular. 
 
For a long period of time, criminology understood homosexuality, or deviance from sex 
assigned at birth as a deviant sexual behaviour. Consequently, LGBTIQ people were 
regarded as deviants who needed treatment.216 Few studies conducted at the earlier stages 
focused on the formation of SOGI in the prison context, claiming that ‘abnormal sexual 
conduct’ among prisoners was a ‘natural phenomenon.’217 In the view of Sykes, same-
sex relationships in male prisons were caused by the pain of imprisonment.218 As men’s 
prisons were viewed as spaces of concentrated masculinity,219 gender non-conformity 
was seen as ‘part of delinquency.’220 Once the ‘deviance era’ – now regarded as highly 
problematic – of criminology research ended, a new and long period of invisibility of 
LGBTIQ prisoners commenced. Current criminologists observe that LGBTIQ people 
completely disappeared from the landscape of criminology research and prison studies.221 
The discipline of criminology – rather conservative and rigid by character – did not quite 
acknowledge  queer subjects, which have always been ‘nomadic and transnational’ by 
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nature.222 This changed later, when perhaps frustration at the ignorance of mainstream 
criminology theory about SOGI issues prompted a younger generation of criminologists 
to argue that ‘queer criminology’ issues, including issues of gender and sexual diversity, 
were marginalized in criminology research projects. 223  Queer criminology scholars 
further note that ‘the general and traditional heteronormativity of the discipline of 
criminology, coupled with the reluctance of LGBTIQ people to draw attention to their 
sexuality, gender or sexual diversity in such studies, often leaves criminologists in a 
difficult position when seeking to understand the experiences of some LGBTIQ 
people.’224  
 
The new scholarship on queer criminology, which is only just emerging, is trying to 
unpack legislative structures and other governmental mechanisms.225 It is integrating the 
stigmatization, criminalization and rejection of the LGBTIQ community as both victims 
and offenders into the theory, meaning that contemporary prison studies and criminology 
are building the capacity to undertake wider research on the lived experiences of 
transgender and other ‘sexual minorities’ in detention.226  
 
Indeed, queer criminology as a discipline is relatively new and includes few authors who 
have published on the social construction of gender and sexualities in prisons. They are 
mostly authors from the United States (US), Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Carl F. Stychin, ‘A Stranger to its Laws’: Sovereign Bodies, Global Sexualities, and Transnational Citizens’ (2000)  27 (4) Journal 
of Law and Society 601-625. 
223 Matthew Ball, Thomas Crofts and Angela Dwyer (Eds.) Queering Criminology (kindle edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2016) Chapter 1. 
224 ibid. 
225 ibid. 
226 Carrie L. Buist and Emily Lenning (Eds), Queer Criminology (New Directions in Critical Criminology) (kindle edition, Routledge 
2016). 
65 
 
(UK), meaning that their writings reflect the specific cultural and socio-political contexts 
of these countries. Despite this, some thoughts can be generalized to study the trajectory 
of queer criminology for the purposes of the prison context. American researcher Regina 
Kunzel has examined sexuality and gender in American prisons. She established deep 
linkages between sexuality in and outside prisons and argued that, in fact, the 
construction of sexuality in prisons, particularly same-sex sexuality and desire, is deeply 
influenced by the construct of a ‘modern sexuality’.227 Kunzel challenges the essentialist 
and binary framework of distinct sexual types, blurring boundaries, confounding 
categories, and producing queerness as a primary feature of the prison.228 She goes on to 
argue that sexuality in prisons has long been a central part of popular, scholarly and 
reformist agendas and that sexuality is constitutive of the modern prison, determining the 
organization and architecture of prisons and relations between prisoners.229 
 
Some scholars have argued that various environmental, biological, psychological and 
sociological factors also influence sexuality in society, and in prison, these factors are 
further complicated by the experience of incarceration. 230  Applying a socio-
psychological argument to prison sex, Benjamin Karpman underscores the violent culture 
of prisons, the hyper-masculinization of the environment and sexual abuse, recalling that 
‘when looking into prison life, one should not forget that the physical, moral, social, 
psychic and sex aspects are all intertwined, mutually and reciprocally affecting each 
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other… all these aspects are part of the system that brings a result of brutalising and 
degradation of criminals, and this is best illustrated in the sex life within these closed 
settings.’231 This is an important point when considering the hyper-masculinization of 
closed institutions that creates a dangerous dynamic within the prison system, often 
causing inter-prisoner violence, particularly sexual violence and abuse against ‘sexual 
minorities’.  
 
Sexual violence against LGBTIQ prisoners is possibly the most important topic for 
consideration when analysing the treatment of transgender prisoners. Hensley, for 
example, argued that the broad consensus in academic literature about sexuality as a 
social construction means that pre-prison background plays an immense role in inmates’ 
participation in prison sex (whether consensual or coercive).232 Hensley and Gibson in 
fact further asserted that sexual orientation was one of the most important risk factors for 
sexual victimization in prison.233 Tewksbury and West, in their recent work, also share 
that the issue of sexuality in prison has been mostly dismissed, inadequately investigated, 
and/or negatively portrayed,234 calling for wider research and understanding of prisoners’ 
sexuality.235  
 
The scarcity of literature makes it difficult to engage with the debate. However, the 
revealing nature of the limited findings above calls for further research into the lived 
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experiences of ‘sexual minorities’ in prisons, as well as sexuality in detention more 
broadly. For the purpose of this thesis, further accounts of lived experiences of 
transgender prisoners are provided in Part Three, where a case study on detention is 
investigated. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This chapter has attempted to grasp different gender identities under the term 
‘transgender’. The chapter started by establishing the foundations of transgender studies, 
by offering analysis about the position of transgender theory in practice and its relations 
with feminist and queer theories, both in society and in prisons. Indeed, in the myriad of 
gender variations that exist around the world, ‘transsexuality’ as an invention of medical 
science has changed the trajectory of the mobilization of the transgender community and 
recognition of gender identity in law. And if ‘transsexuality’ was understood to oppress 
the most vulnerable and force them into the heteronormative structure of the sexes, the 
concept of ‘transgender’ ought to be understood as liberating those oppressed, by 
allowing for gender self-determination.  
 
Gender performativity theory takes a central place in this chapter to substantiate the 
claim of the social construction of gender developed by post-structural theorists, 
specifically Foucault, expanded upon by Butler. And while this chapter was able to 
illustrate the richness of such theoretical argumentation, in particular around transgender 
identity, it struggled to find the grounds for a similar application in the prison context. 
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Two main reasons for this, as highlighted in this chapter, are early deviant theory and an 
extended period of invisibility that seem to have characterized the transgender experience 
in prisons. 
 
Prison structures are strictly binary systems, based on strict sex segregation. Transgender 
identities thus create challenges for the system, and reveal the imperfections, and even 
limitations, of the prison system and the law to protect those with a non-conforming 
gender. The journey starts a little earlier, however, at a stage of determination and 
recognition of identity. The challenge this chapter has grappled with remains the fluid 
nature of transgender and non-binary identities and the rigidity of the law in providing 
rights and freedoms for those with specific identities.  
 
As this thesis continues to challenge the fundamental aspects of transgender identities, 
the next chapter offers an overview of available models of legal recognition of 
transgender identities. It will further provide a critique of the law where relevant, to 
illustrate the discrepancy in the protection system, or the gaps in the application of 
protection mechanisms. As the thesis develops, it will analyse the prison structure in the 
case-study chapter. 
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Chapter II 
Achieving Transgender and Non-binary Gender Recognition in Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Each stage of the theoretical development of transgender studies has had its implications 
for the normative framework in respective societies. In some countries this has been 
captured in laws that give an official recognition to transgender identities. Yet, the 
absence of a rigorous analysis of transgender theory and possible tensions with the law 
have often resulted in compromises between the state, the medical profession and 
transgender groups. On the one hand, laws are seen as a way of accessing rights and 
freedoms; on the other hand, they create heteronormative frameworks for transgender 
people that do not allow for gender fluidity, a core for non-binary identities. Feminist, 
queer and transgender theories and the developments that have taken place at each stage 
of their emergence have had considerable influence on the way national laws are shaped 
and have also carved out ways for transgender people to access rights, freedoms and 
justice. That interaction of theory and law has also been reflected in different models that 
recognize transgender identities. 
 
Three legal models of transgender recognition and citizenship can be identified, each 
corresponding to a theoretical development in the feminist and queer movements. These 
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are the biological, medical and gender self-determination models.236 The first two models 
– biological and medical – are largely based on heteronormative gender and sex 
discourse, whereas the third model allows for legal recognition of fluid genders. 
Furthermore, the biological and medical models have been widely employed in the legal 
context, including in legislation and court decisions. Both have sought strict conformity 
with the binary framework and followed that any deviation from established 
heteronormative norms of gender and sex would be understood as unnatural and 
deviant.237 From the perspective of the protection of transgender rights, the biological 
model fundamentally disregards the transgender concept as it considers gender-crossing 
deviant, unnatural and fraudulent.238 The medical model, on the other hand, has allowed 
transgression but through a medical deviance framework, meaning that medical science 
dictates the legal decision-making with regard to the legal recognition of a person's 
gender identity.  
 
The third model lies in constant tension between the law and a queer understanding of 
gender. By nature, law requires fixed identities or categories, while gender, as a socially 
constructed concept, carries a fluid character that undermines the very essence of fixed 
categories. Nonetheless, recent legal developments in a few countries have shown that 
fluid genders can exist within the fixed categories of the law. In fact, judicial and legal 
policy advancements have enabled gender self-determination to be recognized in a 
number of countries. Legal reforms in Argentina, Denmark, Malta, Ireland, Norway and 
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a few other countries provide an opportunity for transgender people to have their gender 
legally recognized without the obligation of medical intervention. The ‘third gender’ has 
also been recognized by the Supreme Court of Nepal, which, on the basis of a wider 
application of international human rights law and jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, 
concluded that a ‘third gender’ has a right to be recognized in law.239 A similar trend can 
be observed in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
 
Legal developments corresponding to the theoretical developments of feminist, queer and 
transgender studies have been concentrated in a few jurisdictions, limiting the possibility 
of generalizing national or regional laws. The European Court on Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has played a dominant role in generating international human rights law on the 
issue. Other international and regional mechanisms, such as the UN, the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Court), have taken much longer to respond to the challenges 
posed by the contestation of transgender people’s rights and international human rights 
law. In particular, almost all the case law that has enabled the progression from a 
biological to a medical model has been accumulated in the US and the UK. Considering 
the limitations in the available jurisprudence, this chapter will employ jurisprudence 
mainly from the UK, the US and the ECtHR to illustrate how legal systems have 
approached the developments in feminist, queer and transgender theories, and what role 
the law played in securing rights for transgender persons.  
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This chapter examines three different models of transgender recognition in law: 
biological, medical and gender self-determination. Within each of the models, the chapter 
will examine the theory on which the model is founded and the legal structure it creates.  
 
Having studied the available jurisprudence on the issue, both national and international, 
this chapter will highlight the role of medical evidence in recognizing transgender 
citizenship. More specifically, it will start exploring the essentialist view on sex and 
gender and its application to the law, forming a biological model of transgender 
recognition in law. It will go on to critically analyse the medical model and its impact on 
organizing transgender rights. Under the medical model, this chapter will specifically 
examine the concept of ‘pathologization of gender identity’ and provide a brief overview 
of the WHO’s role in addressing the medical model. Towards the end, this chapter will 
provide an assessment of the gender self-determination model and its legal recognition. It 
will reflect the recent developments in a number of countries where reforms have taken 
place to address this issue. The analysis of each model is hoped to contribute to 
understanding human rights claims of transgender persons in both national and 
international jurisprudence. 
 
2. Biological Model of Transgender Recognition in Law 
 
The biological model of transgender recognition was based on the notion of sex as an 
immutable category and was widely applied in transgender persons’ cases to dismiss 
their claims for a gender change. A famous case that best illustrates the challenges this 
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arrangement posed was Corbett v Corbett, the ruling, which was announced in 1971. In 
that case in the UK, April Ashley, despite transitioning from a biologically male to  
female sex, was denied recognition in law. In the case, Mr Corbett sought a declaration 
that his marriage to April Ashley was null and void, on the grounds that Ms Corbett was 
biologically male and therefore a marriage between two males was not possible.240  
 
The judge objected to some of the medical testimony, which suggested that gender 
identity is a ‘psychological factor’ and should be included along with biological markers 
in the determination of the legal sex.241 Instead, Justice Ormrod concluded that only the 
most obvious biological characteristics should be dispositive.242 In other words, Justice 
Ormrod developed a list of biological factors that in his view, constituted an immutable 
nature of sex. These included: a. Chromosomal factors; b. Gonadal factors; c. Genital 
factors; d. Psychological factors; and possibly e. Hormonal/secondary sexual 
characteristics.243 
 
By providing a strict list of elements for a sex category, Justice Ormrod attested that, in 
the eyes of the court, biological sex was fixed at birth and could not be changed by 
natural or surgical means, and therefore any operative intervention had to be ignored.244 
No consideration was given to a psychological perception of gender or even to the 
medical surgery, leaving Ms Corbett in a legal limbo. Indeed, the Corbett case set the 
practice of determining the sex at birth for many decades to come and dozens of court 
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cases seeking recognition of the acquired gender were turned down subsequently, citing 
the Corbett case as a yardstick for determining sex and gender, dismissing any attempt 
for gender deviance.245 Not only did Corbett have an impact inside in the UK, but also in 
other jurisdictions. From thereon, ‘transsexual’ cases were decided negatively, largely 
founded on the reasoning in the Corbett case.246 Courts in Australia, Canada, South 
Africa, Singapore, and the US (in New York, Ohio, Texas, Kansas and Florida) applied 
the Corbett test to assert that ‘transsexual’ persons could marry only in the gender role 
that they had been assigned at birth.247 The ECtHR in multiple cases including Rees v the 
UK, Cossey v the UK, and Sheffield and Horsham v the UK repeatedly reasoned that such 
a matter fell under the margin of appreciation of the member states, and hence denied 
granting rights to transgender persons.  
 
The collision between law and biology, demonstrated in Corbett v Corbett, created 
numerous impediments to achieving transgender citizenship. One is that states have a 
monopoly on regulating issues such as issuance of identity documents, marriage, access 
to welfare, custody of children, access to health, and access to sex-segregated 
facilities.248 These are all denied to transgender people under the strict heteronormative 
boundaries of gender, in which the biological model matches gender with the sex of an 
individual. This also means that, in the area of sex discrimination law, courts for the most 
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part found that discrimination against transgender people was not legally prohibited.249 
For example, in the case of Ulane v Eastern Airlines in 1984, the US Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit reversed a ruling that had found discrimination, stating that 
transsexual people are not protected under the sex-discrimination clause as it relates to 
males and females.250 The Appeals Court argued that although there was discrimination 
against the plaintiff, it was not because she presented as a woman, but because she was a 
‘transsexual’ – but that the latter were not a protected category under the law.251 More 
specifically, the Court held:  
Ulane is entitled to any personal belief about her sexual identity she desires. After 
the surgery, hormones, appearance changes, and a new Illinois birth certificate and 
FAA pilot certificate, it may be that society, as the trial judge found, considers 
Ulane to be female. But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created 
from what remains of a man, that does not decide the case… it is clear that Eastern 
Airlines did discriminate against Ulane, it was not because she was female, but 
because Ulane was a transsexual – a biological male who takes female hormones, 
cross-dresses and has surgically altered parts of her body to make her appear to be 
a female.252  
 
The standing in Ulane changed slightly after the consideration of the case of Price 
Waterhouse v Hopkins, where the appellant challenged sex discrimination due to gender 
stereotyping in the workplace that had led to his dismissal. In that case, the Court 
singlehandedly decided that gender stereotyping can indeed qualify as sex 
discrimination.253 The Court further noted, ‘we are beyond the day when an employer 
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
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associated with their group.’254 For the purpose of discrimination and gender, that 
decision has been understood to indicate that the grounds of discrimination may in fact 
include not just biological sexual identity but also gender identity.255 In fact, both of 
those cases (Ulane and Price Waterhouse) indicate the trouble the judges have had in 
establishing a case of discrimination in accordance with the explicit terms of the law, 
regardless of the gender of the complainant. Despite the uncertainty of terms, the records 
nevertheless indicate that a state court in the US had earlier ruled that gender identity 
plays an important role in determining sex.256 Taylor Flynn writes that as early as 1976, a 
court in New Jersey upheld that a marriage of a ‘transsexual’ woman (only known as 
J.T.) was legal, because she was regarded a female in the law.257 The court in that case 
seems to have established that, among the many components that determined sex, 
psychological determination of gender identity was important to harmonize the 
psychological sex and the anatomical sex with the social sex or gender.258 Furthermore, 
the court declared that when the birth anatomy and the gender identity clash, the role of 
anatomy is simply ‘secondary’.259 In that case it was argued that gender identity was in 
fact the key determinant of the person’s sex. The sex category thus became subordinate 
to gender identity.  
 
Another case to have departed from Corbett was the New York case of Re Anonymous, in 
which the appellant – a male-to-female transgender person – applied to have her birth 
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certificate changed to reflect surgical intervention.260 The court in that case held that the 
applicant had to be a female because her anatomy had been brought into conformity with 
her psychological sex.261  
 
Similar developments can be found in other parts of the world that allowed ‘transsexual’ 
(strictly post-operative) persons to marry in their self-identified gender. This includes 
New Zealand,262 Australia263 and California in the US.264 In Attorney General v Otahuhu 
Family Court, the High Court of New Zealand held that, where a person has undergone 
surgical and medical procedures that have effectively given that person the physical 
confirmation of a specified sex, no lawful impediment could prevent that person 
marrying as a person of that sex.265 Similarly, in Attorney General v Kevin and Jennifer, 
the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Sydney declined to follow Corbett [the 
UK domestic case] and stated that ‘it would be wrong to identify and define a person’s 
gender simply on the basis of the chromosomes, genitals, and gonads with which they are 
born. It is the mind as well as the body that determines the sex of an individual’.266 The 
Court went further and stated that ‘where a person’s gender identification differs from his 
or her biological sex, the psychological perception of gender should in all cases prevail. 
It would follow that all “transsexuals” would be treated in law according to the sex 
identification, regardless of whether they had undertaken any medical treatment to make 
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their bodies conform with that identification.’ 267 To justify its decision, the Court cited 
an expert witness’s testimony that ‘brain or mental sex… [is thought to] explain the 
persistence of a gender identity in the face of external influences’.268 The Australian 
Family Court in Kevin’s case reached the conclusion that ‘Kevin is and always has been 
psychologically male’ and that hence he was a male.269 
 
A slightly different but equally successful case on transgender marriage was decided by 
the California Supreme Court in 1998. In Orange County, California, the petitioner 
Kristie Vecchione sought to annul her marriage to her husband, Joshua Vecchione, 
claiming that Joshua was not a man because he was transgender. She based her claims on 
arguments that it was a ‘same-sex’ marriage and thus not recognized under the law.270 
Ms Vecchione further contended that Joshua was not the father of their child, Briana, 
who was conceived through alternative insemination during their marriage.271 The Court 
disagreed, ruling that ‘Joshua Vecchione, who the court finds was born a female and has 
gone through the transgender surgery, is for all marital purposes a male and the nullity 
requested based on same-sex marriage was denied’.272 As a consequence of that finding, 
the judge declared that the ‘child born as the result of artificial insemination in a 
marriage context is the child of that marriage and is the child of the husband and wife’.273  
 
Indeed, those cases illustrate the trouble common law courts went through to overturn the 
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Corbett case. The rejection of the Corbett test came gradually, in particular in the UK.274 
The case of Bellinger v Bellinger, despite the unsatisfactory decision of the majority, 
produced a dissenting opinion arguing for the impact of psychological factors on 
gender.275  
 
Of particular interest is the dissenting opinion of Lord Justice Thorpe in the Bellinger 
judgment, who considered that the foundations of the judgment in Corbett were no 
longer secure. He took the view that an ‘approach restricted to biological criteria was no 
longer permissible in the light of scientific, medical and social change’.276 Lord Justice 
Thorpe argued that Bellinger’s claim lay in the territory of the family justice system, 
which ‘must always be sufficiently flexible to accommodate social change. It must also 
be humane and swift to recognize the right to human dignity and to freedom of choice in 
the individual’s private life. One of the objectives of statutory law reform in this field 
must be to ensure that the law reacts to and reflects social change… I am strongly of the 
opinion that there are not sufficiently compelling reasons, having regard to the interests 
of others affected or, more relevantly, the interests of society as a whole, to deny this 
appellant legal recognition of her marriage.’ 277 
 
The Bellinger case demonstrates the progress in understanding the normative boundaries 
of gender and sex by the court. Even though the case decided against the appellant, the 
dissenting opinion that argued for the consideration of ‘psychological gender’ should be 
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regarded as a basis for overturning ECtHR case law only a year later. In a similar claim 
to Bellinger in 2002, the ECtHR decided that member states’ ‘margin of appreciation’ 
was limited in the case of recognizing transgender persons before the law, thus departing 
from the biological model. 
 
The biological model of transgender recognition in law clearly limits the enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms for transgender people. The model has been widely criticized, 
including by Andrew Sharpe, who writes that ‘transgender people represent for the law a 
challenge to the notion of sex as naturally immutable, and therefore serve to problematize 
the basis of gendered and heterosexual subjectivities.’278 Sharpe goes on to argue that the 
law has a policing function over gender fluidity, which in a number of different contexts, 
‘deploys pre/post-operative transgender/cross-dresser, transgender/homosexual, 
natural/unnatural, sexual/non-sexual and sexually functional/dysfunctional dyads as 
regulatory strategies around bodies’. 279  Sharpe speaks widely to the claims of 
heteronormative nature of the law and its ability to accommodate genders outside binary 
systems, and proposes a ‘reformist model’ of transgender recognition, which is similar to 
the gender self-determination model, discussed below. The biological model allows the 
application of the non-discrimination principle. Some court cases, such as Ulane in the 
US, indicate that the person concerned was discriminated against on the basis of 
transgender identity. 
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The biological model frames gender non-conformity as a matter of choice and hence 
curbs the ability of the courts to characterize the discrimination experienced by 
transgender persons.280 As explained by Romeo, by employing the biological model of 
transgenderism, ‘courts characterized that the expression of transgressive gender 
identities as something that the plaintiffs did, rather than as legitimate expressions of who 
they were, without any critical consideration of the performative nature of all gender or 
the societal enforcement of gender norms’. 281  Romeo relies on Butler’s gender 
performativity concept282 to demonstrate the failure of the law to accommodate gender 
variance, or non-binary expression of gender. Indeed, this is also demonstrated in the 
courts’ reluctance to articulate the concept of gender in international legal fora, as well as 
in specific jurisdictions (particularly in the US, the UK and at the ECtHR). For example, 
the ECtHR until 2002 ruled that the matter of recognition of transgender individuals in 
the law fell under the margin of appreciation of the member states, even though the Court 
was aware of the serious human rights violations faced by transgender people.283 Also it 
is important to note that despite the Corbett effect on judicial practices across the 
common-law countries,284 as analysed above, developments show that there has been a 
great disparity as to how common-law systems approached the issue to transition from a 
biological model, albeit continuing to reinforce the heteronormativity of gender.  
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3. Medical Model of Transgender Recognition in Law 
 
The fact that the ‘transgender phenomenon’ is largely understood as a subject of medical 
studies is hardly surprising. Since the 19th century, the transgender phenomenon has 
been studied by the medical profession. 285  Before the emergence of the terms 
‘transsexuality’ and ‘transvestite’, the occurrence of ‘transgenderism’, albeit without 
being named, was a subject of study in sexology. For example, Sharpe writes that Karl 
Heinrich Ulrich’s work from the late 19h century described the phenomenon of 
transgenderism without giving it a name.286 Jay Prosser also states that in the early days 
of the emergence of ‘sexual inversion, sexologists sought to describe not homosexuality 
but a broad transgender condition of which same-sex desire was but one symptom, and 
not vice versa’.287  
 
Sexologists in the early days widely believed that ‘transsexuality’ was ‘mentally 
unhealthy’. For example, in 1950, David Cauldwell wrote, ‘are transsexuals crazy? One 
may as well ask whether heterosexuals are crazy. Some are and some are not. Some 
transsexuals are brilliant. Now and then one may be a borderline genius. Transsexuals are 
eccentric. Some of them are not of sound mind, but this is true of heterosexuals’.288 
Cauldwell’s arguments are still relevant today. His concept of ‘psychopathia 
transexualis’ as an independent sexological category was widely researched in relation to 
the phenomenon of transgenderism. He started using the term ‘transsexual’ by 1949 to 
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refer to ‘individuals who wish to be members of the sex to which they do not properly 
belong and who desired surgery to alter their physical characteristics to resemble those of 
the opposite sex’.289 Earlier, in 1931, Dr Felix Abraham reported in the medical literature 
that surgical conversion of a man to a woman had been accomplished. 290 At the same 
time, the early stages of medical theory defined ‘transsexualism’ as a cerebral 
(specifically, a temporal-lobe) pathology, a cytogenetic disorder, an enzyme defect and a 
neurohormonal disorder. 291  And despite the fact that a medical definition of 
‘transsexuality’ had been developing for years to incorporate hormonal aspects of brain 
structures and sex, it remained overall under strict medical scrutiny.  
 
Despite his contribution to the development of the transgender phenomena, Cauldwell 
strongly opposed possible ‘sex change surgery’ on a mixture of ethical292 and practical 
grounds – it cannot, he argued, make a ‘real’ member of the opposite sex.293 Such belief 
indeed puts Cauldwell in opposition to Benjamin, who strongly believed in sex change 
via medical intervention, for the sake of transgender people. Both Cauldwell and 
Benjamin, though different in their approaches to the transgender phenomenon, had an 
immense impact on developing and conceptualizing the medical model of transgender 
recognition in law, which until now continues to impact the ways in which the 
transgender concept is understood.  
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Both Cauldwell’s and Benjamin’s work has been further embodied in the law and has 
strongly involved medical science in the decision-making on legal recognition of 
transgender persons. Even more so, Benjamin developed detailed guidelines on ‘gender 
identity disorder’ positing that those who suffered from ‘gender dysphoria’ or ‘gender 
identity disorder’ by no means all fitted the classic picture of the ‘transsexual’, although 
they all shared the fact that they ‘were intensely and abidingly uncomfortable in their 
anatomic and genetic sex and their assigned gender’.294 Procedures introduced in the 
1950s to diagnose transgender persons are still very much guidelines for the medical 
community. This also had the impact of heavily medicalizing ‘transgenderism’ and 
‘transsexualism’. International institutions such as the WHO-ICD, as well as national 
psychiatric associations such as the American Psychiatric Association (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)), also incorporate some of the elements of 
‘transsexuality’ in their classification systems and further contribute to depathologization 
of transgender communities. 
 
3.1. Medical science and the law: legal recognition of gender change  
 
The medical model of legal recognition of transgender identities has in fact become a 
standard test for courts around the world. Medical evidence is understood to be the most 
reliable in litigation on the basis of which courts grant a person the right to change their 
identity documents, or to be recognized in the law. With very few exceptions, most 
countries will require a person to provide a medical certificate as evidence of gender 
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identity disorder when making an application for legal recognition of their gender. The 
courts, domestic or international, heavily rely on medical evidence to attest to a person’s 
sex change. One such case is Goodwin, which not only revolutionized the ECtHR’s 
approach to transgender recognition but also transitioned European and possibly 
international jurisprudence too from the biological to the medical model of recognition. 
  
Christine Goodwin, born in the UK in 1937, was a post-operative male-to-female 
transgender person. In the mid-1960s, she was diagnosed as a ‘transsexual’. Although 
she married a woman and they had four children, her conviction was that her ‘brain sex’ 
did not fit her body. From that time until 1984, she dressed as a man for work but as a 
woman in her free time. In January 1985, the applicant began treatment in earnest, 
attending appointments once every three months, which included regular consultations 
with a psychiatrist as well as, on occasion, a psychologist. She was prescribed hormone 
therapy and began attending grooming classes and voice training. Since that time, she has 
lived fully as a woman. In October 1986, she underwent surgery to shorten her vocal 
chords. In August 1987, she was accepted on the waiting list for gender re-assignment 
surgery, which took place in 1990 at a National Health Service (NHS) hospital.295 
 
Ms Goodwin was denied retirement at the age of 60 (the retirement age for women in the 
UK at the time) and was requested to make her pension contributions until she reached 
65, which was the age of retirement for men in April 2002.296 She had to choose between 
revealing her birth certificate and forgoing certain advantages, which were conditional 
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upon her producing her birth certificate.297 Goodwin was denied marriage to a male 
person since, in the eyes of the law, she remained a male (under section 11(b) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 of the UK, which applied at that time, any marriage where 
the parties were not respectively male and female was void).298 This test was very much 
based on the case of Corbett v Corbett, decided earlier in 1970s. Moreover, Ms Goodwin 
was not allowed to change her birth certificate from male to female as the determination 
of sex in the UK law exclusively used biological criteria (chromosomal, gonadal and 
genital), as developed by Justice Ormrod in Corbett v Corbett. The only case where an 
amendment was allowed in a birth certificate was if an error had been made when the 
birth was registered. No error was accepted to exist in the birth entry of a person who 
undergoes medical and surgical treatment to enable that person to assume the role of the 
opposite sex.299 This further meant that even though the state-funded NHS system 
provided surgical intervention, it did not provide the means for legal recognition. Those 
‘transsexuals’ who changed their sex continued to be recorded for social-security, 
national-insurance and employment purposes as being of the sex recorded at birth.300 In 
short, the state had created a legal gap, in which transgender people were not able to 
access their rights. 
 
In discussing the Goodwin case, the ECtHR derived its recent reasoning in Sheffield and 
Horsham v the UK. 301  It considered the third-party submissions highlighting the 
comparative studies from other jurisdictions, especially with similar legal systems. For 
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example, there had been statutory recognition of gender reassignment in Singapore.302 
The literature also indicates a similar pattern of recognition in Canada, South Africa, 
Israel, Australia, New Zealand and all except two of the states of the US.303 The Court in 
particular highlighted the cases from New Zealand and Australia where the 
‘transsexuals'’ assigned sex was recognized for the purposes of validating their 
marriages.304  
 
Goodwin mainly argued against the fact that she was not allowed to marry in her newly 
assigned sex, which violated her right to private life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 8 was the only clause that allowed 
transgender rights claims at the ECtHR. The Court considered a number of applications 
on this matter, where it maintained that the issue of surgical intervention and legal 
recognition of post-operative ‘transsexuals’ came under the margin of appreciation of the 
member states.305 The Court argued on deriving from its own jurisprudence ‘in the 
interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law.’306 Applying the 
living instrument argument of the ECtHR further allowed the Court to respond to the 
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changing conditions within the respondent State and within Contracting States 
generally.307  
 
Having established its position, the Court further articulated its reliance on the role of 
medicine in Goodwin’s case as a ‘transsexual’ person. It continued to observe that ‘the 
applicant, registered at birth as male, has undergone gender re-assignment surgery and 
lives in society as a female. However, the applicant remains, for legal purposes, a male. 
This has had, and continues to have, effects on the applicant’s life where sex is of legal 
relevance and distinctions are made between men and women, as, inter alia, in the area 
of pensions and retirement age…. However as she is employed in her gender identity as a 
female, she has had to obtain an exemption certificate which allows the payments from 
her employer to stop while she continues to make such payments herself’.308 The ECtHR 
further notes that ‘the applicant’s gender re-assignment was carried out by the NHS, 
which recognizes the condition of gender dysphoria… Nonetheless, the gender re-
assignment which is lawfully provided, is not met with full recognition within the law, 
which might be regarded as the final and culminating step in the long and difficult 
process of transformation which the transsexual has had to undergo’.309 The Court, 
however, called the UK government’s actions illogical as it had provided a state-funded 
operation, yet refused ‘to recognize the legal implications of the result to which the 
treatment leads’. 310 
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In order to substantiate its reasoning, the Court also explored the medical condition of 
‘transsexuality’. Relying on the research available, the ECtHR stated that ‘there are no 
conclusive findings as to the cause of ‘transsexualism’ and, in particular, whether it is 
wholly psychological or associated with physical differentiation in the brain’.311 It went 
on to assert a growing acceptance of findings of sexual differences in the brain that are 
determined pre-natally.312The Court also considered that ‘transsexualism’ has wide 
international recognition as a medical condition for which treatment is provided in order 
to afford relief, both discussed earlier.  
 
The Court employed medical research on ‘transsexuality’ to argue that, while a 
‘transsexual’ cannot acquire all the biological characteristics of the assigned sex, ‘with 
increasingly sophisticated surgery and types of hormonal treatments, the principal 
unchanging biological aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal element…. It is not 
apparent to the Court that the chromosomal element, amongst all the others, must 
inevitably take on decisive significance for the purposes of legal attribution of gender 
identity for transsexuals’.313 The Court also argued that there was an emerging consensus 
within the Council of Europe (CoE) and elsewhere (specifically, in Australia and New 
Zealand) already providing legal recognition following gender re-assignment and stated 
that sex, in the context of a ‘transsexual wishing to marry, should depend on a multitude 
of factors to be assessed at the time of the marriage.314 The Court explained its previous 
position on the margin of appreciation and standing in 1980s transgender rights cases. It 
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noted that very little common ground existed between states then and not many states in 
fact permitted sex change.315  
 
In the view of the ECtHR, a common understanding on changing gender and acceptance 
has grown over the years.316 The Court noted that, as this matter was too important for 
general jurisprudence to fall under the margin of appreciation, there were no significant 
factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of the individual applicant in 
obtaining legal recognition of her gender re-assignment. Hence the Court reached the 
conclusion that the ‘fair balance that is inherent in the Convention now tilts decisively in 
favour of the applicant. There has, accordingly, been a failure to respect her right to a 
private life in breach of Article 8 of the Convention’.317  
 
The Goodwin case was revolutionary in achieving the right to legal recognition of 
transgender persons with gender re-assignment surgery. However, as seen in the 
reasoning of the ECtHR, it still remained heavily reliant on medical evidence (including 
the standards of the WHO and national guidelines for the treatment of transgenderism).  
 
In subsequent cases, the ECtHR continued to call on states to provide medical and legal 
measures for the recognition of gender identity. It further means that the Court has 
become ever keener to apply existing international human rights norms to transgender 
persons. For the Court, Article 8 on the right to private life became a gateway for 
transgender persons to seek protection for various breaches of their rights. For example, 
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in L v Lithuania, the claimant was seeking gender-reassignment surgery. Even though 
Lithuanian law recognizes the right to change not only gender but also civil status 
(paragraphs 25, 27, and 29), there was a gap – because no law exists in the country 
regulating full gender-reassignment surgery. Consequently, the applicant found himself 
in the intermediate position of a pre-operative transsexual, having undergone partial 
surgery, with certain important civil status documents having been changed. However, 
even when the applicant undergoes full surgery, his personal code will not be amended 
and, therefore, in some significant situations for his private life, such as employment 
opportunities or travelling abroad, he remains a woman.318 Having found a violation of 
Article 8 of the ECHR, the Court found that the circumstances of the case revealed a 
limited legislative gap in gender-reassignment surgery that left the applicant in a situation 
of distressing uncertainty vis-à-vis his private life and the recognition of his true 
identity.319  
 
Similarly, in YY v Turkey, the applicant complained about the infringement of the right to 
respect for private life (Article 8), on the grounds that he had not been allowed to 
undertake gender-reassignment surgery.320 The applicant was repeatedly denied surgery 
on the grounds that there was not enough medical evidence that he could live as a male 
person. Medical reports issued by the İnönü University Medical Centre indicated that, 
despite the fact that the person had a ‘transsexual constitution’ and ‘sex change was 
necessary for his mental health, he was still able to procreate (in his feminine nature),’321 
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contrary to Turkish law for sex change surgery, which requires that a person should be 
unable to procreate if such surgery is requested.322 In other words, full sterilization is 
required for those who want to have a gender change recognized in law. 
 
In this case, the ECtHR was able to consider developments that took place since the 
Goodwin case in 2002, namely the resolutions by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
CoE323 and the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE.324 While 
assessing the member states’ legal practices, the Court found that the infertility criteria 
were in fact a requirement under the law in Turkey.325 In order to establish whether 
Article 8 was in breach, the Court scrutinized the criteria for access to general gender-
reassignment treatment (e.g., hormone therapy), which included diagnosis of ‘gender 
dysphoria’ or ‘gender identity disorder’. The ECtHR established that ‘while approaches 
vary from state to state as to the requirements for legal recognition of the preferred 
gender and procedure governing access to gender-reassignment treatment, it seems that 
some laws are confusing the legal recognition of the preferred gender, and the procedure 
governing access to gender-reassignment treatment’.326 In this case, the ECtHR relied on 
the Goodwin test to find Turkey in breach of Article 8 for not providing the applicant 
(YY) with access to sex change surgery. In applying Article 8, the Court explained that  
while Article 8 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing an 
unconditional right to gender-reassignment surgery, it has previously held that 
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transgenderism is recognised internationally as a medical condition which 
warrants treatment to assist the persons concerned (Christine Goodwin).327 
 
Here the Court goes even a step further and amalgamates ‘medical condition’ with 
Article 8 to guarantee or authorize treatments including surgeries such as gender 
reassignment’.328 The Court took a few more steps to advance the application of human 
rights norms and rejected the practice developed by the Turkish government to request 
sterilization before undergoing sex change surgery, strictly policing the state's margin of 
appreciation. The Court noted that what was at stake was the freedom to define one’s 
gender identity (‘appartenance sexuelle’), a crucial component of the right to self-
determination.329 
 
The ECtHR has progressed its reasoning since. In the recent case of A.P, Garçon and 
Nicot v France,330 the Court, again relying on Article 8 of the Convention, argued against 
the obligation to establish the irreversible nature of the change in their appearance 
(infertility requirement in French law before changing a gender). The Court specifically 
looked at the medical evidence and infertility test as a pre-requisite for making an 
application for legal recognition, scrutinizing its case law to hold that requiring a 
sterilization as a precondition to one’s gender identity recognition amounted to a breach 
of one’s right to respect for private life and physical integrity under Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
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A.P, Garçon and Nicot v France is monumental in that it argued that an infertility 
requirement (sterilization) for the purposes of gender legal recognition should no longer 
be a margin of appreciation. To make its case, the Court found that legal recognition of 
gender self-determination had developed far enough to have become a common practice. 
Sixteen countries in total within ECtHR jurisdiction have abolished the requirement of 
sterilization in law.331 And even though there are about 24 countries in the CoE that still 
require infertility as a pre-condition for lodging an application for the legal recognition of 
a transgender person,332 the Court noted that many of them are currently reconsidering 
the approaches to the matter.333 The Court also relied on policy developments in France 
and elsewhere, indicating a fast-progressing pace of developments,334 which in the 
Court’s view meant that there was sufficient agreement on the matter between the states 
to reach the decision.  
 
The Court further argued that forcing transgender persons into being sterilized was 
tantamount to a breach of the right to respect private life and their physical 
appearance.335 Indeed, imposing a legal requirement to undergo full surgical intervention 
puts individuals in a dilemma: either to undergo a sterilizing operation and renounce the 
full exercise of their right to respect for their physical integrity and privacy or to 
renounce recognition of their gender identity and therefore the full exercise of the same 
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right. Such reasoning and ECtHR case law allowed the judges to find France in breach of 
Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
The A.P, Garçon and Nicot v France is a landmark case that has yet to see its full impact 
on law-making and its application to transgender persons, not only within the CoE, but 
also outside the region it covers. The case articulates that the legal requirement for 
infertility (sterilization), upon which the medical model is based, to recognize 
transgender persons in their newly acquired gender should be considered a breach of 
human rights. Such reasoning gives a wider possibility for adopting a model that is not 
strictly based on the medical model, but on self-determination of gender. While this has 
been a gradual development in many parts of the world, the case of A.P, Garçon and 
Nicot has set a new milestone in advancing the right for transgender persons to be 
recognized in law.  
 
The heavy reliance of the legal system on the medical profession in relation to gender 
identity has been widely criticized by scholars, both in law and sociology. For example, 
Tey Meadow observed that medicine produces no singular definition of maleness or 
femaleness and therefore the courts should not seek corroboration from the medical 
profession. She criticized the medical profession for its interference in court matters: 
‘they [the medical profession] enumerate constellations of bodily and psychological 
indicia and then provide social rationales for why some of gender’s indicia matter more 
than others’.336 Meadow further argued that the law actively constructs the fabric of the 
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gendered body and ties it to relationships with others. While no courts treat gender solely 
as an elective property of individuals, almost half of the courts allow for movement 
between gender statuses. The process of legitimation relies most heavily on medical 
procedures associated with ‘treating transsexuality (efforts to surgically and hormonally 
align the physical and psychological gender of the litigant)’.337  
 
Such a merging of the law and medical science produces a relational construct. Non-
conformity to particular models of gender roles and sexual preference has been linked to 
mental disorder since the emergence of a psychiatric classification. Commenting on 
mental health and human rights, Louise Newman highlights that concepts of gender, sex 
roles behaviour, sexual difference and sexuality have been central to psychiatric 
discourse and concepts of mental disorder and that concepts of healthy psychological 
functioning or normality have been linked to models of gender behaviour and sexuality, 
assuming that gender conformity is intrinsic to mental health.338 She further argues that 
psychiatry as a discipline has been implicated in the explicit and implicit use of its theory 
to pathologize and stigmatize individuals with gender and sexual variance, and continues 
to be involved in mediating access to certain medical interventions such as ‘sex-
reassignment procedures’ for ‘transsexual’ individuals.339 In fact, the approach that 
gender conformity is intrinsic to mental health has been a leitmotif for the entire history 
of the medical model. Cauldwell, Benjamin and others who conducted early research on 
the issue all used the same argument of mental health. In fact, the WHO, which is the 
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global institution that determines the classification of diseases and can have an impact on 
the possible end of the medical model, has also struggled with this notion. Although the 
WHO declassified homosexuality as a disease in the 1990s, it retains the language in 
reference to ‘transsexuality’. 340  One of the reasons this matters is that the WHO 
classification tool is used as evidence for claims in support of a medical model of 
transgender recognition. A quick glance is necessary to understand its role in transgender 
medical policy-making and opportunities for the depathologization of transgender 
persons.  
 
3.2. World Health Organization: the ICD and pathologization of transgender people 
 
The WHO-ICD341 considers ‘gender dysphoria’ and/or ‘gender identity disorder’ as 
illnesses. The American Psychiatric Association changed the name of ‘gender identity 
disorder’ to ‘gender dysphoria’,342 although such a diagnosis remains a major condition 
for a sex change surgery. The concepts of ‘gender dysphoria’ and ‘gender identity 
disorder’ appeared in the medical and social literature in the mid-1990s and quickly 
became established as a dominant category in the medical literature for diagnosing 
transgender persons.343 
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‘Gender dysphoria’ is the term used to describe those suffering from a conflicting gender 
identity. The term was coined by Norman Fisk in 1973 for the purpose of capturing fully 
the diverse group of persons requesting sex-reassignment surgery.344 He also tried to 
reflect the fact that applications for sex reassignment came from a variety of persons, by 
no means all of whom fitted the classic picture of the ‘transsexual’.345 Indeed, as Andrew 
Sharpe argues, the introduction of the language of gender dysphoria gave expression to a 
more liberal and pragmatic approach, already adopted in practice by some clinicians to 
requests for sex-reassignment surgery. 346  At the same time, Sharpe shares King's 
criticism that the new terminology shifted the emphasis from sexuality to gender.347 Even 
if the language change positively impacted on access to sex-reassignment surgery, it to 
some extent also produced negative discursive effects. In his seminal book Transgender 
Jurisprudence, Sharpe asserts ‘while the term “transsexualism” has a relation to 
ontology, where sex-reassignment surgery might be viewed as a route to the realization 
of being, the language of gender dysphoria serves to translate desire into need and 
disorder’.348 
 
Once the new terms were introduced, changes were made in the classification systems. 
For example, in the revised 1994 version of the US DSM-IV, the word ‘transsexualism’ 
was replaced by ‘gender identity disorder’, which signified a person who has a strong 
cross-gender identification and who suffers from gender dysphoria.349 Earlier, soon after 
the terms were first coined in the 1970s, they were adopted by the founding committee of 
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the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association and by the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1979.  
 
According to Bonnie and Vern Bullough, the definition of ‘gender dysphoria’ was 
revised and simplified in the revised DSM third edition in 1987. The essential criteria for 
the diagnosis were ‘a) persistent discomfort and a sense of inappropriateness about one’s 
assigned sex; b) persistent preoccupation for at least two years with getting rid of one’s 
primary and secondary sex characteristics and acquiring the sex characteristics of the 
other sex and c) the person has reached puberty’.350 
 
The DSM was revised again in the 1990s (i.e., DSM-IV) and it was proposed to change 
the definition of gender disorders, including ‘transsexualism’ to make it less dependent 
on surgical interventions. In addition, more careful attention was paid to appropriately 
defining gender dysphoria in both males and females.351 
 
The WHO revision process of the ICD-10 is in progress, with the aim of adopting a new 
ICD-11 in 2018 at the GA of the WHO.352 Therefore, current transgender activism and 
advocacy is focused on the removal of trans-specific categories from the ‘Mental, 
behavioural and neurodevelopmental disorders’ chapter of the ICD-10 and the inclusion 
of a trans-specific category in the ‘Conditions related to sexual health’ chapter in the 
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ICD-11 beta draft.353 This is particularly important as the current ICD-10 still contains 
‘gender dysphoria’ as an illness on the list,354 which is used by the authorities to ask 
transgender persons for medical evidence of their ‘illness’, should they identify as non-
binary or desire to undergo a surgical sex change. 
 
The new draft publication includes two new categories proposed by the WHO Working 
Group: ‘Gender incongruence of adolescence and adulthood’ and ‘Gender incongruence 
of childhood’. It is important to note here that this terminology change is intended to 
provide stigma-free definitions. But activists argue that, by adopting a language of 
gender incongruence, the WHO will dispose of the term ‘gender identity disorder’. As 
defined under the draft, both categories are part of a new draft of ICD-11: Chapter 17 
‘Conditions related to sexual health’. The so-called beta draft will be voted on at the 
WHO assembly in 2018.355 Critics worry, however, that even if there is a consensus 
among professionals on removing transgender diagnoses from the ‘Mental, behavioural 
or neurodevelopmental disorders’ chapter in the ICD-11, it is still likely that this will not 
happen. The proposed changes in the draft ICD-11 still must be endorsed by the states at 
the World Health Assembly in May 2018.356 And there are a number of ‘hostile’ 
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countries that might try to block the ICD-11. Therefore, it remains essential to continue 
mobilization of transgender community against pathologization.  
 
3.3. Criticism and depathologization movement 
 
While some still argue that medical treatment of ‘transsexual’ persons is the right way 
[easily achievable and regulated in law], others oppose ethical aspects of heavy 
medicalization and the labelling of transgender persons as mentally ill. Jennifer Levi and 
Bennett Klein contend that the medical model of transgender recognition perpetuates the 
stigma and social prejudice associated with the disability, because it treats the individual 
as deficient and inherently inferior because she falls below the arbitrary physiological 
standard that delineates social acceptance, which can only be normalized and 
incorporated into society through a medical cure.357 Similarly, arguing against the 
medical model, David Evans highlights that gender identity clinics treating ‘transsexuals’ 
are presented as monitoring the efficacy of their patients’ script-learning and pre-
performance skills in the presentation of un-contentious stereotypical cross-gender styles, 
which are ultimately fake because of the biological anomaly.358 Evans further comments 
that walking, speaking and dressing skills are rigorously rehearsed in these clinics: ‘Dr 
Reid… asks pre-operative “transsexuals” to try and live in the opposite role for at least a 
year before embarking on any irreversible procedures’.359 In his view,  
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whether “transsexuals” are “discovered” or “constructed” by the clinicians they 
approach or to whom they are referred is a moot point, but in a sense it is also 
irrelevant in that ‘transsexualism’ as a social construct establishes its existence 
for those who develop an extensive negotiation with the category as a means of 
giving themselves a sex/gender/sexual identity.360  
 
Opponents of transgender pathologization argue that labelling ‘gender identity disorder’ 
as a mental illness is ‘a double-edged sword: while it allows access to hormone therapy, 
it does so by describing transgender individuals as somehow sick or infirm’,361 and ‘this 
description is at odds with the transgender community’s conceptualization of itself’.362 
Queer theorist Butler has also argued against the medical model of ‘treating 
transsexuals’. She writes that the design and structure of the ‘gender identity disorder’ 
diagnosis creates a paradoxical situation in which it is possible to say that the diagnosis 
intensifies the very suffering that requires alleviation.363 In particular, Butler refers to 
social stigma, associated healthcare fees and violence experienced by transgender people 
while going through the ‘imposed way’ of medical intervention for changing sex.  
 
There are also supporters of the medical model. Prosser, for example, emphasizes the 
‘transsexual’s’ need to live not in the borderland but ‘in a home of his own, on one side 
or the other of that border’. The incongruence that dissociates the self from its body, 
argued Prosser, makes the transgender community the ultimate subject of pathology.364 
Furthermore, with his concept of ‘politics of home’, Prosser describes the ‘transsexual’s’ 
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need ‘to pass’ in the new gender identity for success as signifying the correlation 
between gender identity and social identity.365 ‘Post-transsexuality’, he claims, ‘forgoes 
in advance what has yet to be gained, namely, recognition of the new gender identity and 
the right to make a home in that identity’.366 Radical feminist Janice Raymond, who 
wrote in opposition to a transgender community, states that ‘without [medicine’s] 
sovereign intervention, transsexualism would not be a reality’.367 She calls the medical 
model a ‘remedy’ for treating ‘transsexualism’.368 In her writings, Raymond attempts to 
underline the importance of the medical model of ‘transsexuality’ by noting ‘it is only 
because transsexualism is widely accepted as a condition requiring psychiatric and 
medical intervention in effect as a disease or disease-like that the social and political 
questions surrounding transsexualism are not primary’.369 What this means is that the 
medical model has been used as a way for transgender persons to access rights and 
freedoms. The tension between having access to rights and freedoms through the 
pathological framework and no access to rights still divides the transgender community, 
even as they continue to fight over the recognition of their identity.  
 
The medical model creates an environment where not only international human rights 
law itself seems limited in recognizing transgender persons, but also one in which the 
condition of a heteronormative structure of gender is imposed but with no human rights 
protection in place. The pathologization of the gender identity still seems to prevent the 
possibilities for a full recognition of transgender persons in international human rights 
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law, hence providing meaningful protection. Jens Theilen explores the concept of 
depathologization of transgender persons through international human rights law and 
argues that even though those two subjects at first glance look dissimilar and unrelated, 
international law has a great deal to offer the depathologization of transsexuality, that is 
‘to annul the gender dysphoria clause from the books’.370 This could also help to widen 
the applicability of international human rights law to transgender persons. While 
acknowledging the limitations of law, Theilen argues that international human rights law 
has the power to deconstruct the pathological character of ‘transsexuality’ under the 
WHO medical guidelines and offer a wider and more humane approach to recognizing 
transgender persons.  
 
Theilen argues that only a limited number of human rights mechanisms have engaged 
with transgender depathologization as a substantive human rights issue and takes the 
opposing view from the one developed under earlier ECtHR case law. She departs from 
the medical model and bases her arguments on the fact that pathologization ‘may become 
an obstacle to the full enjoyment of human rights by transgender people’.371 For example, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which monitors implementation 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its concluding 
observations to Germany wrote that ‘with concern that transsexual and inter-sexed 
persons are often considered to be persons with mental illness and that the State Party’s 
policies, legislative or otherwise, have led to discrimination against these persons as well 
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as to violations of their sexual and reproductive health rights’.372 Indeed, within the 
context of the right to health, there should be room for developing a right to 
depathologization for transgender persons, which will have to correlate with the States’ 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.373 However, the right to health should not be 
understood in narrow terms, as only in relation to sex change. A broad understanding of 
the right to health should be used as defined under international human rights law. On 
this, while trying to find common ground between transgender depathologization in the 
jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and 
the ways in which the WHO has dealt with the issue, Theilen argues that the right to 
depathologization should also be a part of gender identity as understood under the 
Yogyakarta Principles and further enshrined in the human rights treaties.  
 
The reasoning and vision set out by Theilen in her article are not idle. Some elements of 
the deconstruction of the pathologization of transgenderism have already been 
implemented in a few countries. However, insofar as the medical conditions remain a 
mandatory requirement for gender recognition at a medical, sociological or legal level, 
transgender persons will continue to face stigma, rejection and denial of rights, including 
the very essence of being – a right to personhood enshrined in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR). In fact, what she is proposing is how gender self-
determination understands gender identity – an important element that needs to develop 
further in order to allow transgender persons to achieve full recognition in law. 
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4. Gender Self-determination Model of Transgender Recognition in Law 
 
Although a relatively new concept, many authors attempted to explore gender self-
determination in the late 20th century. The self-determination of gender – for the 
purposes of this thesis also called the ‘gender self-determination model’ – found its 
application in legal systems as early as a decade ago. In re Blue Diamond Society, the 
Supreme Court of Nepal in 2008 found that laws and practices that discriminated against 
‘sexual minorities’ and third-gender people were unconstitutional.374 The decision of the 
Supreme Court specifically focused on the ‘third gender’ – metis – who were targeted by 
police and others for their non-conforming gender expression and identity.375 And 
because the metis were routinely denied citizenship cards, they did not have access to the 
range of entitlements and benefits that such cards provided.376 As the case analysis 
reveals, this case was about citizenship in its most basic sense. Metis were not recognized 
as citizens of Nepal. The Supreme Court emphasized the universality of all human rights, 
with regard to which the Court heavily relied on international human rights law, UN 
jurisprudence and the Yogyakarta Principles,377 and ordered that metis be given identity 
cards that reflected their ‘third gender’ and that protections against discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity and non-discrimination be enshrined in the new constitution. As 
citizens of Nepal, people of the third gender are entitled to all rights protected by the 
constitution and international law and, as the Court established, it was the ‘responsibility 
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of the State to create the appropriate environment and make legal provisions accordingly 
for the enjoyment of such rights’.378  
 
The new constitution of Nepal, adopted in 2015, includes a specific provision under Part 
2, Article 12 that ‘the person who is entitled to the citizenship of Nepal by descent may 
obtain the citizenship certificate of Nepal from the name of his/her mother or father along 
with gender identity’.379 Though this was enacted eight years after the Supreme Court 
judgment, it should be considered a success in achieving recognition of gender self-
determination via a court ruling in which medical evidence for the change of sex, or 
determination of sex (based on the person’s biology) was deemed irrelevant.380 The 
Nepalese government has introduced a new passport regime with ‘O’ gender in 
recognition of a third-gender citizenship.381 In the words of The Diamond Blue Society, 
which litigated the case, ‘In the community, where many transgender people identify as a 
third gender, an “O” passport will make a huge difference’.382  
 
The Nepalese case is ground-breaking and a long-overdue achievement that demonstrates 
that self-identification can and should be the sole factor in obtaining legal documents for 
what individuals consider their right gender. A number of states of various legal fora and 
political structures subsequently have adopted similar practices, with several countries in 
the region following the Nepalese example in granting certain rights to transgender 
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people. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan now legally recognize more than two genders in 
some way.383 For example, in 2009, the Supreme Court of Pakistan called for a third-
gender category to be recognized,384 while in Bangladesh, the cabinet issued a 2013 
decree recognizing hijras as their own legal gender.385 In 2014, India’s Supreme Court 
issued an expansive judgment recognizing a third gender, affirming the right of every 
person to choose his or her gender.386 In addition, a Delhi High Court ruling in October 
2015 outlined an intrinsic link between the right to legal gender recognition and other 
rights, depicting the clear applicability of human rights law to transgender persons. In 
that case, affirming a 19-year-old transgender man’s right to recourse against harassment 
by his parents and the police, Justice Siddharth Mridul wrote:  
‘gender identity and sexual orientation are fundamental to the right of self-determination, 
dignity and freedom. These freedoms lie at the heart of personal autonomy and freedom 
of individuals. A transgender [person’s] sense or experience of gender is integral to their 
core personality and sense of being. Insofar as I understand the law, everyone has a 
fundamental right to be recognized in his or her chosen gender’.387  
 
Argentina broke ground in 2012 with a law now considered a ‘gold standard’ for legal 
gender recognition.388 Argentina’s Gender Identity Law provides that ‘anyone over the 
age of 18 can choose their gender identity, undergo gender reassignment, and revise 
official documents without any prior judicial or medical approval’.389 The law has 
widened the scope also to allow children to do so with the consent of their legal 
representatives or through court summary proceedings. 
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According to the Human Rights Watch 2016 World Report, in the last three or four 
years, four more countries – Colombia, Denmark, Ireland and Malta – have explicitly 
eliminated significant barriers to legal gender recognition.390 Sixteen countries in Europe 
have some kind of procedure that allows gender legal recognition without a legal 
requirement for infertility (forced sterilization) in some form.391 The legal environment in 
these countries allows transgender persons to change their gender marker on documents 
simply by filing the appropriate forms.392  
 
While those countries have sought the best solutions to enable gender self-determination 
in their local legal cultures and political structures, all of them have one thing in 
common, namely a complete rejection of the pathologization of transgenderism and an 
embracing of the principles of respect for dignity and equality of a person.393 The laws in 
those countries set new standards on legal gender recognition,394 setting examples for 
other countries as to which model to choose.  
 
The gender self-determination model now in place in many countries around the world is 
indeed based on a queer analysis of gender. It rejects the medical model of transgender 
recognition and allows a wider transgender citizenship, not limited to sex change. That 
recognition widens the scope of transgender rights – and LGBTIQ rights more broadly – 
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including marital rights, employment rights and other rights. Despite such achievements 
however, it remains to be seen how that change can be reflected in the implementation of 
gender self-determination. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
While still a foundation for the thesis, this chapter attempted to provide a brief analysis 
as to how queer theory and transgender studies are applied in different legal models. 
Indeed, each model examined in this chapter faces limitations in its approach to 
transgender legal recognition. These limitations are not only due to the ill-suited structure 
and heteronormative nature of the law, but also to the scarcely developed theoretical 
foundation for the application of such law to non-binary gender. 
 
Each of the models that recognize transgender identity has evolved logically and 
corresponded to developments in feminist, queer and transgender theory. If the biological 
model determines gender by relying on a person’s biology, rendering any deviation from 
established norms unnatural and deviant,395 the medical model seeks strict conformity 
with the biological sex and the only way it allows a deviation from this rule is to define 
gender non-conformity as a medical condition. From the perspective of the protection of 
transgender rights, the biological model fundamentally disregards the transgender 
concept because it considers gender-crossing deviant, unnatural and fraudulent.396 On the 
other hand, the medical model allows transgression, but it is through the deviance 
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framework that legal redress for transgender persons is made possible. In the medical 
model, medical science becomes heavily involved in legal decision-making on changing 
and legally recognizing persons’ newly acquired genital organs. Both of those models 
have been largely deemed as not respecting the integrity and inner self of the person. Yet 
the medical model has helped transgender persons to access therapy and social 
acceptance.397 In fact, as outlined above, for a long time, medical evidence (surgery) was 
the only way through which transgender persons could achieve some forms of realization 
of their human rights. However, that recognition has come with a compromise as to what 
are the specific rights that are realized under such model. Forgoing one right to obtain 
another does not fit within the international human rights framework and indicates the 
need for reform, either of the framework or of the recognition model. The model chosen 
in the international community and the transgender community, however, is to adjust the 
framework of human rights protection to accommodate fluid genders, which would mean 
broadening the application of human rights law to include all of them. 
 
The ‘reformist’ model as a way of recognizing gender self-determination has been widely 
debated as the best fit for the recognition of transgender persons before the law, as well 
as with the wider protection framework of transgender persons.398 And while this model 
aspires to the basic acceptance and recognition of the very essence of a human being – 
dignity and personhood – it embraces both the biological and the medical models. It also 
suggests that ‘gender is recognized as a fundamental aspect of human life, which every 
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person has the capacity and inherent right to control’.399 This model too is not without 
flaws, which will be further explored (particularly in the prison context) in the thesis.  
 
The application of these three different models has further highlighted the benefits of 
each system, but also the limitations of each in securing the protection of human rights 
and freedoms. In places where transgender people are still forced into the 
heteronormative structures of society and law, they will continue to present a challenge 
and therefore serve to problematize the basis of gendered and heterosexual subjectivities. 
Before these challenges and limitations are examined in Chapter Four, the thesis will 
continue to explore the international recognition of transgender identities in the next 
chapter. As seen so far, some international mechanisms, particularly the ECtHR and the 
UN human rights bodies, have played a significant role in establishing jurisprudence 
under each of the models of transgender recognition. In each of the models, international 
human rights law has been applied to protect transgender individuals and provide 
guarantees. The journey has not been easy, however. Just as the formation of transgender 
studies was characterized by tensions with feminist and queer studies, its recognition 
under international human rights law has also encountered difficulties. The next chapter 
will look specifically at transgender and non-binary gender recognition, and its formation 
under the human rights framework. 
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PART TWO 
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Chapter III  
Applying the International Human Rights Law Framework to Transgender and 
Non-binary Identities  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Human rights claims for transgender persons have been characterized by constant 
tensions, whether internal within the wider ‘sexual minority’ group or external with 
medical science and legal theory. Challenges to achieving identity-specific recognition in 
international human rights law, as a gateway for access to a range of human rights and 
freedoms, are not isolated. The International Bill of Human Rights remains silent on 
SOGI rights. In fact, for a long time, ‘sexual minorities’ did not share the mainstream 
human rights protection that other groups, such as racial and religious minorities, enjoyed 
in the post-World War II era.400 This is hardly surprising since in the 1950s and 1960s – 
when the seminal human rights treaties were being debated, drafted, and adopted – 
LGBTIQ individuals were barely visible in the domestic realm and all but invisible on 
the international stage, despite having been one of the groups persecuted during the 
Holocaust.401  
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Despite the absence of LGBTIQ-specific norms, international human rights law is not 
created independently of general developments at the national level or regional 
mechanisms. The progress in achieving the recognition of LGBTIQ rights since late 20th 
century has been somewhat reflected in such developments. Yet, politically dominated 
bodies such as the UN can still be a place for lengthy debates before norms are 
formulated. Transgender activism, as well as policy and legal developments, at national 
and regional levels are important predicaments for creating norms within the UN.  
 
Though language specific to transgender rights is absent from the original texts of the 
international conventions, considerable progress has been made to incorporate it into 
current standards. Early debates over sex, sexuality and gender via the feminist 
movement have played a critical role in the formulation of SOGI rights at the UN. 
Starting in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted three major resolutions 
on SOGI. Other UN agencies, such as treaty-monitoring bodies, the Special Procedures 
(SPs) mechanisms and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), regularly address SOGI 
rights in their general comments, concluding observations, recommendations and 
thematic reports. The Yogyakarta Principles were drafted and widely endorsed by the 
UN human rights bodies. The establishment of the first-ever UN mandate on SOGI 
should also be considered a milestone in the recognition of LGBTIQ rights. 
 
Notwithstanding such progress on SOGI rights in the last decade of UN norm-making, 
several countries, often acting as a unified group, actively contest the notion of SOGI and 
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reject the existence of LGBTIQ rights in international human rights law.402 Those 
contestations are not new. However, in parallel to the intensification of LGBTIQ 
mobilization at the UN, opposition has also grown active and aggressive.403 The latest 
attempts to block the SOGI-specific mandate are indeed evidence of that.  
 
Political trade-offs regarding the language in policy documents and negotiations have 
had a lasting effect on the progress of SOGI rights in international human rights law. The 
analysis provided in this chapter will illuminate the developments and challenges in 
forming transgender rights norms at the UN. To provide a comprehensive overview of 
the trajectory of the formulation of transgender rights, this chapter will start by 
examining gender and sexuality within international human rights law, followed by an 
analysis of SOGI norms in UN human rights jurisprudence. 
 
This chapter takes a journey through recent UN history to examine how and to what 
extent human rights law has grown to incorporate transgender rights, their applicability 
and the limitations. It looks particularly at three major resolutions of the HRC, as well as 
the Yogyakarta Principles and their role in advancing human rights law for the 
transgender community. Towards the end, the chapter will analyse recent developments 
at the UN level, and the creation of the SPs mechanism on SOGI.  
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2. Getting the UN Talk Gender – The Feminist Activism 
 
While both concepts – sex and gender – are subject to the variations of their infinite 
manifestations, the law seeks to encompass their expression within singular, fixed 
categories.404 Over a number of decades, sex and gender were understood as synonymous 
terms.405 Within UN institutions and human rights bodies, sex and gender were either 
used interchangeably or gender was often used to connote women. 406  Such an 
understanding of sex and gender also indicates that there was a firm belief in the 
biological model of the sex/gender dynamic. Thus, it was only logical that international 
human rights law had to be challenged in international, political and legal forums for its 
oblivious attitude towards gender and sexuality. With the feminist movement 
intensifying its women’s rights advocacy at the UN,407 international human rights law 
also had become responsive to  developments in gender and queer theories. 
 
Advocacy for ‘sexuality rights’ at the UN was only made possible in 1992, when a cycle 
of UN conferences began in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 408  Commenting on the UN 
Conference in Brazil, Rosalind Petchesky notes that before 1993, the words ‘sexuality’ or 
‘sexual’ had never appeared in an intergovernmental document at international level, 
with the notable exception of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in 
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405 Sex and gender were understood as synonymous terms. For example, The CEDAW Committee General Recommendations and 
other jurisprudence mainly speaks about women as a single sex category, though uses terms such as ‘gender’. 
406 Françoise Girard, ‘Negotiating Sexual Rights and Sexual Orientation at the UN’ in Richard Parker, Rosalind Petchesky and Robert 
Sember (Eds), Sex Politics: Reports from the Front Lines.; http://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/book/index.php., accessed on 12 April 
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407 Girard (n 406). 
408 First of such conference was a Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit).; For more detailed counts on this 
see: Richard Parker, Rosalind Petchesky and Robert Sember (Eds),  Sex Politics: Reports from the Front lines (Sexuality Policy 
Watch 2007). 
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provisions on protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.409 UN records show 
that the word ‘gender’ had been agreed by governments many times before (as recently 
as Cairo410 and Copenhagen411), and appeared in dozens of paragraphs in the draft 
Platform for action.412 In those cases, however, ‘gender’ was associated often used 
interchangeably with ‘woman’. Also, gender was hardly regarded as a sexual right. A 
famous phrase by Petchesky that sexual rights were still the ‘newest kid on the block’413 
may not be referring to specific groups only, but to the limitations regarding general 
sexuality rights in international human rights law. Petchesky further argued for the 
necessity of negotiations over the terminology of sexuality and rights, as it meant that a 
new space ‘in the human rights lexicon for acknowledgement of diverse sexualities and 
their legitimate need for expression’414 could open. The difficulty of such discussions 
within the channels of international human rights procedures could not be underestimated 
though. 
 
Of all the key events that took place during the 1980s and early 1990s, the fourth UN 
World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) was the most significant milestone in 
advancing the concept of sexual rights.415 Even though those rights were discussed in the 
context of women’s sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and 
violence, the conference also sought to address sexual orientation rights, although no 
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411 World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace Copenhagen (14 to 30 July 1980), 
At http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/otherconferences/Copenhagen/Copenhagen%20Full%20Optimized.pdf. accessed on 
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agreement was reached.416 That ‘fleeting appearance’ of the term “sexual orientation” in 
the draft document of the Beijing Declaration also allows an observation that a political 
trade-off was, in fact, taking place over the issues of reproductive rights’.417 The 
reference to sexual orientation was taken out of the final document of the conference, 
again with strong opposition from religious and other traditional-values support 
groups.418  
 
Interestingly, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action contained a reference to 
sexuality while there was still active opposition to the term ‘gender’.419 One explanation 
for this might have been the fact that the term ‘gender’ caused controversy.420 It was 
understood that the language in the outcome document was designed to eliminate the 
possibility that gender might refer to socially constructed feminine and masculine 
roles,421 hence allowing social constructionism theory into legal and policy fora. For 
example, the Holy See requested that the term ‘gender’ be grounded in biological sexual 
identity, male or female.422 Due to the Holy See’s take on gender, it was impossible to 
talk about gender identity.423 As noted by Girard later on, it was clear that representatives 
of the Holy See were against the inclusion of gender, as they made a direct connection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 
UN GAOR, 50th Sess., (1995) UN Doc. A/CONF 177/20, reprinted in Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) 
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with ‘transsexuality’.424 It seems that the term ‘gender’ was increasingly becoming a 
source of interest for different groups, making it an overpopulated site for consideration 
by the states.425 Because gender has a core role to play in transgender politics and theory, 
raising the issue of gender in the Beijing context would have been unacceptable for the 
Holy See.426 
 
Even though the conferences described above were specific to women’s rights, the very 
events themselves helped to encourage discussions on gender identity too. This was 
important because women’s human rights have a longer history, more support and a 
better track record of success than those related to gender identity.427 However, due to the 
different agendas pursued by each group, the advocacy advanced by one group was often 
to the disadvantage of the other group.428 Another reason for a divide has been the 
feminist agenda itself, which was strictly based on binary sex separation between women 
and men.429 Introducing gender as a social construct and the adoption of such a term in 
the Beijing declaration could mean undermining the very foundation of sex 
differentiation that feminists were basing their advocacy arguments on. Maybe this was 
the reason for clear tensions between feminist and some of the ‘sexual minority’ groups 
at the Beijing conference. As reported by some of the participants in the conference, ‘in 
Beijing, feminists and lesbians (and those who overlapped) did not always see eye to eye 
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on objectives and tactics. Some sexual-rights activists working on paragraph 96 [the 
paragraph related to sexuality]’ did not approve of the visibility of the Lesbian Caucus, in 
part because they thought this would jeopardize the negotiations on paragraph 96, but 
also, in some cases, because of discomfort felt with the issues raised by lesbians.430 None 
of those discussions concerned transgender persons or gender identity issues. The 
advocacy was led by feminist groups whose interest was advancing women’s rights by 
using a heteronormative idea of the sexes.  
 
Despite this, feminist theory and activism in international fora such as the UN made 
several important inroads for the SOGI rights. These include allowing feminist theory on 
the separation of the social and the biological, insisting on the difference between what is 
the product of human ideas, mutable and changeable, and what is the product of biology, 
stable and relatively unchangeable.431 The second contribution relates to the first: by 
separating the social and the biological, the constructed and the innate, feminist theory 
insisted that gender was not something innate or ‘essential’ to an individual’s identity.432 
In light of this nexus between feminist theory and sexual identity, Zeidan further notes 
that it is not surprising that at the Beijing Conference, which marked the first substantive 
discussion of sexual orientation,433 transgender rights – or specific rights and freedoms in 
the context of gender identity – were ‘off topic’, first given the nature of the conference, 
but also because of the under-developed character of the concept itself. 
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Women’s rights advocacy within UN forums resulted in success in putting violence 
against women on the international agenda as a human rights issue. Although it 
strengthened the essentialist view of sex and gender, it also contributed to widening the 
debates on language, which could later be used to develop inroads for ‘sexual minorities’ 
to mobilize around international organizations and form coalitions. Once that space had 
been created by feminist activists, ‘sexual minority’ advocates indeed took full advantage 
of numerous UN meetings, including the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and, 
most importantly, the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing.434 The rejection of 
discussions about problems faced by ‘sexual minority’ groups within the UN also had a 
political character. This included denial of the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) status for LGBTIQ organizations and not allowing them to participate in the 
UN meetings for over 10 years.435 Regional mechanisms repeated the same practice. For 
example, in 2010, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
refused to grant the Coalition of African Lesbians (CAL) observer status, citing that CAL 
did not promote any of the rights enshrined in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter).436 A few years later, in 2015, the Commission 
granted CAL observer status.  
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3. Achieving Recognition of Transgender and Non-binary Identities at the UN 
Level: First Attempts 
 
The history of feminist, queer and transgender activism and advocacy are deeply blended 
and interdependent. Therefore, it is difficult to pinpoint when the term SOGI was first 
used and whether the context was actually the UN. Sporadic mentions of the terms 
‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ have been described in this chapter. What is 
important to highlight, however, is the complexity of the term SOGI acquiring a human 
rights meaning. ‘Transsexualism’ in fact may have been the concept through which 
SOGI acquired a human rights meaning. For example, a brief overview of the literature 
indicates that the first document in the SOGI literature database that mentions SOGI as a 
term dates back to the conference on ‘Transsexualism, medicine and law’ that was held 
in Amsterdam at the Vrije Universiteit on 14-16 April 1993.437 A note presented 
by Rothblatt, in ‘An American perspective on transgender health law’, affirming that the 
‘sexual orientation and/or gender identification suspect class naturally groups gays, 
lesbians and transgendered people for the same kinds of reasons that race and ethnicity 
suspect classes group their constituent possibilities (e.g. Polish, Latin, Asian).’ 438 
Rothblatt further recommended that each category of SOGI was different, just like racial 
or ethnic groups.439  
 
Indeed, from a human rights perspective, the historic meaning of this note should not be 
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underestimated. Firstly, it puts the questions in context and identifies ‘sexual minority’ as 
an identity group worthy of rights; secondly, the note coins the rights concept for SOGI, 
which can be adjudicated from a human rights perspective. Despite that, SOGI as a term 
was not much used in the 1990s. While human rights and sexual orientation was a salient 
matter for ‘sexual minority’ groups’ advocacy, gender identity was somewhat neglected. 
The 1990s saw very little, if any, organizing of transgender people around their human 
rights. Both terms – gender identity and sexual orientation – came back in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s and the crystallization process started to take place in the ‘Geneva 
periodical parlances involving bodies and minds from many different quarters’.440 
 
In fact, much of the earliest work concerning the recognition of human rights for ‘sexual 
minorities’ was done within the European system, not the UN or any other regional 
body.441 Some UN member states have consistently attempted to work the concerns of 
‘sexual minorities’ into the language of UN documents, and those attempts were 
routinely plagued with problems.442 Particular attention will be paid to four major 
attempts to create a specific SOGI framework within the UN including the failed attempt 
in 2003 to pass a resolution (though it created a foundation for subsequent successes). 
With a growing body of the jurisprudence and political support from countries, SOGI 
rights have achieved a new standard in securing the protection of the rights of 
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LGBTIQ.443 
 
3.1. Building momentum: 1980–2000  
 
The analysis of official UN material in 2000 indicates that the first concept mentioned 
was in fact sexual orientation. Categories of individuals mentioned also mainly included 
gay and lesbian persons, with occasional reference to ‘transsexuals’. Most often, terms 
used for the group category was ‘sexual minority’. The UN Human Rights Commission 
adopted a resolution supported by Sweden, which was a followed up by the report of the 
UN Special Rapporteur (SR) on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
addressing murders based on sexual orientation.444 Before that, in 1999, the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), in its concluding 
observations to Kyrgyzstan, recommended that ‘lesbianism’ shall ‘be reconceptualised as 
sexual orientation and that penalties for its practice be abolished’. 445  The sexual 
orientation rights were included in all resolutions on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions (since 2000 with the exception of 2001446) adopted by the Human Rights 
Commission447 and later the Human Rights Council (referred in this thesis as HRC), with 
the approval of the UNGA.448  
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Sexual orientation as a human rights claim expanded in different human rights areas. In 
2002, the UN Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution on the death penalty that 
criticized capital punishment for non-violent acts, including sexual relations between 
consenting adults.449 This resolution was repeated over the years450 until the sole standing 
resolution on sexual orientation rights was not proposed in 2003. Clearly, as scholars 
argue, both thematic resolutions with reference to sexual orientation were very limited, 
competing against all the other challenges brought to the attention of the UN,451 but 
admittedly, those attempts created a foundation to openly discuss sexual orientation 
rights within the UN and push for a wider protection framework, including for gender 
identity.  
 
As described above, the gender identity references in UN documents were virtually non-
existent in the 1990s and early 2000s. Despite sporadic mention of gender identity in 
single documents in different jurisdictions, the term did not appear in UN language until 
the mid-2000s. Even more, the first UN resolution proposed for the protection of ‘sexual 
minorities’ did not contain a reference to gender identity, further illustrating the 
compromise between states and political trade-offs. The journey of gender-identity 
language into SOGI and the broader human rights framework of the UN is described in 
Chapter Four. 
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3.2. The Brazilian Resolution and aftermath: 2000–2008 
a. The Brazilian Resolution 
 
A resolution entitled ‘Human Rights and Sexual Orientation’, proposed by the Brazilian 
delegation (the Brazilian Resolution) at the 59th session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 2003, came as a surprise for many, including those countries that have 
traditionally supported sexual orientation rights.452 Brazil had given no advance warning 
to states – even friendly states – that it was going to introduce the resolution. It had 
indicated, however, that there was some sound language in the UN resolutions clearly 
referring to sexual orientation rights, and it was time to escalate that work in some form 
of document. 
 
In the resolution, Brazil simply sought to acknowledge the occurrence of human rights 
violations based on victim’s sexual orientation and to reaffirm that the principles of the 
international human rights law apply to all individuals, including ‘sexual minorities’.453 
The resolution was introduced during the final days of the session, meaning that not 
enough political support could be gathered or professionals and activists be present to 
brief friendly state delegations on the subject matter, which would have helped facilitate 
discussions but also decision-making in support of the proposed resolution.454 Records 
indicate that not much discussion was held on the proposed resolution and the definitions 
included in it, and a large number of states opposed it.455 For example, it was only 
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because of the meaning of the term ‘sexual orientation’ – or rather the lack of 
information – that immediately turned the Vatican and the Organization of Islamic 
Coordination (OIC) against the resolution. 456  Records also show that there was 
indifference to the subject at that time, and not many supporters could be found among 
government representatives to pass the resolution.457 Some countries went even further to 
argue that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be a violation of human 
rights.458 Other delegations called the draft resolution ‘inappropriate’, alleging that it did 
not lie within the scope of the UN, and proposed a ‘motion of no-action’.459  
 
And indeed, the proposed resolution did create a division among member states. Political 
division and territoriality on thematic issues within the then Human Rights Commission 
(the Commission) also showed the reluctance of some countries to engage in active 
political pressure in support of the resolution. For instance, drawing on first-hand 
interviews with activists, Girard wrote that some governments, including Sweden (which 
had supported the resolution on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions) and 
Canada, had felt ownership of the issue, and were not happy to see Brazil taking their 
leadership role without consultation.460A Swedish diplomat stated in a conversation with 
Girard that ‘it’s OK to surprise your opponents, but not your allies’.461 Germany, on the 
other hand, strongly supported the Brazilian resolution and welcomed the fact that 
leadership on the issue had come from a country outside the Western bloc.462 Records 
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show that Germany was unwilling to take over sponsorship of the resolution, fearing that 
would label the initiative as Western. 463 Interestingly, some Western countries silently 
opposed the language of the resolution. For instance, records show that, although Ireland 
aligned itself with the EU against the ‘motion of no-action’464 on the resolution,465 it 
opposed the inclusion of gender identity rights.466 It is not clear, however, whether there 
were initial discussions among states, or whether Brazil had intended to include gender 
identity in the resolution. The fact that Ireland traded with the language indicates that 
there was a discussion among member states; otherwise activists might have pressed for 
the inclusion of the language in the resolution. Official records show, however, that 
gender identity was not raised in any further discussions on the Brazilian Resolution. 
Specific groups mentioned during the debates within the sexual orientation rights 
framework included ‘homosexual’ and ‘bisexual’ persons.467  
 
During the preliminary debates on the resolution, some countries boycotted the 
negotiations. In fact, there was a major backlash around the absence of an official 
definition of sexual orientation in law, which gave hostile countries grounds to argue 
against sexual orientation. Three main opposition arguments were put forward against the 
resolution: first, that the issues of gender and sexuality did not fall within the scope of 
international human rights; second, that the term sexual orientation was not adequately 
defined in international law; and last, that religious law prevented them from accepting a 
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notion of equality for ‘sexual minorities’.468 On the basis of those three arguments, the 
‘motion of no-action’ was proposed primarily to prevent further discussion of the 
resolution. The ‘motion of no-action’ was overcome by 24 to 22, with six abstentions.469 
However, another five amendments to the resolution were proposed. This also meant that 
the resolution was adjourned to the next session for further debate on the proposed 
amendments. That vote was won with 26 in favour of adjourning the issue, 21 against, 
and six abstentions.470 The voting records show an interesting division of interests and 
positions of states. For example, some of the Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Mexico, Costa Rica and Peru) abstained from voting – Argentina in both cases, and the 
rest during the vote on adjourning the issue. Armenia also abstained from voting in the 
second case, whereas the Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand and Cuba, which 
had abstained during the vote on the ‘motion of no-action’, voted to adjourn the 
resolution to the next session in order to delay discussions.471 It seemed that only 
Australia, Canada, the European and some Asian countries fully supported the 
resolution.472 Despite this, states did not work together to incorporate the proposed 
changes to the draft resolution, and when such meetings did take place, no consensus was 
reached (i.e., with Pakistan on behalf of the member states of the Organization of Islamic 
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Cooperation). 473  Records show an intensive character of the debates within the 
Commission where Pakistan tried to rule out the resolution, and, opposing countries, 
such as Germany, Sweden, Canada and others, supported to maintain the resolution for a 
vote.474  
 
The Brazilian Resolution was deferred twice in the next session and finally withdrawn in 
2005.475  
 
b. The aftermath 
 
Even though the draft resolution was new to the UN, the issue itself was not new. As 
illustrated above, the treaty bodies, the SPs and the Commission had all touched on the 
issue of SOGI rights in the previous years. Hence, it was anticipated that the draft 
resolution would establish a framework for a comprehensive discussion of sexual 
orientation rights. At the same time, the resolution was strictly based on existing 
multilateral instruments, all of which had been adopted by the Commission before 2003. 
 
The Brazilian Resolution did not in any manner create new rights, but merely affirmed 
that the existing rights framework is intrinsically applicable to all, regardless of sexual 
orientation.476 Despite this, authors, activists and supportive states all criticized Brazil for 
its unexpected and un-collaborative move to propose the resolution without consultations 
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on the issue. Garvey, for example, suggests that Brazil’s proposal of the resolution was 
likely to fail because the country should either have waited for international courts and 
committees to develop a more concrete view of the subject, or made sure that it had 
enough supporters to pass the resolution.477 This statement is somewhat justified. Not 
only was there no solid political and legal support for the protection of the sexual-
orientation rights, but there was also little community activism for norm-making. The 
UN was not a friendly place for LGBTIQ groups in the early 2000s, with LGBTIQ 
groups continuously denied access to UN meetings. On the other hand, the UN 
mechanisms had already generated some jurisprudence on the ‘sexual minority’. And the 
overwhelming majority of votes for the resolutions on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions and the death penalty at the UN over the years contained ample ground to 
consider that countries were ready to take the issue to the next level.  
 
Despite the failure of the Brazilian Resolution, some positive outcomes can be noted. 
First, it had the effect of ‘raising the profile of human rights and sexual orientation’ in 
international governing bodies, which in turn ‘helped advance those rights throughout the 
course’.478 Second, it not only sparked increased efforts in the LGBTIQ movement to 
mobilize (even though the resolution did not expressly address gender-identity issues), 
but also opened up possibilities for supportive governments to introduce numerous 
similarly themed documents at other UN bodies.479 And, third, it may have pushed 
activists, human rights defenders and members of the LGBTIQ community to advocate 
for the inclusion of gender identity in their advocacy messages.  
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The years after 2003 were marked by multiple statements expressing concern at 
discrimination based on SOGI and some sixty countries signed at least one statement.480 
In 2005, New Zealand delivered a statement on behalf of a cross-regional group of 33 
states.481 It highlighted that ‘over the past decade, several UN human rights treaty bodies 
had found that sexual orientation should be understood as a status to be protected against 
discrimination.’482 New Zealand argued that ‘the issue should remain on the agenda of 
the Commission; and that it was time to break the silence surrounding the question’.483 In 
the following year, Norway, on behalf of 54 states, including 18 members of the newly 
established Council, presented a statement on human rights violations based on SOGI to 
the HRC.484 This was the first time that SOGI as a single concept was mentioned at the 
UN, and an added benefit is that it offered a way for the extension of the application of 
human rights law to transgender persons. For example, in July 2006, the first World 
Outgames, held in Montreal, launched the Declaration of Montreal, which was the first 
attempt to summarize the main demands of the international LGBT movement in the 
broadest possible terms and explain them in the language used in international 
organizations.485 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights delivered the keynote 
address at the International Conference on LGBT Human Rights, held in parallel to the 
World Outgames.486 By March 2008, the number of supportive countries for what had 
become the ‘annual statement on SOGI’ rose to 60, with Slovenia and Argentina making 
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separate but similar statements.487 As the mobilization for the LGBTIQ rights continued, 
in December 2008 Argentina delivered a joint statement at the UNGA on behalf of 66 
member States.488 Both the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights released statements in support of SOGI rights.489 As explained above, by the time 
the statement at the UNGA was organized, countries had already started using the term 
‘SOGI’, meaning that active discussions were taking place at UN meetings between state 
delegations, experts and activists over the inclusion of various groups that came under 
the ‘sexual minority’ umbrella. At the same time, the parallel process of drafting the 
Yogyakarta Principles meant that there was much interaction among academics, 
diplomats, experts and activists over terminology, which further helped the UN 
diplomats and staff to understand the reciprocal relationship between human rights and 
SOGI.490 
 
The UNGA statement in December 2008, supported by 66 member states, was a 
recognition of the developments in regional human rights mechanisms and built its 
claims on the existing human rights framework. That unification of states revealed the 
clear choice of political priorities for the UN and for progressive member states. It also 
underlined the need for better knowledge on SOGI issues among UN member states. The 
difference between the number of states that supported SOGI rights and those that 
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opposed them was marginal. For example, 66 states supported the political statement on 
SOGI rights, while 57 member states supported an alternative joint statement read by 
Syria that questioned the notion of SOGI.491 In that statement, states protested that SOGI 
‘have no legal foundation’ and suggested that recognizing those concepts could lead to 
the ‘legitimisation of many deplorable acts, including paedophilia’.492 Such attacks on 
the LGBTIQ community were not new. The same argumentation had been used 
throughout the 1990s when LGBT rights organizations and advocacy activists were in 
fact denied the opportunity to engage with the UN on those matters.493  
 
The UN human rights bodies, including the treaty bodies, the SPs and the Commission 
(later replaced by the HRC), were also part of the process that worked with the Office of 
the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), academics and other 
internationally recognized professionals and activists to start the process of interpreting 
the application of international human rights law to SOGI. That process took several 
years, however, and was accelerated by a more coordinated and well-structured 
document: the Yogyakarta Principles, which until now serves as the reference guide for 
SOGI rights.  
 
4. Yogyakarta Principles (2006) 
 
The absence of a normative background on SOGI issues, and opposition from some 
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states with regards to the roots of SOGI rights in international human rights law, 
prepared the ground for the OHCHR to facilitate a series of meetings and workshops 
with experts and activists, with the aim of linking SOGI rights with international human 
rights law and providing an interpretation of how the two intersect. As noted by Michael 
O’Flaherty, ‘although ultimately not pursued, the Brazilian resolution on sexual 
orientation and human rights did raise States’ awareness of the issues, and mobilised 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from all regions to engage in UN processes’.494 
Since early 2000, the OHCHR had led the process of consultations among UN experts, 
academics and activists to draft the principles, which would later become the 
‘Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in 
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’.495 Also, in 2005, a coalition of 
human rights NGOs facilitated by the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) 
and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) led a series of consultations where a 
proposal for developing the Principles originated.496 In addition, a few statements were 
prepared to help ensure coherent understanding of SOGI rights in international law. For 
example, as noted above, in 2006, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
addressed the International Conference on LGBT Rights held in Montreal, Canada, 
highlighting the need for a more comprehensive articulation of SOGI rights in 
international human rights law. To further illustrate the importance of state and UN 
experts’ participation in creating jurisprudence on the matter, she stated that ‘(i)t is 
precisely in this meeting between the normative work of States and the interpretive 
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functions of international expert bodies that a common ground can begin to emerge’.497 
Indeed, at this point it was clear that common language was necessary for advocacy 
purposes, especially given states’ inconsistency in their use of language and reference to 
SOGI rights.498 For instance, ARC International observed that particular confusion was 
caused by the concept of ‘gender identity’, with some mechanisms and states referencing 
‘transsexuality’ as sexual orientation, and others frankly acknowledging that they did not 
understand the term.499 More confusion was caused by the battle of terminology, as some 
SPs, treaty bodies and states preferred to speak of ‘sexual orientation’ or ‘gender 
identity’, while others spoke of ‘lesbians’, ‘gays’, ‘transgender’ or ‘transsexual’ people, 
and still others spoke of ‘sexual preference’ or ‘sexual minorities’.500 The process of 
drafting the Yogyakarta Principles in the end served not only as a way of providing an 
interpretation of the international human rights law, but also of mobilising experts, 
academics and activists to agree on terms and definitions to bring consistency to SOGI-
rights language. 
 
To develop a comprehensive document that would articulate the application of human 
rights law to SOGI, 29 experts were invited to undertake the drafting of the Principles. 
Experts came from 25 countries representative of all geographic regions. Most 
importantly, it involved one former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Mary 
Robinson, also a former head of state, of Ireland); 13 current or former UN human rights 
special-mechanism office holders or treaty-body members; two serving judges of 
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domestic courts; and a number of academics and activists.501 The drafting process took 
over 12 months and was finalized in late 2006 at an international seminar at Gadjah 
Mada University, in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on 6-9 November 2006. The Principles were 
officially launched on March 26, 2007, at the UN headquarters in New York and at the 
OHCHR in Geneva.502  
 
The Yogyakarta Principles consist of 29 principles, each containing a statement of 
international human rights law, its application to a given situation and an indication of 
the nature of the state’s duty to implement the legal obligation. The Principles are 
designed to establish a background for the universality of human rights and their 
application to all persons without discrimination and the right of all people to recognition 
before the law (Principles 1-3).503 Principle 11 addresses the fundamental rights to life, 
freedom from violence and torture, privacy, access to justice and freedom from arbitrary 
detention, whereas Principles 12-18 provide background for the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights.504 Principles 19 to 21 cover issues such as expression of one’s 
identity and one’s sexuality without State interference, based on SOGI, including the 
rights to participate peaceably in public assemblies and events and otherwise associate in 
community with others.505 Other rights include asylum from persecution based on SOGI 
(Principles 22 and 23), and the right to participate in family life, public affairs and 
cultural life without discrimination based on SOGI (Principles 24 to 26).506 Principle 27 
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specifically recognizes the right to defend and promote human rights without 
discrimination based on SOGI, and the obligation of states to ensure the protection of 
human rights defenders working in these areas. Holding rights perpetrators accountable 
and ensuring remedy for those who face rights violations on the grounds of SOGI is 
secured in Principles 28 and 29.507  
 
The Yogyakarta Principles have become the most influential, yet unofficial, set of human 
rights standards in developing SOGI norms within international, regional and national 
fora.508 They have played an important role in codifying soft law on the issues of SOGI, 
as well as establishing a generic framework for the application of human rights to 
LGBTIQ. The high level of representation of experts, academics and grassroots activists 
gave the Principles both great political weight in terms of impact and lent them to 
legitimacy of the individuals concerned. As O’Flaherty and Fisher summarized, ‘these 
principles identified a number of different ways in which the rights of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender people are protected by international instruments and provided 
the roadmap on the issues concerned with these groups’.509   
 
Even though it has only been just over 10 years since their endorsement, the Yogyakarta 
Principles have earned their place in national court judgments,510 regional quasi-judicial 
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bodies and international human rights decisions and standards.511 The Principles form a 
non-binding agreement of international law experts who specialize in sexuality and 
gender-related rights. 512  The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has cited the 
Principles as evidence of the applicability of international law to SOGI in relation to 
guidelines for asylum-seeker protection.513 The definition of gender identity provided in 
the Yogyakarta Principles was adopted by the Argentinian legislature as the basis for the 
law on gender identity passed in March 2012.514 The Yogyakarta Principles were cited by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in General Comment 
No. 20 on ‘Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights’: the Committee 
recommended that states prohibit discrimination on the grounds of gender identity, using 
the Yogyakarta Principles’ definition of gender identity.515 Even though the General 
Comment did not cite a specific principle from the Yogyakarta Principles or any other 
substantial rights interpretation, the use of this definition by an official UN treaty body 
highlights the many possible uses of these principles and positions them in a very visible 
place within the UN.516  
 
The Yogyakarta Principles have further advanced and progressed the concept of gender 
identity. They harmonized the messages of different LGBTIQ groups and activists and 
unified the transgender-specific cause under gender identity. They also helped the human 
rights mechanisms within the UN to use the same language in order to advance gender-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 For example, the term ‘gender identity’ as provided in Yogyakarta Principles was added to the Draft OAS Convention against 
Racism and all Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance at the behest of Brazil, after it adopted the Principles as part of its Brazil 
Without Homophobia campaign (see at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/). 
512 More on this see Sanders (n 465). 
513 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity (November 21 2008) http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48abd5660.pdf accessed on 8 May 2015 
514 Dreyfus (n 406). 
515 UN ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 20  (art. 2), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2009) para. 2. 
516 Ettelbrick and Zerán (478). 
141 
 
identity rights. As David Brown highlighted, before the Yogyakarta Principles there was 
no single mention of the term ‘gender identity’ in any soft-law instrument or treaty-body 
opinion, and interpretation of regional instruments was limited to Europe.517 Since the 
launch of the Principles, international lawmakers have referenced gender identity with 
greater frequency.518 Ten years on, the Yogyakarta Principles are helping to form 
international law naturally, by virtue of repetition.519 
 
Supporters of the Yogyakarta Principles agree that the Principles rest on firm 
philosophical foundations and tend to draw upon a principled discourse of equality, non-
discrimination, and justice.520 Those who argue for the specific rights for LGBTIQ 
persons regret, however, that the Principles abandon efforts for special rights and focus 
instead on the universality of rights.521 Some criticism is also voiced that the Principles 
are too generic for the sake of being inclusive of different sex and gender principles, but 
at the same time offer a normative framework for the ‘sexual majority’.522 The role of the 
Yogyakarta Principles in developing transgender rights cannot be underestimated. Not 
only do the Principles provide a definition of gender identity, which specifically covers 
transgender people, but they also serve to establish fundamental principles on the basis of 
which individual rights of transgender persons can be claimed.  
 
It is noteworthy that the Yogyakarta Principles are currently being revised under the 
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‘Yogyakarta Principles + 10’ process. 523  Ten years on from the endorsement, 
international experts, academics and UN human rights bodies have come together to 
revise the Principles in accordance with the original Yogyakarta preamble, which 
provides that the Principles will require reflection on the current state of international 
human rights law and hence should be revised on a regular basis in order to take into 
account developments within that law and its application to the particular lives and 
experiences of persons of diverse SOGI over time and in diverse regions and countries.524 
The updated set of principles will be made public later in 2017. 
 
While it remains to be seen how the Yogyakarta Principles continue to support SOGI 
rights at the international, regional and national levels, it is also important to consider 
how much political weight it has developed. 525  SOGI rights language has been 
consistently incorporated into UN human rights bodies. For example, recent analysis of 
the Yogyakarta Principles and UN jurisprudence on SOGI shows that out of the 29 
Yogyakarta Principles, 12 have received special attention.526 From this, the top three 
priority topics addressed via the UN UPR process are those regarding non-
discrimination, the right to security and the right to privacy (decriminalization of same-
sex relationships).527 Indeed, it is not surprising to see those principles as top priorities, 
considering the number of countries that still retain criminalization of same-sex 
relationships, which affects most LGBTIQ groups. It also shows the importance of the 
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underlying principles of human rights as the basis for claiming the enjoyment of other 
rights. While different human rights bodies within the UN play different roles in creating 
the protection framework, SOGI has been applied across these agencies.528 As for the 
Yogyakarta Principles, they are persistently quoted within the UN human rights 
mechanisms, acquiring an important status as an international instrument within the UN 
forum, and have been rapidly assimilated into policymaking. Moreover, the Principles 
have fostered further debates over SOGI rights within international and regional human 
rights mechanisms to create a formal structure for rights claims.529 The Principles also 
gave way to a new era in gender-identity jurisprudence by offering a consolidated way of 
interpreting the international human rights law as understood by academics, experts and 
activists. Through such impacts, the Principles have played a crucial role in furthering 
the UN norms on SOGI rights since 2006. The section below describes developments 
relating to the SOGI resolutions, in which the principles were also instrumental.  
	  
5. Back to the UN Human Rights Council  
5.1. Human Rights Council Resolution #1 – Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity - 2011 
 
A ground-breaking statement put forward by Colombia, presented to the HRC in the 
March 2011 session on ending violence based on SOGI, was signed by 85 States – the 
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greatest number to have ever supported a statement of this kind. 530  This was a 
continuation of the statements made on behalf of 66 States at the UNGA in 2008 and the 
statement by 54 States back in 2006. Notably, in the 2011 joint statement the signatories 
came from all regions and also included South Africa. What is important is that despite 
its progressive constitution [which includes SOGI as a protected ground for 
discrimination], South Africa had so far not supported initiatives around SOGI at the UN. 
Furthermore, when voting for the Brazilian Resolution, South Africa abstained from the 
motion of no-action vote, and supported the adjournment of the draft resolution. 
However, in this instance, lobbied to support the statement, South Africa tabled a 
surprise resolution just days before the joint statement was presented.531  
 
The proposed resolution initiated the creation of an intergovernmental working group 
with exclusive competence to discuss ‘new concepts’ such as sexual orientation, and a 
mandate to clarify the meaning of sexual orientation in the context of international 
law.532 In fact, this proposition could have been a political move. By that time, the 
Yogyakarta Principles, which contained not only a definition of SOGI but also provided 
for the application of international human rights law to the concept of SOGI, had already 
attracted high political popularity.533 Hence, the resolution contained the same language 
as the Yogyakarta Principles and included a statement welcoming attention on SOGI 
issues. The draft also included a request to the OHCHR to continue to address SOGI 
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rights, including preparing a report on the situation of LGBT persons worldwide and 
calling on states to end criminal sanctions based on LGBTIQ status.534  
 
Despite the increased number of supportive statements on SOGI rights, some 
disapproval, especially from OIC countries, was also noticeable. Pakistan spoke on 
behalf of the OIC member states and reiterated that it was an attempt ‘to shift the focus 
from the real issues’ that the UN was tasked to attend to. The group further contended 
that notions of SOGI lack legal foundation in any international human rights 
instrument535 and therefore that the debates were void. That tit-for-tat approach of 
statements and counter-statements at the HRC and the UNGA seemed to have hardened 
the lines between opposing States and had not yielded the desired results. In that context, 
the initiative by South Africa to create a space for dialogue was seen as a way of moving 
the substance of the debate forward. Many, however, saw a danger in such a move and 
subsequently South Africa was persuaded to defer the resolution to the next Council 
session.  
 
On 9 June 2011, South Africa tabled a historic resolution for consideration by the HRC, 
entitled ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (Resolution 17/19). 
Active support was shown by the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries and 
backed by the Western European and Others Group. However, as in previous instances, 
when discussing draft resolutions on SOGI, the OIC member states presented an almost 
unified position, providing a string of explanations for their vote against adoption 
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(including from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Qatar and Mauritania). 
Indeed, South Africa put itself in a particularly difficult position, as it was isolated from 
most of the African Group. For example, harsh criticism was expressed from Nigeria 
(claiming to speak on behalf of the African Group), which stated that ‘the resolution fell 
outside of international human rights principles’.536 NGOs report that during the informal 
negotiations on the draft text, this isolation was marked through the absence of almost all 
of the African Group and the OIC, except Egypt, which engaged in some of the earlier 
consultations, mainly to express its view that the concepts of SOGI needed defining.537  
 
The resolution 17/19 was adopted with 23 votes in favour,538 19 against539 and 3 
abstentions.540 Mauritius, despite its previous criticism of SOGI rights and votes against 
the Brazilian Resolution, also broke from the African Group by voting in favour, while 
Burkina Faso, Zambia and China abstained, and Kyrgyzstan was also absent. In 
explanations after the vote, Mauritius noted that while it respected Nigeria’s position on 
the resolution and its position as a leader of the African Group, in this particular case its 
own position was ‘more nuanced’541.  
 
The 2011 SOGI resolution was ground breaking. It was the first standard-setting UN 
document on SOGI. The 2011 resolution also marked an important milestone that 
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garnered support from countries on all continents.542 It was followed up by rigorous work 
by the High Commissioner for Human Rights calling for the repeal of laws criminalizing 
homosexuality, comprehensive laws against discrimination, and investigations of hate-
crime incidents, and other measures to ensure the protection of LGBTIQ rights.543 
 
The 2011 resolution was pioneering in the recognition of SOGI rights, but it also set a 
standard framework for further work by the HRC and wider UN bodies. It gave guidance 
to the political spectrum of the HRC to review and debate the report on SOGI rights by 
the OHCHR. The resolution was also standard-setting for the HRC panel discussion in 
the following year and a baseline for a follow-up study by the High Commissioner. This 
further meant that a continuum of the work on SOGI would be maintained and even 
more, as seen, intensified.  
 
Since the adoption of Resolution 17/19, countries that championed the 2011 resolution 
asserted their lead in statements presented together with allies calling for a ‘genuine 
dialogue’ on the subject.544 However, those that had objected to the existence of the 
SOGI rights continued to contest possible links between SOGI and international human 
rights law and the obligations of States.545  
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Even though the HRC saw no other active developments and proposals on SOGI, the 
issues remained a focus of attention. A series of regional meetings were held in Asia, 
South America, Africa and Europe with the aim of identifying challenges faced by 
LGBTIQ persons and discussing the tools for an effective response. A final regional 
meeting took place in 2013 in Oslo, Norway, where findings from all regional meetings 
were analysed.546 The conclusions of the regional convenings showed a need for the UN 
to create a mechanism that would systematize attention on violations and discrimination 
against LGBTIQ persons. And while acknowledging that the creation of an expert 
mechanism on such a sensitive issue would be a great achievement, it was still a 
politically delicate issue for South Africa, whether it was ready to pursue this goal.547   
 
5.2. Human Rights Council Resolution #2 – Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity – 2014 
 
A second SOGI resolution was proposed for adoption at the HRC session in September 
2014. This time, a new leadership emerged, with Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay 
sponsoring the resolution. The group was determined to ensure a constructive process of 
consultations, including organising informal consultations and conversations with all 
stakeholders, including those who had concerns. Despite those attempts, the OIC member 
states presented seven amendments aimed at undermining the very sense of the 
resolution. The proposed changes targeted the term SOGI throughout the text of the 
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resolution.548 All seven of the proposed changes were put to a vote and were voted 
against.549 That result was due to the transparent process of negotiations over the 
resolution by the lead states, which eschewed procedural tactics as a way of blocking the 
proposed hostile amendments. 
 
The 2014 resolution on Human Rights and SOGI was adopted by a recorded vote of 25 in 
favour,550 14 against,551 and 7 abstentions.552 The supporting votes increased by two 
votes, and most of the support came from states of the Latin American region, the 
Western group and all states from the Eastern European group, except Russia. There was 
also increased support from the Asian group, as well as the African group, where only 7 
of its 13 member states voted against the resolution, compared with 10 in 2011.553 At the 
same time, despite some varied messages, states expressed a readiness to maintain the 
dialogue, even if they were not ready to commit their support.554 
 
The resolution once again acknowledged the work of the OHCHR on ‘discriminatory 
laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual 
orientation and gender identity’.555 It further requested that the High Commissioner 
update the report on SOGI. In particular, the resolution asked to explore how 
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international human rights law could be used as a tool to combat human rights violations 
based on SOGI.556 The states’ intention of exploring SOGI further shows a clear lack of 
information, but more importantly, it shows a common interest in further analysis of the 
ways in which human rights standards and norms could be applied to SOGI. Despite 
general attention on SOGI, however, the issue of gender identity as a specific topic and 
in relation to transgender persons, including recognition before the law, received very 
little or no attention at all.557 The main focus of the resolution and the advocacy itself 
was non-discrimination as a common right for all LGBTIQ persons. The same trend 
continued at next stages of SOGI development at the UN. 
 
5.3. Human Rights Council Resolution #3 –The Independent Expert on Protection 
against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity 
 
For the 32nd session of the HRC in 2016, the Latin American Core Group (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay) officially tabled the new SOGI 
resolution.558 The draft text sought to reaffirm the international human rights framework, 
condemned SOGI-related violence and discrimination, and proposed to create a three-
year limited-period mandate on SOGI. The language for the mandate was carefully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556 UN HRC Res (2011) A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1. 
557 More generally on sexuality and human rights, see International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Sexuality and Human Rights,’ 
(2009) At: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/47/137_web.pdf accessed on 13 January 2015.  
558 Sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay, and co-sponsored by Albania, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United States of America. Angola, the Netherlands and Paraguay 
withdrew their original co-sponsorship. Subsequently, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Serbia and Slovakia joined the sponsors.; UN HRC Report on its thirty-second session, Res A/HRC/32/2 (2016) para 169. 
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chosen to ensure that it caused no controversy during the debates.559 In other words, 
despite the HRC’s common practice of establishing a SR, in this case an Independent 
Expert mandate was proposed. The core group also understood that ‘hostile states’ would 
be working hard to defeat the resolution. Therefore, the language too would need to be 
neutral. For instance, at the first unofficial negotiations, Russia had already condemned 
the resolution as ‘complicated, controversial and unacceptable’, noting that there was ‘no 
agreement in science or law’ on the term SOGI, which lacks support from ‘the majority 
of the world’s population’. Russia declared that it was not ready to engage in the drafting 
process and walked out.560 
 
In fact, the proposed draft resolution was built on two previous resolutions from 2011 
and 2014. Both resolutions had been adopted by a majority of the HRC with support 
from all regions. And while those previous resolutions had mandated two reports by the 
OHCHR, which documented both serious violations and positive developments in all 
regions of the world, it had highlighted that there the need for a mechanism to bring more 
systematic attention to the issues.561 It also seemed in line with the Oslo Conference 
declaration on the need of SPs mechanism on the SOGI rights. Thus, the core group of 
countries proposed to create an Independent Expert mandate to assess implementation of 
existing international human rights law, identify best practices and gaps, raise awareness 
of violence and discrimination based on SOGI, engage in dialogue and consultation with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559 Arc International, ‘Appointing an Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender identity: An Analysis of Process, Results 
and Implications’, 13 June – 1 July 2016. At http://arc-international.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/HRC32-final-report-EN.pdf. 
Accessed on 12 September 2016. 
560 UN HRC Res (2016) A/HRC/32/L.2/Rev.1.;  ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
561 High Commissioner's report to the UN HRC on violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, 
A/HRC/19/41., 15 December 2011.; High Commissioner's report to the Human Rights Council on discrimination and violence against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, A/HRC/29/23, May 2015. 
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states and other stakeholders and undertake other activities geared towards addressing 
violence and discrimination on those grounds.562 Importantly, the core group persistently 
repeated that the resolution did not seek to create new rights but simply affirmed the 
applicability of existing human rights standards to those who faced human rights 
violations because of their SOGI.563 Indeed, the Yogyakarta Principles served as a 
baseline standard for this. Over 20 years of treaty-body jurisprudence recognizing 
intrinsic links between human rights law and SOGI also were used to ensure that the lists 
of grounds for non-discrimination were not exhaustive, by employing terms such as ‘of 
any kind’, ‘such as’ and ‘or other status’.564 The core group also relied on the increase in 
support for the issue between the 2011 and the 2014 HRC resolutions, encompassing all 
regions, which in the view of the core group was indicative of countries’ growing 
acceptance of SOGI rights.  
 
As expected, the opposing group, represented by Pakistan on behalf of the OIC (except 
Albania), proposed eleven amendments, which meant that the review and the adoption of 
the resolution would be complicated.565 Debates saw 29 diverse states making statements 
about their understanding of SOGI, their notion of the appropriate balance between 
cultural and religious sensitivities and respect for human rights, and divergent views of 
the meaning of universality. 566  The HRC session also witnessed government 
ambassadors struggling to talk about sexuality,567 which, given the context, made it a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 UN HRC Resolution on Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity,” (2016) 
A/HRC/32/L.2/Rev.1.; Also, ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
563 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
564 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
565 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
566 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
567 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
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awkward situation at times. It also highlighted the need for more education on sexuality 
and human rights among diplomats and those represented in the HRC and other 
multilateral meetings. 
 
The single resolution involved a series of 17 votes, including a preliminary vote on a ‘no-
action motion’ – a procedural manoeuvre aimed at blocking even discussion of the 
resolution – brought by Saudi Arabia; then 11 votes on the OIC amendments led by 
Pakistan;568 a last attempt to oppose retention of four separate parts of the text (brought 
by Qatar and the Maldives);569 and, finally, the vote on the resolution itself.570 The final 
draft resolution was adopted with 23 votes for,571 18 votes against,572 and 6 abstentions573 
(Resolution 32/2).574 The historic vote concluded in the HRC’s victory to establish the 
first UN Independent Expert on SOGI.  
 
The resistance did not stop there, however. In parallel to the OHCHR selecting 
candidates for the position of UN Independent Expert on SOGI and later approving 
Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn as the UN Independent Expert on SOGI, 575 the countries in 
opposition to SOGI were preparing to overturn the historic victory. Though the 
resolution to appoint Professor Muntarbhorn as the UN Independent Expert was adopted 
within the HRC without a vote, the African Group, in an unprecedented move, sought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
569 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
570 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
571 Albania, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Vietnam.  
572 Algeria, Bangladesh, Burundi, China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Togo, United Arab Emirates.  
573 Botswana, Ghana, India, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa. 
574 UN HRC (2016) A/HRC/32/2, Thirty-second session, Report of the HRC on its thirty-second session, A/HRC/32/L.2/Rev.1. para 
225. 
575 ILGA and Arc International (n 8). 
154 
 
halt the original Resolution 32/2 through a draft resolution at the ECOSOC. The African 
Group requested to defer consideration of and action on HRC Resolution 32/2 (creation 
of the UN Independent Expert). This was justified to allow time for further consultations 
to determine the legal basis upon which the mandate of the SP established therein would 
be defined.576 Eight Latin American States introduced a counter-amendment to contest 
the African Group’s proposal.577 It was successful – but by a tight margin of 7 votes 
(including 13 African governments that did not support the ‘African Group’ language 
opposing the mandate).578 After the third committee, the African Group tried to block the 
mandate via the UNGA. Specifically, the representatives of Burkina Faso, speaking on 
behalf of the African Group, submitted a verbal amendment to block financial support for 
the UN Independent Expert on SOGI.579 Mobilization by the states that had supported the 
SOGI resolution through all the stages (the HRC, the ECOSOC and the UNGA) showed 
strong opposition to the attempts to undermine the integrity of the HRC.580 It also helped 
increase awareness of the importance of the issue and single out countries and publicly 
shame them for overt attempts to defame the integrity of the international human rights 
infrastructure. An attempt to block the appointment of the Independent Expert on SOGI 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576  Arc International, “United Nations SOGI mandate safeguarded in face of hostility”, 21 November 2016., at http://arc-
international.net/united-nations-sogi-mandate-safeguarded-in-face-of-hostility/. Accessed on 30 November 2016.; Also, Munira Ali, 
Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray, Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, Sir Nigel Rodley, Clara Sandoval, Ahmed Shaheed (n 8) 
577 ILGALAC, 'Urgent Action Needed: SOGI Independent Expert STILL At Risk!' (2016) <http://ilga-lac.org/en/urgent-action-
needed-sogi-independent-expert-still-risk/> accessed 9 January 2017. 
578 ibid. 
579 OHCHR, “Council establishes mandate on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity.” At http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20220., Accessed on 8 January 2017.; Arc 
International, “United Nations SOGI mandate safeguarded in face of hostility”, 21 November 2016., at http://arc-
international.net/united-nations-sogi-mandate-safeguarded-in-face-of-hostility/. Accessed on 30 November 2016.; Also, Munira Ali, 
Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray, Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, Sir Nigel Rodley, Clara Sandoval, Ahmed Shaheed (n 8) 
580 In addition to the state mobilization, 870 organisations around the world came together to show support to the mandate and its 
work, and regional human rights mechanisms had expressed their support for the Independent Expert work. See at: 
http://www.ishr.ch/news/lgbti-rights-general-assembly-rejects-attempt-halt-work-uns-new-independent-expert., accessed on 3 January 
2017 
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was defeated at the UNGA by a recorded vote of 84 to 77, with 16 abstentions.581 
Finally, the UNGA’s Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues), voting 
111-2 with 59 abstentions, rejected the proposition to halt the work of the already 
appointed Independent Expert on SOGI.582 The final attempts to block the new mandate-
holder were made in unprecedented ways for the UN. The opposing countries tried to 
block financial support for the Independent Expert, a move that had never been seen 
before. Indeed, the group attempted to stop funding for the mandate as well as for a few 
other country-specific UN experts (Burundi, Iran, Syria, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories and Belarus).583 The UNGA’s Fifth Committee (Administrative & Budgetary) 
was requested to ‘stay out of politics’ and concentrate on budgetary issues in compliance 
with its mandate.584 With the Fifth Committee rejecting the financial constraints on the 
mandate, the final battle for the opposing states was lost.  
 
6. Dissecting Transgender Rights Language in the Prism of the SOGI resolutions 
 
The analysis of the three resolutions illustrates clear progress in understanding of the 
concept of SOGI, as well as problems surrounding the issue. If, for example, in 2011, the 
proposal was to open dialogues about ‘discriminatory laws and practices and acts of 
violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity,’585 in 
2014 the HRC was a bit bolder as it made an inquiry about how good practices could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 International Service for Human Rights, ‘LGBT rights | Any further attempts to halt work of UN's independent expert must be 
resisted’, 1 December 2016., At http://www.ishr.ch/news/lgbt-rights-any-further-attempts-halt-work-uns-independent-expert-must-be-
resisted., accessed on 3 December 2017. 
582 ibid. 
583 International Service for Human Rights, ‘UNGA71 | Last minute attempt to choke UN funding for human rights’, 22 December, 
2016. At http://www.ishr.ch/news/unga71-last-minute-attempt-choke-un-funding-human-rights., accessed on 23 December 2016. 
584 ibid.  
585 UN HRC Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity (2011) A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1. 
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shared with a view to ‘overcoming violence and discrimination, in application of existing 
international human rights law and standards to SOGI’.586 In the next step for the 2016 
resolution, the HRC went even further to ask the newly appointed UN Independent 
Expert on SOGI to ‘assess the implementation of existing international human rights 
instruments with regard to ways to overcome violence and discrimination against persons 
on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity’.587 All three documents have a 
common trend, which is exploring the discriminatory laws and practices that affect 
people’s SOGI. A criticism that should be made against the resolutions and the process 
of getting SOGI rights recognized at the UN is its general approach. While it is important 
to acknowledge that these resolutions have indeed created a framework in which other 
human rights bodies then can develop group or theme-specific jurisprudence (e.g., 
transgender-specific rights), it is also true that such a great (although justified) focus on 
discrimination has meant that specific aspects of individual sub-groups within the ‘sexual 
minority’ category have been somewhat overlooked. Specific rights for sub-groups 
versus the common human rights framework for the wider LGBTIQ group needs further 
exploration, which is attempted in the next chapter. However, it is important to note that 
the HRC resolutions are not considered in isolation. As outlined in this chapter, the 
specific language contained in the Yogyakarta Principles as well as jurisprudence from 
the UN human rights mechanisms should be complementary to the framework language 
proposed by the HRC.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
586 UN HRC Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity (2014) A/HRC/27/L.27/Rev.1. 
587 UN HRC Resolution on Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (2016) 
A/HRC/RES/32/2. 
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7. Conclusions  
 
The recognition of transgender persons and in particular the establishment of gender 
identity under international human rights law has been a long process that will continue 
to develop. The short overview of the UN human rights mechanisms shows that progress 
has been made towards the recognition of underlying principles of human rights. 
Although transgender rights are not clearly part of the international human rights frame, 
they have made some inroads into the system via treaty bodies’ recommendations, both 
concluding observations and some general comments on the treaties, the SPs, and the 
UPR. The drafting and endorsement of the Yogyakarta Principles have been a milestone 
in advancing transgender rights, and while this is a progressive move towards 
recognizing the sub-group-specific and identity-based right for transgender people, it still 
leaves a concern as to how general human rights apply specifically to transgender people. 
In the context where most attention is paid to the underlying principles of human rights, 
which related equally to the wider group of ‘sexual minorities’, claiming a specific right 
becomes somewhat challenging, in terms of both establishment and implementation.  
 
With this in mind, what preceded the appointment of the UN Independent Expert on 
SOGI should never be underestimated. Early feminist activism for norm-creation at the 
UN, the Brazilian Resolution and years of rejection of LGBTIQ activists created a clear 
and opportune foundation for advancing SOGI rights within the UN system and beyond. 
The recent history of transgender people has shown that, despite immense tensions both 
within the transgender community and other ‘sexual minorities’, rejection, 
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medicalization and denial of transgender embodiment, political recognition has been 
made possible both within the UN and regional mechanisms. Some drawbacks should 
also be highlighted, however. In particular, a one-size-fits-all approach does not seem to 
work for individual groups of LGBTIQ community. 
 
This chapter has attempted to illustrate the politics behind the making of gender-identity 
norms in an international context. It also showed the progression in making wider SOGI 
rights and advancing normatively – although it must be acknowledged that transgender 
rights and specific norms related to the subjective experiences of non-binary gender are 
overshadowed by the wider SOGI rights frameworks. It is hoped, however, that the new 
process of redrafting the Yogyakarta Principles will shed some light on transgender-
specific norms and definitions.  
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Chapter IV 
Examining the Applicability of International Human Rights Law Through the 
Framework of Human Rights Principles and Substantive Rights 
 
1. Introduction  
 
International human rights protection mechanisms, while still not comprehensive, 
provide a baseline structure for SOGI rights. Due to the historical journey in which 
transgender politics developed and obtained access to rights, tensions persist over how 
international human rights law applies to SOGI, the wider group of LGBTIQ, and more 
specifically to transgender persons. In the early days of political activism, disagreements 
within the transgender community and their identitarian position within the wider ‘sexual 
minority’ were rather strong, which might have hampered the advancement of 
transgender rights. At the same time, over the years the collective ask for non-
discrimination against ‘sexual minorities’ did not pay much attention to the identity-
specific requirements of transgender groups.588 
 
Transgender language, as argued in Chapter Four, did not appear in international human 
rights law until relatively late. Although relevant transgender-rights language already 
existed in the 1990s,589 only in the mid-2000s did international fora such as the UN start 
differentiating the specific needs and challenges of transgender persons.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 Minter (n 63) 143. 
589 For example, see Bill of Gender Rights’ in the USA in 1991, Gender Rights agreed in 1996.; Also, Helmut Graupner and Phillip 
Tahmindjis, Sexuality And Human Rights (Routledge 2005). 
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While international human rights law has been explicitly interpreted to apply to SOGI, 
and protection frameworks have been extended to LGBTIQ groups, two alternative 
frames of protection are usually discussed in the context of transgender rights. The first 
relies on the underlying principles of human rights and looks at LGBTIQ groups as a 
whole, and the second is interpreted to emphasize specific rights of transgender persons. 
Chapter Three illustrated the journey of recognizing transgender rights in international 
standards. It specifically studied three major HRC resolutions adopted in the last six 
years that provide the grounds for non-discrimination claims. As illustrated in those 
resolutions, principles of non-discrimination and equality have traditionally been the 
main framework within which common identities such as ‘sexual minorities’ or ‘sexual 
orientation’ were discussed.590 Perhaps that one-size-fits-all approach limited transgender 
groups to collectively organize themselves for a new identity label. It is true that the co-
label that transgender groups carried together with the other ‘sexual minorities’ did not 
help them much to frame their own. To better understand the general-framework-versus-
specific-rights dynamic, this chapter offers further investigation and research into the 
topic. 
 
Furthermore, the chapter continues to examine the applicability of international human 
rights law to transgender persons, as well as the tension between underlying principles of 
human rights and transgender-specific rights. In trying to uncover the limitations of 
human rights law in providing relevant protection for transgender persons, it will study 
the principles of equality, dignity and non-discrimination versus specific rights (the right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 O’Flaherty and Fisher (443). 
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to privacy and the right to personhood, in particular) to ascertain the limits and 
possibilities for the protection of transgender persons’ rights. 
 
As with the thesis as a whole, this chapter is limited by not providing insights from 
transgender and LGBIQ movement on mobilization and advocacy. While recognizing the 
reductive nature of desk-based research and analysis, the chapter uses the available 
literature as an opportunity to understand the common normative frame of human rights 
law and specific rights related to transgender people. By critically analysing the available 
legal framework and its limitations, as well as the making of transgender specific norms, 
it is hoped that the chapter will shed some light on the possible advancement on this 
issue.  
 
This chapter examines the rights specific to transgender persons, particularly gender 
identity and privacy rights. Due to its intrinsic link with sexual orientation, it will also 
make reference to sexual orientation where relevant. However, it should in no way be 
understood that sexual orientation is a subject of the analysis in the thesis or in this 
particular chapter. 
  
The chapter will also explore the rights of transgender persons under international human 
rights law and the limitations of such protection, if any. After cementing a foundation for 
claims by transgender persons in the general human rights protection framework, it will 
analyse human rights claims in more detail, basing individual rights claims on the 
underlying principles of human rights: equality, non-discrimination and dignity. This 
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then will be used to further examine other substantive rights for transgender people. Like 
the previous chapters, however, this chapter also relies heavily on the case law from the 
ECtHR and to some extent at the UN. Where available, other regional mechanisms and 
jurisprudence that highlight the issue of SOGI are also referenced below. 
 
2. Transgender Persons and the ‘Sexual Minority’ Rights Framework 
 
Categories of ‘sexual minorities’ have fragmented over time, encompassing new sub-
groups or identities. In the early days, transgender groups (as a sexual minority) did not 
collectively organize to assert a new identity. Rather, as examined in Chapters One and 
Two, the label emerged from medical discourse.591 And, as argued in Chapter One, such 
external interference became the core factor for transgender organization and political 
activism against the medical profession and more generally for the assertion of their 
rights and freedoms.592 
 
In order for transgender people to obtain rights and freedoms, a step forward was to 
organize under a minority framework of some sort, as well as to develop their identity. 
The establishment of such an identity, however, proved to be a difficult process, not only 
for the transgender communities, but also for feminist and LGBIQ representatives. As 
noted in Chapter One, some radical feminists hold strong negative opinions about the 
inclusion or recognition of transgender women in women’s and feminist movements.593 
For the transgender community, framing their identity as a minority could bring 
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advantages, but framing themselves as a distinct minority under the LGBTIQ umbrella 
could bring even greater advantages. In this context, the dichotomy between aspiring for 
‘simply human rights’ and for specific ‘transgender rights’ has earned not only a 
particular theoretical and practical interest in terms of establishing norms for the 
protection of transgender people but also in understanding the limitations of such a 
framework.  
 
The common frame of LGBTIQ, or SOGI, can be both empowering and disempowering 
for transgender individuals, for example when claiming the right to non-discrimination. 
Outwardly, such a frame can be helpful for social mobilization under the LGBTIQ 
umbrella. At the same time, however, it can affect the desire of the sub-group of 
transgender people to identify themselves in this way. The varying impacts of this frame 
underscore the fact that the transgender movement has a rich history of identity tensions 
rooted in conflicts that have divided and sometimes polarized the gay movement from 
the beginning.594 Those conflicts largely relate to the essentialist view versus the social-
constructionist understanding of sex and gender. As Shannon Minter noted on this, 
changes in the social meaning of gayness and gender have been blended and theoretical 
discussions over the relationships among LGBTIQ groups have been a central feature of 
gay politics.595 In addition, throughout the 1990s, when the transgender movement was 
emerging and developing, it was only natural that to ensure the application of the human 
rights law to all the LGBTIQ categories, no sub-category could be seen on a parallel 
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advocacy front. This is well illustrated in writings from the 1990s, in particular on sexual 
orientation and human rights. Eric Heinze, in his seminal 1995 book Sexual Orientation 
– A Human Right: An Essay on International Human Rights Law outlined sexual 
orientation rights as fundamental and equally urgent.596 Although supportive of human 
rights claims by sub-groups, he believed that for the purpose of human rights law, 
‘gender identity may be included within (or may supplement) the concept of sexual 
orientation’. 597  Heinze focused on the general equality and non-discrimination 
framework for LGBTI, asserting that in the struggle for human rights protection, 
similarities were more important than differences.598  
 
Heinze’s approach to gender-identity rights is not unusual if put in context. In the early 
1990s, transgender rights had yet to emerge, and human rights discourse was yet to 
develop. A brief survey of transgender rights cases before the 2000s shows that even 
claims brought to regional or international human rights bodies did not make clear 
identity-based statements for transgender rights. 599  Other scholars, such as Robert 
Wintemute, Laurence Thomas and Michael Levin, and Michael Goodhart took a similar 
route, arguing that gender identity was part of sexual orientation.600 Wintemute also 
proposed a framework that would help to examine sexual-orientation rights, meaning that 
this would also include transgender rights: a) non-discrimination, b) privacy rights, and 
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c) protection of other rights.601 Wintemute, however, did not refer to gender-identity 
rights specifically, leaving room for further interpretation as to where transgender rights 
would fit under this framework.  
 
The tensions within queer theory and transgender groups are well reflected in writings on 
human rights and SOGI. For example, some theorists openly opposed transgender-
specific rights, noting that transgender people should be advocating for ‘simply human 
rights’.602 The fact that transgender people are human beings, means that by virtue, they 
deserve the protections to which all human beings are entitled.603 While this is an 
important point and true in relation to all LGBTIQ persons, it also contains an element of 
the disputed ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, spurring debates over the dangers of a common 
anti-discrimination frame and identity politics within the ‘sexual minorities’ group. 
 
A group of academics and practitioners that took a different approach from ‘one-size-fits-
all’ in the 2000s found themselves criticizing the 1990s generation of writers. As clearer 
gender-identity language appeared in academic journals and in material distributed for 
activism, education on SOGI issues as well as differences and similarities became easier 
to understand. According to O’Flaherty and Fisher, transgender rights were marginalized 
more than sexual orientation in the UN debates on human rights.604 Therefore it was 
significant to spell out specific transgender rights, grasp the experiences and the diversity 
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of transgender people and enable their rights claims to be adjudicated. 605  Those 
sentiments in fact have proved important in transgender community mobilization. 
Indubitably, arguments can be made that identity and groups-specific rights claims for 
transgender persons can be lost if too much focus is made on wider issues of SOGI, or 
even issues of human rights more broadly. For example, transgender activists argue that 
in the existing legal regime transgendered people are viewed as ‘non-persons, with no 
right to marry, to work, to use a public bathroom or even to walk down the street in 
safety’.606 That assertion stems from the fact that transgender people have sought an 
identity that is unique to their embodiment and subjective experiences. And if the 
protection framework for transgender persons does not reflect their social, historical and 
political identity as they see it, the framework fails to serve the purpose of the protection 
of their rights and freedoms. Without a connection between the formulation of human 
rights law and transgender people’s lived experiences, identifying difficulties faced by 
transgender persons without ‘strategic transgender human politics’, a new framework for 
protecting transgender people’s rights would be impossible. 607  Indeed, transgender 
experiences can only validate the writings by authors with the purpose of providing a 
greater protection framework for transgender persons. 
 
Ascertaining identity has meant more for transgender people then just a recognition that 
does not grant actual rights. By being able to distinguish themselves from a common 
category of ‘sexual minorities’ or the LGBTIQ umbrella, transgender communities began 
to have justifications for specific standards separate from common, underlying principles 
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of human rights mechanisms and policies. A problem that some argue stands in the way 
of a transgender identitarian agenda, however, is the fixed transgender identity versus 
non-binary gender discourse. Identities are inherently fixed, which then may become the 
foundation for citizenship rights claims.608 In the case of transgender persons, however, 
this may not always be the case. The problem lies in ‘gender identity’ as a restrictive 
concept.609 Indeed, a clear notion of gender identity as it relates to transgender people 
will privilege the notions of a clear and coherent identity over concepts of blurred 
identifications, such as non-binary gender identities. 610  The conflicting nature of 
transgender identity (fixed categories of transgender identity versus non-binary, fluid 
genders) has also had a wider impact on the development of international human rights 
law and the protection frame, which continues to impact how the human rights 
framework develops, in particular within closed settings. According to Kendall Thomas, 
to tackle the dilemma of clear gender identities against blurred gender, transgender 
activism should pursue a complex and sophisticated double strategy.611 First, it should 
demand that the state abolish laws regarding gendered forms of being and seek a political 
order in which they can freely exercise their gender. And second, the strategy should 
include ‘empty space’ in the law, which includes writing non-identitarian language into 
anti-discrimination laws, meaning that such laws apply to all genders. Such laws, he 
notes, should include any gender, including those with no gender at all.612 This theory, 
however, risks the same criticism that can be applied to the general human rights law 
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framework and its application. If the concept of transgender is more than a gender 
identity, transgender activists should seek transgender-specific rights in addition to 
common principles that have universal applicability. 
 
There is, however, a fear that if too many rights are granted to sub-groups, it may lead to 
an overregulation of the identity of transgender people. For example, Wendy Brown 
notes that the designation of a particular identity category as worthy of rights ‘may entail 
some protection from the most immobilising features of that designation but such rights 
also reinscribe and regulate the category to which they apply’.613 This means that a 
regulatory dimension of identity-based rights emerges to the extent that rights are never 
deployed freely, but within a discursive, hence normative context, precisely the context 
in which the identity category is ‘iterated and reiterated’.614 Brown argues that legal 
theorists concerned with identity categories (not just gender) not only turn to different 
dimensions of the law, depending on the identity category with which they are 
concerned, ‘but they often figure the law itself in a quite incommensurate way’.615  
 
The challenges and complexities attached to gender should not be underestimated, in 
particular when applying the normative frame of human rights law. For a relatively 
small, marginalized group such as the transgender community, association with wider 
groups of LGBIQ can indeed provide wider access to the, albeit more generic, 
international frame of protection. However, such an association also carries a possibility 
that, if strongly blended with the wider ‘sexual minorities’ group, they will no longer be 
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perceived as a unique group, affected by normative or social frameworks, and thus 
worthy of rights.  
 
Whether via the common framework of underlying principles, or a specific-rights 
framework, transgender communities seek normative recognition in international human 
rights law. Each frame, however, to some extent fails to acknowledge the role and 
importance of the other. As outlined above, a frame based on underlying principles of 
human rights fails to consider the specific needs and human rights abuses that 
transgender people experience. On the other hand, a transgender-specific rights 
framework seems to prioritize a gender-identity right as a right specific to transgender 
people, thus missing the opportunity to connect with other rights. The limitations also 
demonstrate the gaps in law and challenges for global norms to adapt to the subjective 
embodiment of a particular group. To address these gaps, however, connections should 
be made between the frameworks. Instead of using the two approaches as opposing 
concepts, they should be applied together to create a comprehensive protection 
framework for transgender persons. The next two sub-chapters therefore will look into 
each of the alternative frames and their limitations as it applies to transgender persons. 
 
3. Transgender People Through the Prism of Underlying Principles of Human 
Rights Law: Dignity, Equality and Non-discrimination 
 
Equality and non-discrimination, coupled with the concept of dignity, are probably one 
of the most researched areas of human rights, from moral, philosophical, political and 
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legal theoretical perspectives.616 It is not the purpose of this section to go into the 
ontology of egalitarianism, the roots of dignitas617 or the variations of the concept of 
equality. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is still important to establish the 
foundation upon which the modern legal concepts of equality and non-discrimination are 
based. This will help to develop linkages between underlying principles of human rights 
and their application to transgender people. 
 
International law places human dignity, equality and non-discrimination at its heart.618 
These principles are the foundation of the UN charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). All three principles that are considered underpinning principles 
of human rights – dignity, equality and non-discrimination – can be characterized as a 
kind of Grundnorm, a ground of normativity within the human rights system.619  
 
The value of equality, dignity and non-discrimination remains core in moral, political and 
legal philosophy. It is, however, argued that equality is a legal principle of fundamental 
value. It provides a basis for personal development and individual freedom.620 The 
supporters of this argument assert that equality is one of the basic tenets of almost all 
contemporary moral and political theories, where humans are essentially equal, of equal 
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worth, and should have this ideal reflected in the economic, social, and political 
structures of society.621 Similarly, critics argue that ‘dignity as a value and right lacks a 
sufficiently clear meaning to serve usefully as the dominant conceptual tool’622 and that it 
remains a ‘value that does not have clear political or moral correlates’.623 The most 
frequent inquiries proposed in the context of dignity are in relation to its meaning (right 
or value) and the relationship between dignity and other rights and value systems.624 
Dignity is understood as a core for a number of normative claims, though it does not 
itself have a normative character. 
 
Non-discrimination on the other hand is regarded as a normative expression of equality. 
These two intrinsically linked concepts have had a long-lasting effect on international 
human rights law. Manfred Nowak argues that, in fact, equality and discrimination are 
not self-defining concepts and both need interpretation through normative frames. In his 
commentary, Nowak notes that ‘the content and reach of the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination are not agreed’.625 He nevertheless examines them in legal theory as a 
red thread throughout the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).626 Other legal theorists, such as Bertrand Ramcharan, also comment that the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination are widely acknowledged as forming part 
of international customary law, 627  and that therefore the concepts should not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621 ibid. 
622 Cowen (n 616). 
623 Riley (n 616). 
624 Cowen (n 616). 
625 B.G. Ramcharan, Equality and Nondiscrimination’ in Louis Henkin (ed), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, (Columbia University Press 1981) 246-69. 
626 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant On Civil And Political Rights. CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, NP Engel 2005) 600. 
627 Ramcharan (n 625) 249. 
172 
 
separated.628 Ramcharan, while arguing that equality and non-discrimination constitute 
part of customary international law, asserts that the principles of equality and non-
discrimination are part of international jus cogens, peremptory norms, binding on all as 
superior law.629 He based his arguments on the interpretations and academic work of 
authoritative legal institutions such as the International Law Commission and the 
International Court of Justice, state practice, including pronouncements by international 
conferences, and authoritative publicists.630 
 
The vagueness of the concept of equality and the absence of a strict definition of it as a 
legal concept have spawned a multiplicity of ideas about the concept. As with the 
concept of dignity, criticism has been directed at whether equality should be understood 
as a value or a right that can be adjudicated.631 In this regard, Jeremy Waldron has argued 
against equality being a foundation for all rights. In his thesis, he states that ‘if there are 
any human rights, they are presumably to be secured for all humans equally. But that 
doesn’t give us license to say that equality is the foundation of all rights, though again 
there may be independent arguments to that effect’.632 Waldron addresses specifically the 
works of Andrea Dworkin, who argued for ‘various conceptions of equality: equality of 
welfare and equality of resources’.633 Dworkin argued in particular that equality should 
serve as a foundational principle.634 Ramcharan seems to also support this idea by 
suggesting that ‘although equality is implied in the fact that all human beings have the 
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same human rights, the emphasis on equality indicates that it is a right additional to and 
independent of other specific enumerated rights’635.   
 
International human rights law has codified equality, dignity and non-discrimination. The 
prohibition of discrimination in Article 2(1) of UDHR serves as a basis for the obligation 
of states parties to ensure the rights of the two covenants that stemmed from the UDHR, 
without distinction, in particular, of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.636 Equality, dignity 
and non-discrimination constitute the dominant themes of the ICCPR. Equality is also 
implied in that the rights recognised by the covenant are rights of all human beings 
equally.637 Article 2 of the ICCPR requires that state parties respect and ensure the rights 
recognised in the covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status,638 whereas Article 26 ensures a general right of equality, including a 
prohibition of discrimination and an obligation to take active measures against 
discrimination.639 Those provisions are repeated in regional human rights conventions, 
which mostly provide an accessory prohibition of discrimination.640 Both Articles 2 and 
26 of the Covenant are referenced interchangeably to refer to equality, equality before the 
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law, equality before the courts, equal protection of the law, equality of the sexes, non-
discrimination and non-distinction. 641    
 
Regional human rights mechanisms all emphasize the principles of non-discrimination, 
equality and dignity. Article 24 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
(IACHR), for example, emphasizes that ‘[a]ll persons are equal before the law. 
Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.’642 
Article 10 of the same convention outlines that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have his 
honor respected and his dignity recognized.’643 Notably, the Banjul Charter requires 
‘strict equality of all persons before the law’ and ‘respect of the dignity inherent in a 
human being and to the recognition of his legal status.’644 The CoE inserts a specific 
article on non-discrimination in the ECHR, stating that ‘[t]he enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’645 The 
Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR) too outlines principles of equality, non-
discrimination and dignity as a common ground for the document.646 
 
All of the regional human rights bodies, including the CoE, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the African Union, have recognized SOGI rights. The CoE 
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now regularly adopts resolutions addressing discrimination on the basis of SOGI.647 In 
particular, the Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers on measures to combat 
discrimination on grounds of SOGI CM/Rec(2010)5 serves as a standard in various areas 
of SOGI rights. Other bodies, such as the OAS, have also adopted multiple resolutions to 
address discrimination against LGBTIQ people.648 The ACHPR also adopted a resolution 
to emphasize non-discrimination principle in protecting SOGI rights.649 
 
Core principles – dignity, equality and non-discrimination – and their contestation have 
been best demonstrated in the SOGI-rights framework. In fact, there has been a gradual 
trend towards recognition of freedom from state interference in sexual conduct and non-
discrimination based on sexual orientation.650 Laurence Helfer suggests that the core 
component to ensuring equal protection and non-discrimination would be the right ‘to 
develop one’s personality and dignity’.651 Helfer himself, writing in 1985, made an 
important connection between sexual orientation and human rights, expanding sexual 
orientation rights into the mainstream human rights discourse by applying a language of 
‘personality’, ‘dignity’, and ‘equal protection’. Again, historical context becomes 
important in this case because gender identity – and transgender rights more specifically 
– were not subjects of discussion in the mid-1980s.  
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A number of human rights scholars recognize dignity, equality and a non-discrimination 
clause as the gateway for rights claims.652 Further argumentation is made that just 
because the International Bill of Human Rights does not mention SOGI, it does not 
necessarily mean that LGBTIQ people are not protected from discrimination under 
international human rights law653 or that no freestanding rights to equality exist in 
addition to those explicitly listed.654 Both Michael Thomas and Jack Donnelly provide 
the human rights frame for claiming rights, as well as creating a ground for developing 
other freestanding rights.655 Donnelly placed issues of sexual orientation and human 
rights within the subjective experiences of the individuals’ concerns and asserted that 
‘sexual minorities are in many ways no more analogous to women than they are to 
religious minorities. Although involving issues of sex and gender, and although women 
and homosexuals share many similar experiences of victimization, ‘sexual minorities’ 
also suffer in systematically different ways from women.’656 Through that positioning as 
a ‘sexual minority’ group, Donnelly is able to develop a human rights framework via the 
minority-rights protection angle and already tested strategy for claiming non-
discrimination. In doing so, Donnelly argues that in order to have a robust system of 
protection, it is important to provide an explicit list of the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination on SOGI.657 He then calls for a commitment to the overriding objective of 
‘all human rights for all’ to widen the scope of protection.658  
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Donnelly proposes that a possible avenue for the inclusion of LGBTIQ persons under the 
equality and non-discrimination framework of the ICCPR, is Article 2 of the Covenant, 
and in particular the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of ‘other status’ and 
‘sex’. Despite the limitations that the ICCPR might have, he suggests the ‘interpretative 
incorporation of gay rights to be read as “sex” in Article 2 and to include sexual 
orientation’.659 An example of this was given by the UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRCttee): in the first-ever sexual orientation and human rights case, it found a violation 
on the grounds of non-discrimination. 660  In fact, in applying the ICCPR non-
discrimination framework to sexual orientation, the Committee took a disputed action. 
Although a ‘clever and provocative’ move by the Committee to find Australia in breach 
of Article 2 of the covenant, it provided no grounds for such a finding.661 Conversely, 
such an interpretation of Article 2 of the ICCPR was not intended, especially at the time 
of drafting the provision, and second, that this is an interpretation that is not a widely 
held view even in legally advanced European countries.662 While it was important to 
advance such rights within mainstream human rights law, it was largely seen as a 
disconnected from the spirit of Article 2 at its travaux préparatoires. Indeed, the 
Committee, without elaboration, simply stated, ‘that in its view the reference to “sex” in 
Articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation’,663 inviting 
criticism for lack of depth and analysis on sex and sexual orientation, or other related 
issues.664 However, as will be observed in the following chapters, international bodies 
often avoid such detailed definition of terms, leaving much room for interpretation by 
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individual states. This is rather evident in the gender-identity and prison context, which 
will be discussed later and in particular in Chapters Five and Six. Following the Toonen 
case, the Committee reviewed a number of other cases on non-discrimination. These 
include Young v Australia and X v Colombia, both concerning discrimination on the 
grounds of sex or sexual orientation.665  
 
The IACtHR has reviewed a few cases related to discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation (sexual minority status – original emphasis). The first case within the Inter-
American system to substantively address discrimination based on sexual minority status 
is Atala v Chile.666 The Court found that a lesbian mother and judge, who was stripped of 
custody of her three daughters by the Supreme Court of Chile, had her rights violated. 
Specifically, the IACtHR found that the right to equality, together with the article on 
non-discrimination, and the right to private life of the IACHR had been violated.667 Its 
ruling stated that ‘a right guaranteed to all persons cannot be denied or restricted under 
any circumstances based on their sexual orientation. Doing so contravenes Article 1(1) of 
the American Convention.’668 Two other cases against Colombia were considered at the 
IACtHR, which looked at sexual orientation as a ground for non-discrimination. In both 
cases – Angel Alberto Duque v Colombia and Duque v Colombia – the IACtHR 
examined complaints that surviving partners of same-sex relationships were denied a 
survivor’s pension on account of their sexual orientation. The Court in both cases found 
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Colombia in breach of the principle of equality and non-discrimination.669 It explained 
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to a survivors’ pension under the 
Colombian legislation applicable at the time of the facts (2002) had been discriminatory 
on the basis of sexual orientation.670  
 
Possibly one of the landmark decisions on the issue of equality, non-discrimination and 
sexual orientation are the cases of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister for Home Affairs and Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa, 
both brought to the Constitutional Court of South Africa.671 While both cases concerned 
discrimination on the basis of status, the Constitutional Court in both cases found that 
unmarried couples are equivalent to married couples, when the laws are inherently 
discriminatory.672 In the latter case, the South African Court also looked at an earlier case 
from Canada, Miron v Trudel, which was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
1995, which had held marital status to be an analogous ground protected from 
discrimination.673 In a similar claim in the case of Egan v Canada, the Supreme Court of 
Canada reviewed the exclusion of same-sex relationships from the common-law 
definition of marriage. Deciding the case in favour of same-sex couples’ access to 
pension benefits equal to those of married couples, the Court concluded that sexual 
orientation was an ‘analogous ground’ to the other grounds covered by Section 15 of 
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the Charter (equality before the law).674 
 
Some setbacks have also been seen in upholding the underlying principles. In Kanane (a 
case from Botswana) and Banana (Zimbabwe), the courts rejected the claim that there 
had been a violation of the principle of non-discrimination. The constitutions of both 
countries provide non-discrimination as a basic guarantee for human rights, as well as 
containing a list of prohibited grounds. In Kanane, the Court of Appeal asserted that 
public interest should be a factor when considering the legislation, in particular when 
such legislation reflects a public concern. Falling back on ‘public concern’, the Botswana 
Court of Appeal rejected the claim. A rather appalling paragraph contained in the Court’s 
reasoning is that ‘[g]ay men and women do not represent a group or class which at this 
stage has been shown to require protection under the Constitution.’675 On the other hand, 
in the Banana case, while also rejecting the claim, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 
rejected the idea of non-discrimination, claiming that the constitution guaranteed 
protection from arbitrary search and had ‘nothing whatever to do with whether or not 
consensual sodomy is a crime’.676  
 
The case of Kenneth Suratt and Others v Attorney General, reviewed by the Court of 
Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, took the equality and non-discrimination discussion to 
another level. In fact the issue in question was the Equal Opportunity Act, which was 
argued as unconstitutional in several respects and for the purposes of SOGI rights, 
because it explicitly excluded sexual orientation from the prohibited grounds of 
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discrimination.677 The Court argued that because the act explicitly excluded sexual 
orientation from its definition of ‘sex’ (a prohibited ground for discrimination), it was 
unconstitutional.678 In that case, the Court seemed to have looked at Vriend v Alberta, in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the case of a college laboratory instructor, 
dismissed from job because of his homosexuality. 679  That Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act, which did not include 
sexual orientation as a protected ground, and held that the act was not in compliance with 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ equality clause.680  
 
Indeed, discrimination takes place in different areas of life, and the case law that has 
been produced so far reflects that. What is important is that in almost all cases where 
non-discrimination is argued in sexual-orientation cases, it is applied in conjunction with 
substantive rights. It is also noteworthy that in most of the non-discrimination cases, an 
issue in question is sexual orientation. There are in fact few cases that reflect on gender 
identity and a non-discrimination clause specifically. For example, the well-known case 
of Sunil Babu Pant and Others v Nepal Government and Others specifically argued for 
the third gender while looking for recognition of transgender individuals as a third 
gender. The group also argued that the law prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
SOGI specifically, and remedies are provided by the state.681 The Supreme Court of 
Nepal considered a much broader issue than possibly any other national court had done 
on this matter. The Court looked at whether LGBTIQ people were entitled to 
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constitutional and international human rights. In reviewing the case, the Court conducted 
a broader comparative analysis of the legislation and the case law available at that time, 
including the newly endorsed Yogyakarta Principles, to arrive at its conclusion. The 
Supreme Court in its judgment relied heavily on international standards and 
jurisprudence to find that transgender people did indeed face violence, stigmatization and 
discrimination,682 and hence extended the protection framework of equality and non-
discrimination to homosexuals and third-gender people.683 The Sunil Babu Pant and 
Others v Nepal Government and Others case has had a great impact in expanding the 
rights of transgender persons, both in the region and internationally. It also became the 
very first case to recognize the rights of transgender people and allow their access to 
human rights under a gender self-determination framework, as discussed in Chapter 
Two.684  
 
Another case that was recently decided from the Supreme Court of Nepal deserves to be 
highlighted here. In it, the Court looked at citizenship rights in the constitution of Nepal 
and held that it would be against human rights not to provide citizenship on the basis of 
identity.685 In practice, this means that the government of Nepal will be obligated to 
develop specific laws regulating the granting of citizenship on the basis of gender, and to 
create an atmosphere for gender and ‘sexual minorities’ at the local level. In the petition, 
advocate Hari Phuyal and former Attorney-General Sujan Pant pleaded on behalf of the 
plaintiff. Together with the Sunil Babu Pant case, the latest developments in Nepal create 
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an exciting and an opportune legal environment for the realization of transgender rights.  
 
Similarly, in a recent case from India, National Legal Services Authority v Union of India 
and Others,686 non-discrimination against transgender persons (the term ‘transgender’ 
was defined by the Supreme Court broadly to include hijras, eunuchs, kothis and 
aravanis) was considered. While the case is very similar in nature to the previous case 
from Nepal, the Supreme Court of India also looked at the historic injustice against 
transgender people. The Court examined the existing legislation in the country to hold 
that, due to the absence of specific legislation protecting transgender people, the 
community faced discrimination in various areas of life. For this, the Court found the 
‘necessity to follow the international Conventions to which India is a party and to give 
due respect to other non-binding international Conventions and principles’.687 The Court 
further referenced the Yogyakarta Principles and their relevance in application of human 
rights law to transgender persons. In holding the Indian government accountable, the 
Court ruled that ‘Hijras, Eunuchs, apart from binary gender, be treated as “third gender” 
for the purpose of safeguarding their rights under Part III of our Constitution and the 
laws made by the Parliament and the State Legislature’ and that ‘[t]ransgender persons’ 
right to decide their self-identified gender is also upheld and the Centre and State 
Governments are directed to grant legal recognition of their gender identity such as male, 
female or as third gender’.688 The ruling in this case, National Legal Services Authority v 
Union of India and Others, together with that from an earlier case of Naz Foundation v 
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Government of NCT of Delhi and Others, 689  create a strong ground for non-
discrimination claims for SOGI. In another case on gender modification on identity 
documents, Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice held that protection had to be granted to 
a ‘transsexual’ and ordered that a new birth certificate be granted to him. Moreover, the 
Court underlined that the constitutional principle of non-discrimination and protection of 
human dignity had to be preserved.690 Subsequently, in 2004 Mexico City amended its 
Civil Code to permit an individual to change the name and gender on their birth 
certificate. 691  Specifically, the Mexico City Civil Code was amended to allow 
modification of a person’s birth certificate. Later in 2014, Mexico City also passed a law 
to permit transgender individuals to legally change their gender without a court order.692  
 
Over the years, the meaning of non-discrimination has changed. That is particularly 
noticeable in the context of SOGI. If, for example, in early legal standards and cases no 
explicit mention of the concept of non-discrimination on the basis of SOGI as a 
prohibited ground is found, over the period under review, the use of the phrase ‘other 
status’ has become common. It indeed reflects the fact that the nature of discrimination 
has changed over time. ‘Other status’ grounds have become of a ‘comparable nature to 
the expressly recognised grounds’.693 For example, the CESCR has argued that the ‘other 
ground’ reflects on both the nature of discrimination as an act and on the covenant as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689 Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of New Delhi and Others, Writ Petition No. 7455/2001. 
690 Human Rights Watch, ‘Important International Jurisprudence Concerning LGBT Rights’ 29 May 2009.; at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/25/important-international-jurisprudence-concerning-lgbt-rights#_National_Courts accessed on 9 
March 2014. 
691 Austrian Red Cross, Mexico: Sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI): COI Compilation, May 2017.  
692 ibid. 
693 UN ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 20 (n 515). 
185 
 
living instrument that is able to accommodate emerging challenges.694 Some human 
rights mechanisms have also adopted specific language to ensure more openness to the 
protection of SOGI. The UN Committee Against Torture (CAT Committee) in its 
General Comment 2, while trying to reinforce the principle of non-discrimination 
towards LGBTIQ persons, specifically includes the language of ‘gender’, ‘sexual 
orientation’ and ‘transgender identity.’695 SOGI has progressively been added to the list 
of prohibited grounds by treaty bodies through their jurisprudence. Almost all treaty 
bodies and SPs mechanisms now include a non-discrimination clause in their 
recommendations in relation to SOGI.696 For example, the CESCR has issued General 
Comment on the ‘Right to sexual and reproductive health’, ‘Non-discrimination in 
economic, social and cultural rights’, the ‘Right to Social Security’, the ‘Right to Water’, 
the ‘Right to the highest attainable standard of health’ and the ‘Right to Work’, all 
including reference to SOGI. Similarly, the CRC Committee has redrafted the 
commentary on the ‘Right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence’, 
‘Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child’ and ‘HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child’ so that all now have some 
reference to the rights of LGBTIQ persons.697 The CEDAW has also issued either 
general comments or concluding observations and reports that specifically outline 
protection frames for lesbian and transgender women.698  
 
Such a wide recognition and acknowledgement of SOGI means that the treaty bodies 
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have started to explicitly include the prohibited grounds of SOGI in the interpretation and 
implementation of the treaty they monitor. If in the early 2000s there was hardly a report 
by the SPs mechanisms containing LGBTIQ-related issues, nearly all reports now 
contain narrative on violations against LGBTIQ people. For example, at the latest 
(35th) session of the UN HRC in June 2017, up to 22 reports were received from various 
UN SRs that included the language of non-discrimination and SOGI.699 
 
Establishing non-discrimination in regional human rights mechanisms has also taken 
time. The ECtHR, despite having ruled in the Dudgeon case (discussed in more detail 
below) that the applicant’s right to private life had been violated, noted that, because it 
had found a breach of Article 8 (right to private life), it was unnecessary to consider the 
non-discrimination clause.700 It took another 18 years for the ECtHR to establish that a 
difference in treatment based on sexual orientation was a violation of the applicant’s 
rights under the non-discrimination clause. In the case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v 
Portugal, the ECtHR found a breach of the claimant’s right to non-discrimination in 
conjunction with violation claims under privacy rights.701   
 
Application of the non-discrimination clause to transgender persons was litigated slightly 
later. It was not until 2010 that the ECtHR issued a judgment – in PV v Spain – where it 
stated that ‘transsexuals are entitled to the enjoyment of human rights, which are 
enshrined in the Convention without discrimination’.702 In that case, however, the Court 
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linked ‘transsexuality’ to dysphorie sexuelle, once again highlighting a heavy reliance on 
the medical model of transgender and ‘transsexual’ concepts.703 More recently, however, 
without lengthy reasoning, the ECtHR clarified explicitly that all transgender people are 
protected on the grounds of gender identity too. In another case against Georgia, in 2015, 
the Court further reiterated that the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 of the 
ECHR duly covers questions related to SOGI,704 expanding the prohibited grounds for 
discrimination to include the protection of LGBTIQ persons. 
 
On a few occasions, however, courts have also found a breach of dignity in cases of 
LGBTIQ persons. In 2010, the High Court of Uganda reviewed the case of Kasha 
Jacqueline, David Kato Kisule and Onziema Patience v Rolling Stone Ltd and Giles 
Muhame, where the applicants were contesting the state’s conduct as interfering in their 
private lives in breach of their rights to human dignity and protection from inhumane 
treatment.705 After some deliberation, the Court found that the applicants’ right to human 
dignity and protection from inhumane treatment was threatened, thereby representing a 
violation of the country’s constitution.706 Another similar case considered earlier by the 
High Court was a claim of Mukasa and Oyo v Attorney General, High Court of Uganda 
at Kampala.707 In that case, the Court ruled that the police and government officials had 
breached the constitutional rights of the appellant. The High Court relied on international 
standards and norms to argue for the grounds of underlying principles of human rights 
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and their applicability in the case. Both of those cases concerned LGBTIQ activists in 
Uganda and their public activism for SOGI rights. 
 
Possibly one of the most recent rulings linking dignity, equality and non-discrimination 
is in the case of Caleb Orozco v AG of Belize.708 The claimant challenged section 53 of 
the 1981 Criminal Code of Belize, which read that ‘every person who has carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature with any person or animal shall be liable to 
imprisonment for ten years’. Finding the clause unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of 
Belize accepted the claims on almost all points and affirmed the protection grounds for 
SOGI to guarantee human dignity, right to privacy, right to freedom from discrimination, 
freedom of expression and the equal protection of the law.709  
 
Those cases illustrate intrinsic links between the principles, but also as to how important 
they are in obtaining justice for those whose rights are violated. With the increased 
awareness of the issues of non-discrimination and SOGI, as well as legislative changes 
around the world to accommodate SOGI, case law asserting SOGI as a prohibited ground 
of discrimination is increasing. At the same time, the number of countries that recognize 
SOGI in their constitutions has also risen. At least 10 countries have constitutions that 
include SOGI as a protected ground.710 It is also interesting to note that all three 
principles – dignity, equality and non-discrimination – have best been served in 
conjunction with substantive rights, particularly the right to private life. In other words, 
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underlying principles and substantive rights have had a mutually reinforcing effect in 
advancing SOGI rights, which further addresses the limitations imposed by the common 
principles versus specific-rights discourse. The rest of this chapter provides analysis of 
two specific rights that are argued to be specific for transgender persons.  
 
4. Transgender Specific Rights 
4.1. Are there really transgender-specific rights? 
 
The question that is raised sometimes in relation to SOGI rights are new ones that fall 
outside the remit of the existing human rights framework. In fact, such was the position 
of hostile countries at the UN level too that used the argument to oppose SOGI 
resolutions at the HRC and even more, attempted to undermine already established 
mandate of the Independent Expert on SOGI.  
 
This thesis has so far argued that there are transgender-specific rights, which are not a 
new set of rights instead are existing ones that need specific attention for transgender and 
other LGBIQ groups due to the historic oppression and abuse they have experienced. 
Specifically, for transgender persons, it includes their right to gender identity and 
recognition before the law. Like any other individuals, transgender persons are entitled to 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights and regional 
human rights instruments. Therefore, only those specific rights that are most discussed in 
the context of transgender persons are addressed in this thesis. 
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4.2. Gender identity and right to be recognized before law (right to personhood) 
 
The right to identity includes the right to self-determination and the right to define one’s 
own gender identity, as well as to express such identity. Gender identity as a right as 
understood today was first defined under the Yogyakarta Principles, which provide that 
gender identity is understood to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and 
individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex 
assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if 
freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical 
or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and 
mannerisms.711  
 
Earlier, in 1996, a statement on the International Bill of Gender Rights was adopted at 
the International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy asserting that 
‘gender identity was a fundamental right that allow individuals to define, and redefine as 
their lives unfold, their own gender identities, without regard to chromosomal sex, 
genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role’.712 Paragraph 2 of the same document 
provides that ‘given the right to define one’s own gender identity, all human beings have 
the corresponding right to free expression of their self-defined gender identity’.713 
Internal experience, embodiment, identity and personhood repeatedly appear in the 
definition of gender identity. 
 
In a philosophical tradition, identity can be defined as the connectedness of the general 
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and the individual, that is, as sameness under discontinuous conditions.714 Some scholars 
argue that the first conceptual application of term ‘identity’ occurred at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. In Presentation of My System of Philosophy, Friedrich Schelling 
first conceptualized his system of ‘absolute identity’, which he further developed in later 
work.715 Friedemann Pfäfflin argues that it is Schelling’s work on identity with which ‘he 
laid the foundation for identity to become a central epistemological concept of the 
modern history of philosophy’.716  
 
Charles Taylor, in writing about personhood and personal identity, argued that every 
individual defines him or herself.717 He wrote: 
 I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the family tree, in the social 
space, in the geography of social statuses and functions, in my intimate relations 
with the ones I love, and also crucially in the space of moral and spiritual 
orientation within which my most important defining relations are lived out.718  
 
Taylor further provided two conceptions of persons, both of which share the ordinary 
notion of a person, defined by certain capacities:  
 a person is an agent who has a sense of self, of his/her own life, who can evaluate 
it, and make choices about it. This is the basis of respect we owe persons… The 
central import of all this for our moral thinking is reflected in the fact that these 
capacities form an important part of what we should respect and nourish in human 
beings.719  
 
Perhaps that understanding of personhood and its centrality to the UDHR served as a 
foundation for the arguments put forward by Heinze in his essay, ‘Sexual Orientation – A 
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Human Right’, for a specific right to personhood in the context of sexual orientation. 
Heinze argued that human dignity, identity and personhood were indeed the core of 
sexuality and sexual orientation.720 To qualify his argument, Heinze asked whether 
personhood itself implied the inner capacity of individual dignity and identity. If 
sexuality is not simply a part of the person, neatly divisible from the rest, nor merely a 
chimerical charade of fantasies or desires, but fundamental to individual existence, or 
more simply, fundamental to human existence,721, does it not mean that sexuality, SOGI 
are core elements of personhood?  
 
Personhood has long been a central principle of human rights. The UDHR makes a 
reference to human beings – ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights’.722 To make a concept of personhood a human rights argument for legal purposes, 
Jens David Ohlin in his paper ‘Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human 
Rights?’ identifies three basic classes of arguments: 1) personhood as synonymous with 
biological human beings (naturalistic argument); 2) person in a non-naturalistic sense; 
and 3) personhood as a signal to the conclusion of an argument (normative use).723 
Although those three arguments do not necessarily exhaust all possible uses for the 
concept, they do nonetheless cover the vast majority of human rights claims about 
persons. Indeed, this further means that personhood is in fact a bundle of rights, 
entitlements, privileges, obligations and duties that are distributed to different types of 
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legal persons in different ways.724 Furthermore, personification does not necessarily 
entail the same collection of rights, privileges and entitlements, or the same sort of 
capacities, for each person recognized.725  
 
Gender-identity recognition in law has attracted attention since activists and transgender 
persons themselves have managed to achieve some recognition either at the national or 
international level. Legal recognition of individuals is enshrined under international 
human rights law and legal personhood is considered the ‘benchmark’ for the distribution 
of rights and entitlements in civil law.726 In this respect, recognition of legal personality 
is linked to the prohibition of discrimination, which is necessary for the possession of 
human rights. It also shall serve as a precursor to legal capacity.727 
 
The right to be recognized before the law is set out in core international human rights 
treaties.728 Article 16 of the ICCPR provides that all human beings have the basic human 
right to be recognized as a person before the law.729 According to this provision, 
everyone shall be granted the ‘capacity to be a person before the law’. In other words, 
this means that anyone recognized in the law is a potential bearer of legal rights and 
obligations. As noted by Fernando Volio, legal personality is a crucial aspect of 
expressing oneself freely. In the words of Volio, legal personality  
 distinguishes one man from others and permits him to assert his essential dignity 
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erga omnes. It concentrates the attention of the legal order upon each human 
being. It gives to the essential dignity of the human being reality in law. Without 
it, man would not be truly free, for he would be subject to injustice and injury 
without legal remedy.730 
 
At the regional level, this right is enshrined in Article 3 of the IACHR731 and in Article 5 
of the Banjul Charter.732 The right to be recognized before the law was not included in 
the European instruments, however. In particular, the ECHR does not contain such 
wording, nor does it explicitly mention the right to personhood, as it seemed 
‘unnecessary’ to specify the wording when such ‘could be deduced from other articles in 
the Convention’.733 The impact of that approach by the ECHR on the interpretation of the 
Convention and both the right to privacy and personhood are discussed below. It is clear 
from the travaux préparatoires of the ECHR, however, that personhood was understood 
as a core to the right to private life.734   
 
Article 16 of the ICCPR, on the other hand, stipulates that ‘everyone’ has the right to 
have his or her status and capacity recognized in the legal order.735 Everyone, ‘a person’, 
with status and capacity in the legal order – each has rights and assumes obligations. At 
the same time, the capacity of human beings to be persons before the law begins at birth 
and terminates at death.736 In addition, an important term in Article 16 is ‘recognition’. 
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As Volio notes, this term was used to reinforce the right set out in that provision by 
stressing that the right should be ‘recognized’ as a fundamental human right rather than 
‘conceded’ by virtue of the covenant.737 The use of the term ‘everywhere’ was also the 
subject of debate during the travaux préparatoires. According to Volio, the inclusion of 
the term ‘everywhere’ meant that ‘a state party cannot deny the right of “personhood” 
under Article 16 even to persons not subject to its jurisdiction’.738 By explicitly affirming 
the right to personhood and application of such right without a restriction on jurisdiction, 
it is clear that the travaux préparatoires focused on emphasising the fundamentality of 
this right, as well as the importance for States to observe and monitor it.  
 
The HRCttee has not used Article 16 of the ICCPR in the context of gender identity, or 
SOGI more generally.739 So far, the Committee has established the usefulness of Article 
16 in the context of forced disappearance, and has discussed the right to recognition 
before the law in conjunction with the prohibition of torture, the right to liberty and 
security of person, arbitrary arrest and detention and respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person. In this context, the Committee seems to have argued that Article 16 of 
the ICCPR is concerned when the state authorities intentionally remove a person from 
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time if the victim was in the hands of 
the State authorities when last seen and, at the same time, if the efforts of his or her 
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relatives to obtain access to potentially effective remedies, including judicial remedies 
have been systematically impeded.740 The HRCttee notes that, due to the circumstances 
in which disappeared persons are placed, i.e. deprivation of their capacity to exercise 
entitlements under law as a direct consequence of the actions of the state, it must be 
interpreted as a refusal to recognize such victims as persons before the law.741 Indeed, 
enforced disappearance is a theme that requires research in its own right and this thesis 
does not aim to analyse the subject. However, what is important to note is the HRCttee’s 
approach to the interpretation of Article 16. Since the Grioua case in 2003, the 
Committee has applied the same interpretation of Article 16 in other case law. In that 
regard, the Committee questioned state interference in the exercise of the right to 
personhood before the law and analysed the obligation of the state to withhold from 
interference in the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the ICCPR.742 For the purposes of 
recognising the person before the law, however, there still seems to be a room for further 
interpretation. In other words, while the HRCttee has made links between Article 16 and 
other rights under the ICCPR, it still has not addressed the core question of the right to 
recognition before the law. There are questions about having recognition before the law 
in the first place, as well as who may or may not have recognition and on what basis. 
Those aspects of Article 16 as it particularly relates to transgender persons’ recognition 
before the law remain unaddressed.    
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The right to recognition before the law is a core to forming human dignity. Manfred 
Nowak suggests that Article 16 should in fact be considered as the core of the ICCPR, 
due to its systematic and intrinsic connection to all the other provisions of the 
covenant.743 This further means that, in order to have access to the rights under the 
ICCPR, one must first have his/her capacity as a person recognized before the law, which 
starts from birth.744 Nowak further asserts ‘without this right, the individual could be 
degraded to a mere legal object, where he or she would no longer be a person in the legal 
sense and thus be deprived of all other rights, including the right to life’.745 Applying this 
criticism to the HRCttee, it becomes clear that it [the Committee] must address the issue 
to ensure the close of the gap in the legal interpretation. Nowak’s interpretation is 
perhaps most relevant for transgender persons too, who are often denied legal recognition 
of their gender. If the ‘right to recognition before the law’ allows the individual to be 
recognized as a person in the legal order, and such recognition is a necessary pre-
requisite to all other rights, having gender identity recognized before the law to allow 
transgender persons to become fully subjects of the legal order is a foundation to 
materialize the rights and freedoms in full capacity.746  
 
The difficulty, however, of adjudicating Article 16 of the ICCPR in relation to 
transgender persons’ legal gender recognition lies in the fact that no cases have been 
brought to the HRCttee under this particular claim. No scholarship so far seems to have 
argued that gender legal recognition should be discussed under Article 16 (recognition 
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before the law). It seems that the question that should be asked here is whether such 
reluctance is related to the ‘gender versus sex’ discourse, or perhaps whether the fact that 
international human rights treaties are still based on binary models of the sexes means 
that human rights mechanisms are still not ready to address the right to the legal gender-
identity recognition of transgender persons.  
 
The UN treaty bodies have not so far specifically looked at the case of the right to gender 
identity under the right to personhood provision. As outlined in this chapter, the primary 
body to do so would have been the HRCttee, which has yet to develop its thinking on the 
issue. And even though there have not been individual communications on this particular 
issue, the Committee seems to have improved in including the terminology in its 
communication with states.747 In the regional mechanisms, however, due to the fact that 
the ECHR does not have the same article as other human rights treaties, a different 
dimension for recognising a gender identity right has been adopted. In the African 
context, the language of recognition before the law is somewhat overlooked, both within 
the text of the charter and in the interpretation of the norm (Article 5). The IACtHR has 
attempted to address the issue. However, it took the route of substantive rights under 
privacy provisions to arrive at its final judgment.748 The ECtHR, on the other hand, has 
championed the application of the right to gender identity in its reasoning. Despite the 
fact that the ECHR does not contain specific wording on recognition before the law or 
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right to personhood, the convention has been interpreted widely to include that right 
under the privacy rights.  
 
4.3. The right to privacy and transgender 
 
The most successful legal claim for transgender rights has been the right to private life, 
or privacy rights as they are commonly referred to. Before analysing the case law, 
however, it is important to provide a short overview of the theory on the right to private 
life. In philosophical discourse, privacy is divided into two areas: consequentialist and 
deontological theories of privacy.749 The former views privacy as an instrumental value 
in the pursuit of certain social goods, though it does not recognize the individual’s 
interest in privacy.750 The latter theory states that privacy merits protection because of its 
nature. It is seen as necessary for the protection of the innate human values of dignity and 
autonomy.751 Possibly the closest argument of privacy and personhood was made by 
Beate Rossler, who argues that privacy has some function of protecting an autonomous 
life.752 Similarly, Alan Westin suggests that ‘privacy is the voluntary and temporary 
withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical and psychological 
means.’753 This can be interpreted as meaning that individuals are capable and able to 
determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
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communicated to others.754 Such an interpretation indeed makes privacy and the inner-
self (personhood) profoundly connected terms.  
 
There are various other interpretations put forward by scholars. For example, David 
Feldman describes the right to privacy as controversial, giving control over the 
boundaries of the spheres of social existence, a matter of being able to choose where, 
when, and with whom to cooperate or to withhold cooperation.755 Other authors speak of 
the ‘poverty of privacy’ because of its malleability. Raymond Wacks, for example, 
argues that what can be properly protected by law in the name of privacy is personal 
information.756 Though, such interpretation leaves the necessity for further interpretation 
of personal information. Relating to Wacks’s point, Macklem also suggest that one 
aspect of privacy is intimacy and while it ‘must keep company with liberty in order to 
have special value, it is also in tension with it’.757  
 
Possibly, reflecting on the different interpretations of the term ‘privacy’, various 
definitions have been suggested in legal discourse too. The travaux préparatoires of 
Article 17 of the ICCPR also show the matter in question was a subject of heated 
discussions at the UN.758 Preliminary discussions during the travaux préparatoires also 
show that the terms ‘privacy’ and ‘private life’ were used interchangeably and 
supposedly as synonyms.759  
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The UDHR and the ICCPR established the right to privacy as a norm of international 
law. The provision on privacy in Article 17 of the ICCPR is worded almost identically to 
Article 12 of the UDHR.760 The sole difference between the two norms is that Article 17 
of the ICCPR not only prohibits ‘arbitrary’ interferences with one’s privacy and with 
more specific aspects of the private sphere, but also ‘unlawful’ ones. More specifically, it 
states that (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation; and (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.761 Other regional instruments, to some extent, also recognize the 
right to private life. For example, Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the ACHR 
contain explicit provisions for guaranteeing the right to private life, while the Banjul 
Charter makes an implicit statement for the protection of privacy under Article 4.762 
 
Commenting on Article 17 of the ICCPR, Nowak formulates the idea of privacy by 
stating that ‘the sphere of individual autonomy whose existence and field of action does 
not touch upon the sphere of liberty of others is what we call privacy’.763 He notes that 
‘standing at the centre of the liberal notion of freedom is the human being as autonomous 
subject who is absolutely sovereign over himself or herself and all of his or her actions 
that do not interfere with others’.764 As observed from the travaux préparatoires, 
according to the liberal concept of freedom, this is precisely the point at which the 
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absolute protection of individual liberty comes to an end.765 
 
SOGI rights are new to the language of human rights law, as noted earlier. Therefore, 
even though human rights treaties do not explicitly mention SOGI, scholarly articles 
argue for the necessity of protection measures for SOGI. Nowak, in his commentary on 
the ICCPR, writes that ‘special obligations to fulfil the right to privacy by means of 
positive action and to protect it against interference by private parties arise in relation to 
persons deprived of their liberty and other persons in a vulnerable position, such as 
children… homosexuals and transsexuals’.766 He further cites the European jurisprudence 
to argue that ‘transsexuals’ have a right to legal recognition of their changed identity.767 
Nowak pays particular attention to sexuality under the privacy claim. He discusses 
broader sexual behaviour concepts in which interference seems permissible when 
absolutely necessary for the protection of those affected (particularly children).768 Nowak 
then relies on ECtHR jurisprudence to argue that states are prohibited from imposing 
rigid moral restrictions on the private sexual practices of their citizens.769 No other case 
can highlight the ECtHR practice on this better than the one below. 
 
a. Sexual orientation: privacy and the non-discrimination clause in Dudgeon 
(ECtHR) vs. Toonen (HRCtee)  
 
Heavy reliance on ECtHR jurisprudence is not coincidental. In fact, the ECtHR was the 
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first regional or international institution to issue a decision on the protection of sexual 
orientation rights claims, in the case of Dudgeon v UK. The applicant, Jeffrey Dudgeon, 
was a 35-year-old shipping clerk who lived in Belfast.770 In January 1976, police 
searched Mr. Dudgeon’s flat in connection with a drug investigation, found marijuana, 
and charged another person with drug crimes. During the search, police also discovered 
and seized personal papers belonging to Dudgeon that described his homosexual 
activities, and questioned him about his sex life for more than four hours.771  
 
The ECtHR undertook a test to establish whether interference in Mr Dudgeon’s privacy 
(questioning about his sex life, searching of his personal belongings) constituted a breach 
of his right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. In finding that the ‘sodomy law’ 
criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct in Northern Ireland violated the privacy 
rights under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court found that there was no social need to 
justify ‘the risk of harm to vulnerable sections of society’ and thus that laws were not 
necessary.772 In Dudgeon v UK, the ECtHR stated that ‘the law should not intervene in 
matters of private moral conduct more than necessary to preserve public order and to 
protect citizens against what is injurious and offensive and that there is a sphere of moral 
conduct which is best left to individual conscience just as if it were equitable to liberty of 
thought or belief’.773 By extending the right to privacy to homosexuality, the ECtHR 
decided not to pursue its reasoning on Article 14 (non-discrimination) of the Convention, 
despite its having been argued by the claimant.  
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Dudgeon v UK was indeed a landmark case in the history of the decriminalization of 
homosexuality in Northern Ireland. It also set an example for wider ECtHR case law 
within European regional human rights mechanisms and internationally. Two other cases 
that followed shortly afterwards and that succeeded in court – Norris v Ireland774 and 
Modinos v Cyprus775 – were ones in which the ECtHR again ruled on privacy grounds. 
Interestingly, while the ECtHR in Dudgeon did not consider it necessary to also look into 
Mr Dudgeon’s discrimination claims, in Norris the Court affirmed that there were not 
sufficient grounds for the government to maintain laws that are discriminatory against 
particular groups of people.776 As outlined above on the non-discrimination point, it was 
important that the common principles were applied to the substantive provisions of 
international instruments to better illustrate the negative impacts that the laws in place 
have had. With the Dudgeon case, the ECtHR became the first international body to find 
the government in breach of the right to private life, opening up new developments in 
sexual-orientation jurisprudence, both within the regional body and internationally.  
 
Thirteen years later after Dudgeon, a similar case, Toonen v Australia, was submitted to 
the HRCttee. The Committee was thus the first international body to apply human rights 
claims to sexual orientation. The claims came on two grounds: breach of privacy, and 
equality and non-discrimination. The complainant in Toonen v Australia was a gay man 
who argued that the Tasmanian Criminal Code (Australia), under which consenting 
sexual contact between adult men in private was an offence, breached the ICCPR with 
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respect to Article 2 (non-discrimination), Article 17 (privacy rights) and Article 26 
(equality before the law).777 Although it was not the first time that the HRCttee had 
encountered a case on homosexuality (the Committee had reviewed Hertzberg v Finland 
a year earlier in which it applied a margin of appreciation to argue that this was a 
national matter),778 but it was the first time that the Committee issued a historic 
viewpoint on the criminalization of same-sex activity between consenting adults. The 
Committee argued that adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered under 
‘privacy’, and that Mr. Toonen was actually and currently affected by the continued 
existence of the Tasmanian laws.779 The HRCttee went further to consider and to assert 
that interference in the author’s privacy had taken place, even if the legal provisions had 
not been enforced for a decade. The Committee concluded that the mere existence of 
provisions in the law that directly ‘interfere’ with the author’s privacy, already 
constitutes a breach of rights protected under the ICCPR.780  
 
Both the HRCttee and the ECtHR considered cases with similar claims that there was 
interference in private life and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. As the 
ECtHR preceded the HRCttee in discussing the case, it seems to have set the standard 
that the Committee followed in finding Australia in breach of the ICCPR.781 However, 
while the ECtHR avoided discussing the discrimination clause in the case of Dudgeon, 
considering it unnecessary as it had already found a violation of Article 8, the Committee 
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might have considered it an opportunity to expand the protection ground for non-
discrimination and stated that sexual orientation was protected under Article 2 of the 
Covenant under ‘sex’ ground. More specifically, the Committee held that the reference to 
‘sex’ in Article 2(1) of the covenant (which provides that the rights in the covenant 
should be granted to everyone without distinction of any kind such as race, sex, religion, 
etc.) must be read as including sexual orientation.782 Although the two cases concerned 
similar claims with regard to sexual-orientation rights in particular contexts, both had an 
immense effect in developing and expanding international human rights jurisprudence 
further, both within the CoE and internationally. Both cases were expanded to 
accommodate gender-identity rights, which are more specifically discussed below. 
Indeed, since the HRCttee adopted the observation on Toonen v Australia, other treaty 
bodies and SPs started repeatedly addressing the issue, including urging the states to 
reform laws criminalizing homosexuality or sexual conduct between consenting adults of 
the same sex.783  
 
There was a long pause in litigating SOGI cases at the UN human rights mechanisms. In 
fact, almost no case was considered until recently. The HRCttee issued two viewpoints in 
early 2017, specifically looking at the rights of transgender persons. In both cases the 
Committee considered Articles 2 and 17 of the ICCPR (non-discrimination in 
conjunction with the right to private life). These cases, though different in context, had 
the same emphasis on gender identity rights. Even more, in both cases the plaintiffs 
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chose to argue under privacy rights. The case against Australia (G v Australia)784 argued 
for legal gender recognition, whereas a second case (MZBM v Denmark)785 concerned 
breach of privacy by making a gender identity public. In the first case, G was a female 
transgender person who was refused a sex change on her birth certificate unless she had a 
divorce first. As of now, gender reassignment is lawful in Australia and post-operative 
transgender individuals are provided with the opportunity to be legally recognized in 
their reassigned sex and are protected from discrimination on transgender grounds.786 At 
the same time, Australia has anti-discrimination legislation that specifically includes sex 
or gender diversity as grounds for non-discrimination. The complainant [G] in this case 
argued direct discrimination and state interference in her private life. In the case of 
MZBM, the question was related to the deportation of a transgender woman to Malaysia. 
Even though she had undergone gender-reassignment surgery (in 2010), she still 
appeared as a male person on her identification documentation. She experienced 
aggravated violence in Malaysia, including being stopped and searched frequently by the 
Malaysian police.787 The complainant came to Denmark in 2014 to claim asylum. The 
Committee in both cases explicitly highlighted that Article 17 of the ICCPR (‘privacy’) 
protects gender identity, and that Article 26 of the ICCPR (non-discrimination) also 
protects marital status, gender identity and ‘transgender status’.788 What is important to 
highlight, however, is the Committee’s main findings that the divorce requirement to 
obtain legal recognition of gender per se is unacceptable. In his view, such a requirement 
was not based on reasonable and objective criteria in the context of Australia –where the 
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applicant was able to obtain a change of her gender marker in some other documents, 
including passport; where territorial governments could decide to issue new birth 
certificates not requiring divorce; and where same-gender marriages concluded abroad 
could be recognized. In this case, the Committee for the first time found violation of 
Article 17, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR. Although the Committee 
did not elaborate much on recognition before the law, that decision does advance legal 
gender recognition. In the case against Denmark, the Committee did not comment 
extensively on gender identity and recognition before the law in Malaysia, because the 
case concerned the complainant’s deportation from Denmark, so it was against Denmark. 
As such, the Committee did not find any violation. 
 
From this analysis, the G v Australia case is of particular importance in bridging the 
provisions of non-discrimination, gender identity and the right to private life. 
Jurisprudence on the issue of gender identity seems to be further developing under the 
auspices of privacy. If such developments until now were more prominent at the regional 
level, and particularly at the ECtHR, this case might be an indication that a similar trend 
could develop at the HRCttee level. However, if that happens, further theoretical analysis 
will be necessary to determine the relationship between Articles 17 and 16.  
 
b. Gender identity as right to privacy: the Goodwin test  
 
As stated above, until 2002 privacy rights were mainly developed in the context of sexual 
orientation, and very little or no reasoning existed in relation to privacy and gender 
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identity or transgender rights. Cases that were brought before international courts (mainly 
the ECtHR) were related to ‘transsexual’ persons’ rights and mostly in relation to the 
change of legal documentation in order to reflect their new (changed) sex, or denial of 
other rights.789 These cases were largely unsuccessful due to the application of a margin 
of appreciation. The ECtHR did not stop at the sexual-orientation rights claims in 
Dudgeon case in 1981. It expanded to private life to include the right to personhood and 
personal autonomy.790 As already outlined above, the ECtHR does not contain the right 
to be recognized before the law because the drafting experts did not consider it necessary 
to include such a right in the text. The experts indicated that it was a fundamental 
principle for all the other rights, and thus there was no need to codify it.791 
 
This changed in early 2000, when the ECtHR again pioneered in reviewing a case related 
to gender identity and further commented on recognising transgender persons’ rights in 
international human rights law. The case of Goodwin v the UK concerned Ms Christine 
Goodwin, who had faced sexual harassment at work during and following her gender re-
assignment. She had experienced difficulties concerning her national insurance 
contributions, as all her legal documentation still identified her as male. Goodwin had 
been allowed to change her sex through surgery, but was denied legal recognition in her 
newly acquired gender or the possibility of changing her official identity documents. She 
complained under Article 8 of the ECHR (the right to private life) and Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination).  
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The Court took a longer way to arrive at a breach of Goodwin’s right to privacy. The 
ECtHR held that states that permit sex-reassignment surgery must treat post-operative 
‘transsexuals’ as if they had changed sex for all legal purposes, including marriage. 
Overcoming the technical objections of the respondent state, the Court noted, ‘the 
applicant in this case lives as a woman, is in a relationship with a man and would only 
wish to marry a man. She has no possibility of doing so. In the Court’s view, she may 
therefore claim that the very essence of her right to marry has been infringed’.792 The 
Court argued that a ‘transsexual’s freedom to define herself/himself according to his/her 
gender, is one of the most basic essentials of self-determination’.793 And despite the fact 
that the right to be recognized before the law [which would have been equivalent to 
Article 16 of the ICCPR] does not exist under the ECHR, the Court established that the 
notion of such autonomy not only ‘underlies’ the right to a private life, but also embodies 
a different, more expansive, idea of the meaning of private life.794 Regarding this, the 
ECtHR noted that  
 the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human 
freedom. Under Article 8 of the Convention in particular, where the notion of 
personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, 
including their right to establish details of their identity as individual human 
beings... the right of transsexuals to personal development and to physical and 
moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others in society cannot be regarded a 
matter of controversy.795  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 Goodwin v United Kingdom (n 295). 
793 Angus Campbell and Heather Lardy, ‘Transsexuals - The ECHR in Transition?’ (2003) 53 (3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly.  
794 ibid. 
795 Jill Marshall, ‘A right to personal autonomy at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) European Human Rights Law 
Review.  
211 
 
Following Goodwin, two other cases – Van Kück v Germany796 and Schlumpf v Suisse797 
– were reviewed by the ECtHR. In Van Kück, the applicant was an employee of the 
German government who sought partial reimbursement from her private health insurance 
company of the expenses of hormone treatments and gender-reassignment surgery.798 
The applicant was entitled to reimbursement of ‘necessary’ medical expenses, and her 
claims were denied on the grounds that the surgery was considered unnecessary in the 
view of the possibility of the applicant’s gender identity disorder being resolved by 
extensive psychotherapy. On appeal, the German court also accepted the argument that 
treatments were non-reimbursable because the applicant, by self-administering female 
hormones without medical supervision, had ‘herself deliberately caused the disease [sic]’ 
in violation of the insurance conditions.799 The applicant argued, inter alia, that she had 
been denied her right to a fair hearing, guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the ECHR, because 
the German court had arbitrarily required that gender-reassignment surgery [infertility 
test] be the only possible treatment for her disorder.800 She also argued that the national 
court had concluded without evidence that her use of hormone treatments had ‘caused’ 
her gender disorder.801 The decision, she claimed, violated her rights to privacy and self-
determination under Article 8 of the ECHR.802 In that case, the ECtHR ruled that where 
insurance plans cover ‘medically necessary’ treatment, gender-reassignment procedures 
must be included.803 In a similar insurance claim, in the case of Schlumpf v Switzerland, 
the ECtHR held that the two-year waiting period required before reimbursement of 
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gender-change operation costs was too inflexible, as applied to the 67-year-old 
complainant.804 
 
The fact that the ECHR does not contain a right to be recognized before law could have 
created a legal obstacle for the court to undertake and review the cases related to gender 
identity. The Court nevertheless found a way to utilize the ECHR as a ‘living 
instrument’, which develops over time to accommodate new developments in the region 
of its jurisdiction. Moreover, due to its wider application and interpretation of Article 8 
of the Convention, the Court has managed to extend the protection claims under the 
Convention to the issues of personal autonomy, personhood and identity claims. Those 
provisions can also be easily accommodated under Article 16 of the ICCPR, which 
provides a specific provision on recognizing individuals before the law on equal 
principles. With the HRCttee issuing a decision on gender-identity claims under the 
right-to-privacy claims of the ICCPR, it might be that the right to personhood under 
Article 16 of the ICCPR will not be considered in relation to transgender rights. This, 
however, could raise questions about the interpretation of the right itself, as well as why 
complaints do not claim such a right more directly.  
 
Those two specific rights – right to personhood and privacy – of transgender persons 
prove, however, to be intrinsically intertwined concepts that can neither contest each 
other or be considered in isolation. The brief survey of the case law and soft law of the 
human rights bodies also shows that underlying principles of human rights, dignity, 
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equality and non-discrimination are the core that allows the rights claims for transgender 
persons. Furthermore, what this analysis has also shown is the connection between those 
principles and their ability to support the adjudication of substantive rights, particularly 
in the context of privacy rights, as it relates to gender identity. While international 
standards and norms such as HRC resolutions and the Yogyakarta Principles provide a 
general framework for the application of human rights to SOGI, limitations seem to 
persist in the way those norms are interpreted. The conundrum between the right to 
recognition before the law and the right to private life is one of them. Further restrictions 
on the application of human rights law to transgender persons in particular will be 
discussed in the next part of this thesis on a case study on detention.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter posed a question on the limitations of protection mechanisms available for 
transgender persons. The chapter looked at the human rights protection framework in 
three different clusters: first, to understand the place of transgender rights within the 
SOGI rights framework; second, to understand the importance and the role of underlying 
principles of human rights; and third, to look into the concept of transgender-specific 
rights, in particular gender identity and privacy rights.  
 
A number of observations will be made as this thesis progresses to analyse transgender 
and legal theories. With the progress of international human rights law, transgender 
rights seem to be emerging more clearly in the general human rights framework. This is 
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mostly done in two ways, in the general principles framework and regarding specific 
rights (which in this case refers to gender identity, which is often understood as the only 
transgender-specific right). However, both frames lack evidence on how successful they 
are in upholding transgender rights in practice. The tensions and disagreements within 
the transgender community over transgender identity and non-binary gender still 
continue to unsettle the movement in achieving full consensus on access to and 
realization of human rights. The analysis in this chapter reveals a clear development that 
the underlying principles of human rights – dignity, equality and non-discrimination – 
are and will continue to be the core for gender identity rights claims. Those principles 
should also be considered as the entry to the rights realm. This is evident in most of the 
claims made by transgender individuals discussed in the chapter. However, having those 
common principles does not conflict with the idea of specific rights. In fact, the chapter 
suggests that the most well-developed specific rights that transgender persons have 
claimed are the right to privacy and gender identity. The right to health, which was not 
discussed in the chapter but was part of the medical model discussed in Chapter Two, 
also plays an important role – although that model is the subject of debates among 
activists and professionals, also addressed in Chapter Two.  
 
While this chapter attempted to conceptualize gender identity as a specific right for 
transgender persons, it also illustrated how the same concept of identity can be and is 
understood as part of the right to privacy, both through the right to recognition before the 
law and the right to privacy that create a complex and intersectional theoretical 
dimension. This is made clear in the most recent reasonings of the ECtHR and the 
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HRCttee – the only international human rights bodies so far to have issued judgments on 
gender identity and privacy in conjunction with equality and non-discrimination claims. 
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PART THREE 
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Chapter V 
Lived Experiences of Transgender Persons in the Places of Detention 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The last few years in the LGBTIQ movement have been characterised by rapid progress 
in the application of human rights law to SOGI. The establishment of the first ever UN 
Independent Expert on SOGI in 2016, and a handful of judgments by the human rights 
bodies indicate slow but apparent progress in reflecting the transgender lived experiences 
in the policy and law. There has been a gradual recognition of a gender self-
determination model of transgender legal recognition, with over 10 countries now 
supporting it. However, the number of countries that retain laws criminalizing LGBTIQ 
people is still high, at 76, as reported by the High Commissioner for Human Rights.805 
The medical model of the transgender legal recognition in law also has a large number of 
country supporters, however with international standards, including the WHO-ICD 
reform and recommendations, this might change in the near future.  
 
The area where the application of human rights law has lagged behind regards the places 
of detention.806 If the lived experiences of transgender persons have been evidently 
reflected in progress made from the biological model of transgender recognition 
(effectively, a deliberate deprivation of the right to personhood) to medical and to the 
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gender self-determination models with respective jurisprudence and advancement of 
policies, the same has not taken place in the context of detention. Some attempts have 
been made to apply prison standards to transgender and non-binary gender prisoners, 
though due to the complex nature of containing fluid genders in single-sex spaces, these 
attempts have had little impact as to how prison systems operate in relation to 
transgender prisoners. Tensions between the fixed categories of sex and gender in the 
prison context and the fluid nature of transgender embodiment is also one of the major 
intersections where violations of transgender prisoners’ rights originate from.  
 
Prisons typically are characterised by rigid, strict structures, which makes it challenging 
both for the law to regulate specific groups in prisons, particularly if the group’s identity 
undermines a core characteristic of prisons (e.g., isolation of the sexes), and also for the 
state authorities to implement such policies in practice.807 In the words of a transgender 
prisoner, ‘prisons are bastions of “a one size fits all”… where any ideology sexuality or 
sexual identity that deviates from the prison system’s cultural norms is heavily 
suppressed’. 808  
 
Indeed, no blueprint exists as to how to treat transgender prisoners. With the history of 
‘deviance’ and ‘invisibility’, not only the transgender but also all ‘sexual minority’ 
categories have been left out of specific safeguard measures in detention, as also argued 
in Chapters Three and Four. Though different models outlined in Chapter Two have 
enabled transgender groups to claim the protection of their rights and freedoms, progress 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807 Kunzel  (n 227). 
808 Sarah Jane Baker, Transgender Behind Prison Walls (kindle edn, Waterside Press Ltd 2017) section 1. 
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and application of these models in the prison context have been limited. Analysis of legal 
recognition models in the prison context provides some useful insight on the limitations 
of the application of human rights law in the prison context in safeguarding transgender 
prisoners.  
 
The experiences of transgender prisoners magnify the specific normative gaps in policy 
and impact of such policies on transgender persons. In prison systems, transgender 
people are often stripped of their basic rights and are left to the mercy of other prisoners 
or the prison staff, both of whom can be the first source of violence. Decisions on 
housing transgender prisoners, including allocation and segregation, prolonged terms, 
medical treatment, general prison conditions and ability to express one’s gender are 
among the most critical of the many rights at risk. These experiences and challenges 
faced by transgender prisoners are coupled with common stigma, a personal struggle 
against the binary models of the sexes, and heightened inter-personal violence.  
 
This chapter aims to analyse the lived experiences of transgender prisoners that challenge 
the norms of human rights law and their application to their experiences. By narrating the 
lived experiences of transgender prisoners, it will unlock the theory and practice. It will 
start by providing an overview of the statistical data on transgender prisoners, and 
continue with illustrations of their lives in prisons, with a step-by-step analysis of the 
challenges faced. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the lived experiences from both 
women’s and men’s prisons, thus reflecting the experiences of both male and female 
transgender prisoners. However, due to the lack of literature on the experiences of 
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transgender men in prisons, this chapter employs more examples from the transgender 
women’s perspective. Where it was possible to obtain literature about transgender men, 
the challenges faced by transgender men prisoners are highlighted too.  
 
2. Data and Numbers on Transgender Prisoners 
 
Chapter One, under the heading of transgender studies in prisons, highlighted the 
intersections between transgender studies and prison theory. Both the deviance and the 
invisibility stages outlined earlier have had a huge impact on how the transgender 
experiences (or wider ‘sexual minority’) are narrated in theory and practice. Little data 
exist as to the number of transgender persons in most individual prisons and broader 
prison systems. The absence of numbers (and thus stories) about transgender prisoners is 
then used to justify the absence of law or policies. In other words, no numbers mean no 
data, no data mean no life stories of transgender prisoners, and no stories mean the 
absence of the problem, and if there is no problem in practice, there is no need for 
policies and laws to apply. This is, however, a flawed approach when it comes to the 
transgender prisoners and their lived experiences in incarceration. In particular, even a 
brief survey of the criminology and sexology literature from the early 20th century 
makes it clear that the problem of ‘sexual minorities’ in prisons existed, though was 
hardly acknowledged. 809  Such limited visibility or ignorance of the existence of 
transgender prisoners leads to low numbers being reported, and this also leads to either 
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ignoring their problems or their problems being enmeshed with wider human rights 
concerns that exist in prison systems.  
 
In recent years a growing visibility of transgender prisoners in some countries (for 
example, UK and the US) has elicited policy changes including in data gathrering. The 
countries have started to publish data on the numbers of non-binary gender persons 
housed in their places of detention. For example, in the UK it has been suggested that one 
in four prisons in England and Wales are holding transgender inmates.810 In 2017, the 
UK prison services reported that there were 70 inmates living in, or presenting in, a 
‘gender different to their sex assigned at birth.’811 In the US, a study from 2009 showed 
that approximately 750 prisoners across the country’s prison system identified as 
transgender.812 In Thailand, out of around 300,000 prisoners, more than 6,000 are 
registered as ‘sexual minorities’.813 In mid-2016, it was reported that there were 150 
‘homosexuals’ imprisoned in Brazil.814   
 
It is not a common practice for prison services to collect information on LGBTIQ 
prisoners. Monitoring and documenting the implementation of SOGI rights in prison is a 
difficult task. These mechanisms have been further criticised for being ‘crude’ and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810 Josh Halliday, 'Transgender Woman Found Dead In Cell At Doncaster Prison' The Guardian (2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jan/05/transgender-woman-jenny-swift-found-dead-at-doncaster-prison> accessed 11 
January 2017. 
811 ibid. 
812 Esinam Agbemenu, ‘Medical Transgressions in America's Prisons: Defending Transgender Prisoners' Access to Transition-Related 
Care’ (2015) 30 (1) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law. 
813 Drake King, 'Thailand Separates LGBT Inmates, Considers Segregated Prison' Associated Press (2017). 
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‘ineffective’.815 For example, Robinson argues that the application of crude binary 
systems makes everything turn on whether the inmate can convince the prison 
administration as to his or her identity816 and argues that such policies can make 
transgender prisoners more vulnerable to violence and abuse. Other researchers argue 
that the lack of information about ‘sexual minority’ prisoners is not simply a product of 
institutional indifference or neglect, but a much deeper and a more institutional 
discrimination, which starts before a person gets into a prison.817  
 
It is not always safe for prisoners to disclose their gender identity as transgender and 
gender non-conforming people. Lamble argues that gender incongruence remains over-
policed and over-imprisoned in many jurisdictions though not reported. 818  Indeed, 
Lamble is right to argue that the monitoring and forcing people in respective gender 
groups starts outside the prison walls. Transgender people, not conforming to strict 
binary identities, face discrimination in various areas of their lives: housing and 
employment, bullying in schools, estrangement from family, street harassment and hate-
based violence. These factors greatly increase the risks of social exclusion, economic 
insecurity and criminalization and make transgender persons more vulnerable to 
violence.819 Lamble’s point is reinforced by the accounts of transgender prisoners, who 
argue that prisons are ‘full of people who have been punished since the day they were 
born’.820 In other words, Lamble questions the legitimacy of the justice system, which 
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captures the most vulnerable even outside prisons, such as those living in extreme 
poverty and who experience extreme forms of violence including institutional violence 
and societal stigma. Fearing further violence, it can often be the case that transgender 
prisoners hide their identities to spare themselves from attacks. Non-binary identities do 
not allow the production of rigid statistics; rather, it encourages dynamism and inter-
changeability of gender and expression, making it difficult to produce counts of people 
including in the prison context. 
 
In the absence of precise or even approximate data, what is important is the 
acknowledgement of the presence of such people in prisons, which can be a first step 
towards putting appropriate safeguards in place for the humane treatment of transgender 
prisoners. At the same time, it is important to look at the challenges and types of 
violations transgender prisoners face in closed environments to understand the challenges 
faced by non-binary persons in heteronormative prison systems. For this, understanding 
of the lives of transgender prisoners is required. 
 
3. Lived Experiences of Transgender Prisoners  
 
Academic literature on transgender prisoners’ experiences is very limited and is 
dominated mainly by North American scholarship.821 Though there has been some 
research on transgender prisoners published by non-governmental organisations,822 the 
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overall picture remains limited. Some information is available from a small number of 
countries that have also started addressing the issues of transgender prisoners, namely the 
UK,823 Canada824 and Malta,825 but the vast majority of existing literature comes from the 
US. It is impossible to generalize from that context, since the US has unique 
characteristics in its particular type of criminal justice system with high-profile issues of 
race and gender as well as problems such as mass incarceration and hyper-violence.826 
This means that there is a great need for further research into transgender prisoners’ 
experiences of prisons in a wider variety of contexts.827  
 
Limited available data shows that transgender people have faced a broad range of 
harmful situations, ranging from the potentially fatal to subtler and ‘quotidian 
ignominies’. 828  Within the criminal justice system, these experiences are often 
exacerbated by violence. Transgender or non-binary identity makes this group more 
susceptible to harm, both inter-prisoner and from prison officials.829 Prisons by default 
restrict transgender people from expressing their gender identity.830 Even more, the 
binary character of prisons means that during the decision-making process, transgender 
prisoners are forced into two alternative sex/gender expressions only: male or female. 
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When no other choice is presented to non-binary individuals, a forceful enforcement of 
biological model of gender becomes inevitable. This means that while in prison, 
institutional policies and practices will limit or erase aspects of transgender life and deny 
opportunities for gender expression.831  
 
The use of improper pronouns is significant to transgender inmates and is part of their 
personhood. Therefore, such treatment in the prison system can violate one’s dignity.832 
On this, queer theorists argue that violent enforcement of gender norms can be 
understood as breaches of the principles of dignity. Such actions might include: a) taking 
away the ability of imprisoned people, who are often marginalised in multiple ways, to 
self-determine their dress; b) forcing imprisoned people to adhere to dominant social 
norms through dress, even when they deeply object; c) using the full weight of the 
criminal legal system to punish those who refuse to adhere to those norms; and d) using 
dress that does not match dominant norms as a form of punishment and humiliation.833 
Problems related to dress code are commonly faced by transgender prisoners, particularly 
in situations when such policies are designed at a lower level and are often a 
discretionary power of the individual prison administration. 
 
The underlying presumption is that ill-treatment of transgender prisoners for expressing 
their gender begins as soon as the person enters the prison facility.834 Such ill-treatment 
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is either physical or psychological. For example, in the US context, discrimination 
against transgender persons is often effectuated by using incorrect pronouns to refer to 
transgender inmates, performing unnecessary searches for the purpose of exposing 
transgender inmates’ genitalia and denying gender-appropriate clothing and grooming 
items.835 This suggests that for transgender prisoners, it is often at their first arrival at the 
places of detention and during subsequent decisions about their allocation to prisons that 
are the most crucial in locating the origins and sources of further violence and ill-
treatment. 
 
A wider range of problems has been recorded in other jurisdictions. In the UK, for 
example, prison regulations of clothing and grooming standards are entirely fitted with 
binary sex models. These standards in practice do not take into account diverse genders 
transgender persons have.836 Many suffer verbal abuse and are treated as pariahs.837 
Prisoners are not allowed to wear long hair (particularly in male prisons) and have no or 
restricted access to some types of clothing, specifically trousers and skirts, underwear 
and/or bra (specifically for transgender women). These rules disproportionately affect 
transgender women prisoners. The bra restriction is particularly noteworthy, as 
transgender women often have developed breast tissue through surgery or hormone 
treatment. Taking such negligence into account, a court in the UK has called such 
practice ‘harassment’ and ‘indignity’. In particular, the Court in a case of R (on the 
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application of Green) v Secretary of State for Justice, concerning transgender prisoner’s 
rights, stated that:  
this form of harassment is the kind of ongoing indignity that can lead to more 
significant issues down the line… Some health problems can result from women 
being denied bras ... [and the lack of bras], in a number of cases, sexual 
harassment.838  
 
In addition to the physical pain caused by inappropriate clothing, many transgender 
inmates suffer psychological trauma from being unable to express their gender identity 
adequately.839  
 
Considering prison life, practices of deliberately calling inmates by incorrect names or 
titles can be insignificant. Yet such practices reflect the level of undignified treatment of 
prisoners in general, and their meaning can be amplified according to how much such 
expression, pronounce and names mean to individuals, including transgender persons. In 
the words of Maruri, ‘the use of improper pronouns is significant to transgender inmates, 
and some can be willing to risk punishment to demand recognition of their gender 
identity’,840 meaning that calling correct pronounce, and names reinforces their identity, 
and, as a result, is of high importance and core to their being. General issues of treatment 
of prisoners and specific experiences related to gender expression, inter-prisoner 
violence, medical care and other issues of transgender prisoners’ concern is organised in 
three main themes in this chapter: (1) violence, (2) protective custody, (3) medical 
treatment. By illustrating the extent of human rights violations against transgender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
838 R (on the application of Green) v Secretary of State for Justice (n 832).;  Also, R (on the application of AB) v Secretary of State for 
Justice (n 832). 
839 Scott (n 828).  
840 Scott (n 828). 
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persons in prisons and narrating the lived experiences of transgender prisoners this 
chapter will provide an insight into transgender prisoners lives during their incarceration.  
 
3.1. Violence  
 
Prisons are often characterized by violence and widespread sexual abuse (including rape) 
of those who appear weak and feminine, particularly in male prisons. While transgender 
persons, as well as other ‘sexual minorities’, are not the only people vulnerable to sexual 
victimization in prisons (particularly in male prisons), their vulnerability is compounded 
by additional risks related to their appearance and being. Furthermore, deprivation of 
liberty and unequal power relations between the state and those imprisoned, engender 
vulnerability to torture and other ill-treatment.841 Automatically assigning the place of 
LGBTIQ persons in the prison sexual hierarchy, as well as the absence of any safeguards 
in place, makes them almost automatic targets for such abuse.842 Furthermore, research 
on excessively masculine nature of the prison environment also means that anyone 
feminine in such a system will be susceptible to sexual assault, particularly rape.843 For 
example, reports from UN experts including from the 1990s show that transgender 
women are ‘punished’ for transgressing gender barriers or for challenging predominant 
conceptions of gender roles.844 Some authors also argue that in the prison sexual 
hierarchy, the act of rape – forcing a weaker prisoner into the sexually passive role – is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841 UNGA Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2009) UN Doc. A/64/215,  para 39, 47. 
842 Sharon Dolovic, ‘Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison’ (2011) 48 American Criminology Law Review 1  
843 Don Sabo, Terry Kupers and Willie London (eds), Prison Masculinities (Temple University Press 2001).; David S Cohen, 
‘Keeping Men Men and Women Down: Sex Segregation, Anti-Essentialism, and Masculinity’ (2010) 33 Harvard Journal of law and 
gender 
844 UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156, para 17., UN Committee against Torture, 
Concluding observations on USA, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (25 July 2006), para 32. 
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itself the moment of gender redefinition (the point at which that person is ‘turned out’ 
and becomes newly classified as female). Building on this, Dolovic notes that in the case 
of gay men and transgender women in male prisons, there is no need for any moment of 
gender redefinition, since in the hypermasculine culture of prisons, gay men and trans 
women in male prisons are regarded as female by definition and are thus automatic 
targets for sexual assault.845   
 
Violence, and specifically sexual violence against transgender persons, has been detected 
in multifaceted forms: inter-prisoner, when fellow prisoners exercise domineering power 
over the weak and sexually abuse them, or from the prison administration, which can 
include forced anal846 or vaginal examinations847 to ‘prove’ the homosexuality of a 
person in question848 or when conducting searches including ‘strip searches’ on prisoners 
both at arrival and during the imprisonment. Ill-treatment inflicted on transgender 
prisoners is varied. For example, a transgender woman prisoner describes her first 
encounter with a prison and the humiliation she experienced during the initial intake 
process as follows:  
When I arrived at the reception center... I stepped off the bus and was strip-
searched in front of two guards and about a dozen male inmates. A sergeant 
yelled, “Look at the tits on that one! Those are the best-looking tits I’ve ever seen 
on a man”. He pointed me out to a six-foot, three-inch inmate and said to him, 
“You like that one, don’t you? I’m going to put you in a cell with that one.” 
Another sergeant called me “tits” and “titty man”. ... While the rest of my group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
845 Dolovic (n 837). 
846 UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156, para 17-25.; Report of Working Group of 
Arbitrary Detention (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/16/47/Add.1., para 28.; See also 9th Annual Report of the UN CAT Report of the 
Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (2016) UN Doc. CAT/OP/C/57/4, para 61.; also see UN HRC Report of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/19/41, para 37. UNHRC Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/22/53, para 79.  
847 The court held that ‘finger vaginal examination, conducted abruptly and simultaneously by several persons, constituted a form of 
rape and torture.; See Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v Peru Petition No 11,015 and 11,769, (Inter-American Court 2006) para 312.    
848 Report of Working Group of Arbitrary Detention (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/16/47/Add.1., para 28.; See also 9th Annual Report of 
the UN CAT Report of the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (2016) UN Doc. CAT/OP/C/57/4, para 61. 
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went through the intake process, I was left sitting on a bench until the afternoon 
so that all the other intake inmates could see me.849  
 
As noted above, prisons can be generally masculine and violent places with a particular 
impact on transgender persons. 850  Reflecting on being imprisoned as transgender 
prisoners, Sarah Jane Baker, who transitioned while in prison notes: 
Being a transgender in our macho prison system is no soft option, some of us, … 
face ridicule, attack and discrimination on a daily basis. I am saddened that what 
rights we do have are seen as privileges, rather than a humane and civilised way 
of treating some of the most vulnerable inmates within our penal system. We face 
prejudice not only from other inmates but also prison staff, who find it difficult to 
treat prisoners as individuals. It is easier to manage prisoners by treating them all 
the same, making no allowances for those who are transgender, disabled or 
mentally ill.851  
 
This is an important point, particularly when arguing for a specific approach to the 
transgender prisoners to ensure safeguard mechanisms in place. Notably, Baker also 
singles out other vulnerable groups that often become victims of the ‘one size fits all’ 
approach. 
 
The experiences that prisoners have often can be similar. Experiences of transgender 
prisoners, however, can be particularly daunting given the particular vulnerability that 
they experience. To put it in the words of a transgender prisoner, it is not easy to live in a 
prison ‘where a third of prisoners seem to think I should be killed, a third want to have 
sex with me, and the remaining third feel comfortable enough to threaten and verbally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
849 Stop Prisoner Rape, ‘In the Shadows: Sexual Violence in U.S. Detention Facilities’ - an Alternative NGO Report Prepared for the 
36th Session of the UN Committee Against Torture, 2006. 
850 Baker (n 808). 
851 ibid. 
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abuse me in full view and hearing of prison staff.’852 Indeed, this quote sums up the 
general treatment transgender persons expect in prisons, as well as their perceptions of 
states’ involvement in inflicting ill-treatment onto them. Such a hostile environment, 
coupled with the invisibility and absence of information of the transgender prisoners 
often leads to the ignorance of their rights, both in law and policy and also at the level of 
implementation.  
 
The SPs mechanisms have reported the plight and extreme vulnerability of transgender 
women who are most often imprisoned in male detention facilities since late 1999.853 For 
example, the UNSR on Independence of Judges and Lawyers noted that putting a 
transgender person into a prison opposite to his or her gender means ‘further 
victimization of transgender persons in detention, as well as lesbian and gay 
prisoners.’854 The available human rights literature suggests that rape and sexual abuse in 
the prison context are often committed by other inmates, which raises an issue of risk 
assessment. The risk assessment, whether either for an individual or group related, is 
often an area that is overlooked in many prisons. This failure has its negative 
consequences for the general prison population but more specifically for transgender 
persons. This thesis does not focus on this issue exclusively, but its importance should be 
highlighted for consideration. For example, on the issue of risk assessment in prisons, the 
UNSR on Torture suggested that ‘consideration should be given to the protection of 
LGBTIQ detainees, who can be at risk of physical and sexual abuse if placed within the 
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853 UNGA  Human Rights Council, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers (2011) 
A/66/289, para 81. 
854 Ibid 102.  
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general prison population.’855 The SR further noted that efforts should be made to avoid 
placing transgender prisoners in situations where there is a high risk of torture and ill-
treatment. In particular, it suggested that ‘any decision in relation to the placement of 
LGBTIQ detainees within a place of detention should avoid further marginalizing them 
within the prison community or rendering them at further risk of torture or other ill-
treatment’.856  
 
Despite sporadically reported incidents of sexual abuse against LGBTIQ persons, 
accessing the statistics on prison rape and sexual abuse is notoriously difficult, as many 
such instances go unrecorded. Reporting sexual violence cases often means risking lives 
in extremely violent prison settings, and is associated with shame and social stigma. It 
also means more visibility for the inmate, thus exposing themselves to further violence. 
Many prisoners may choose not to report such violent incidents due to concerns for their 
own safety. Despite this, a few individual prisons have attempted to generate local 
numbers, which can give an indication as to the extent of the abuse. It is important, 
however, to avoid generalisation of this data due to its homogenous nature and primary 
relevance to particular prisons in the US. A 2007 study conducted in the California 
prison system found that ‘67 percent of inmates who identified as LGBTIQ reported 
having been sexually assaulted by another inmate during their incarceration, a rate that 
was 15 times higher than the inmate population overall’.857 As already noted above, the 
gruesome practice of sexual violence against transgender women prisoners, in particular, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
855 UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2010) UN Doc. A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, para 231.; UNGA Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156, para 23. 
856 UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture on Jamaica (2010) UN Doc. A/HRC/16/52/Add.3, para 47. 
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has been a focus of reporting by a number of UN SPs mechanisms. In 2011, the UNSR 
on Violence Against Women reported on a case in El Salvador in which a transgender 
woman was housed in a male-only prison and detained in a cell with gang members. She 
was raped repeatedly, sometimes with the complicity of prison officials.858  
 
Despite the paucity of empirical data, researchers have compiled countless accounts of 
transgender prisoners experiencing sexual attacks, coercive sex, harassment, and forced 
prostitution at the hands of prison staff and fellow inmates. A letter sent by a transgender 
prisoner pleading for help reads:  
It's war in here.... I’m raped on a daily basis, I’ve made complaint after 
complaint, but no response. No success. I'm scared to push forward with my 
complaints against officers for beating me up and raping me. I was in full 
restraints when the correctional officers assaulted me. Then after they said I 
assaulted them. All the officers say is “I didn't do it”. The Inspector General said 
officers have a right to do that to me. That I’m just a man and shouldn’t be 
dressing like this.859 
 
The stories presented here are specific to the context and individuals who gave the 
testimonies. However, they do represent the overall trend of violence reported by ‘sexual 
minorities’, both in and outside of prisons. The egregious nature of ill-treatment deserves 
further and more in-depth investigation of the phenomenon and its implications on 
transgender persons.  
 
To avoid sexual abuse and rape between inmates and particularly LGBTIQ persons, often 
the only option is to place them ether in solitary confinement or administrative 
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segregation as special categories or vulnerable prisoners. This potentially leads to another 
set of problems and human rights violations, which has been scarcely addressed in 
international human rights law. Security risks often overshadow individual rights of 
prisoners, and paradoxically, in the case of transgender prisoners, often such ‘security 
measures’ are applied in their best interest to protect them from abuse. 
 
3.2. Protective custody  
 
The prison authorities often argue that gender identity and expression, as well as sexual 
orientation, are the core that makes transgender, non-binary and ‘sexual minority’ 
prisoners targets of sexual abuse. Even more, often such beliefs serve as one of the 
grounds for state justification to use solitary confinement as a way of protecting 
vulnerable detainees.860 Accordingly, transgender prisoners, as well as other LGBIQ 
persons in detention, often end up in ‘protective custody’.861 Prison administrations 
justify this by saying that in these situations only two choices are available – to place 
transgender prisoners with prisoners of their birth sex, which can put them at risk of 
violence862 or place them under protection. Often the decision is made in favour of the 
latter option.863 The problem, however, remains in the definition of ‘protective custody’. 
This is particularly important due to its practical resemblance to solitary confinement. A 
brief survey of transgender prisoners’ testimonies show how often ‘protective custody is 
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861 UNGA Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture (2011) UN Doc. A/66/268., para 69.; Also see UNGA Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156, 64. 
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used as a euphemism for solitary confinement’.864 A transgender prisoner described her 
experience in protective custody during her testimony:  
I was placed in protective custody, which at this facility basically meant solitary 
confinement. I spent my days in a small cell with no water, magazines, or 
programming. I was rarely taken to the yard for recreation, and my pleas for 
water and something to read or occupy my time with usually went ignored. The 
officer who guarded the unit would pretend not to hear me. This is cruel treatment 
that I don't think anyone should have to experience, especially not someone who 
has already been victimized repeatedly.865  
 
Another research from the US indicates that while in protective custody, a transgender 
inmate is often on lock-down for 23 hours a day in a small cell and is cut off from 
recreation, educational opportunities, employment opportunities, worship services, and 
all forms of human contact, as highlighted above.866 Tarzwell, for example, argues that 
‘protective segregation’ often differs little from punitive segregation or solitary 
confinement. She also notes that at best, segregated prisoners are removed from the 
companionship of other prisoners, denied access to many prison programs, confined to 
smaller cells and limited time in exercise yards, and are further stigmatized.867 
 
In this thesis, protective custody is treated the same as solitary confinement due to their 
resemblance, but also because of how individuals experience these two measures – in one 
case as a disciplinary, in another case as a protection, though both with similar effects. 
This thesis will attempt to illustrate the impact of solitary confinement in order to 
underline the severity of isolation, which is what protective custody also entails.   
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865 National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Testimony of Mayra Soto, Just Detention International (2006). at 
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The issue of solitary confinement cannot be analysed in detail in this chapter and it 
requires a further examination both in theory and practice. The legal definition of solitary 
confinement and analyses of international instruments on this issue are discussed in the 
next chapter, but it is pertinent to provide experiences of transgender prisoners who end 
up in ‘protective custody’. 
 
Prison authorities exercise discretionary power to impose solitary confinement. The 
decision as to whether to allocate a prisoner to ‘protective custody’ is discretionary too. 
Because transgender prisoners are often viewed as disobeying the rules of single-sex 
space and unwritten rules of prison culture, it is also seen that such discretionary power is 
used to punish those who show ‘deviant’ behaviour from the norm. For example, this is 
how a transgender prisoner describes the experience of transitioning inside the prison: 
‘For the first three or four years I was locked up, I didn't really have any problems at 
all—no write-ups, no bad incidents with staff or inmates… as soon as I came out [as 
trans], everything started going downhill.’868 In another case, a prison psychologist 
describes the case of a prisoner who was trying to transition while the prison: ‘she (a 
transgender woman prisoner) was removed from her trustee job as a librarian and 
confined to the vulnerable prisoner unit, banged up for 23 hours a day, because the 
authorities claimed they could not guarantee her safety.’869  
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Despite the harrowing nature of solitary confinement, transgender and other LGBIQ 
prisoners disproportionately experience the effects of it. Transgender prisoners are 
housed in solitary often as a default, mainly to ‘protect them from violence’ from the 
general population. 870  Although such decisions are made in the ‘best interest’ of 
transgender persons, in practice they work against them. LGBTIQ people in ‘protective 
custody’ experience the same mental health deterioration that typically characterizes 
solitary confinement, impact that makes it equal to ill-treatment.871 For example, while in 
‘protective custody’, transgender prisoners are treated as prisoners under disciplinary 
punishment: locked-down for 23 hours a day in a small cell and cut off from recreation, 
educational opportunities, employment opportunities, worship services, and all forms of 
human contact.872 They may also be denied access to programmes and medically 
necessary healthcare, and are at increased risk of assault and harassment from officers.873 
Having witnessed such ill-treatment and inhumane conditions of detention in which 
‘sexual minorities’ were housed, the UNSR on Torture stated that the unacceptable 
conditions of separate cells in which ‘vulnerable groups such as gay, lesbian and 
transgender persons were held’874 were highly likely to have constituted torture and other 
ill treatment. If ‘protective custody’ entails the description of solitary confinement, and 
many testimonies surveyed for this thesis shows it does, a conclusion can be made that 
by subjecting ‘sexual minorities’ to so called ‘protective custody’ they are in fact without 
procedural guarantees and safeguards are placed in solitary confinement. This also means 
that even though theoretically protective custody is designed for the protection of 
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871 Sharon Shalev, 'A Sourcebook On Solitary Confinement' [2008] SSRN Electronic Journal. 
872 DiMarco v Wyoming Dept. of Corrections (n 865) 
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transgender prisoners, in reality it strips them of all the rights they could access in 
prisons, and subjects them to ill-treatment as stated by the UNSR on Torture. 
 
Solitary confinement as a disciplinary punishment is contained in prison regulations and 
rigorous official procedures are applied to its implementation. Protective custody lacks 
such procedures. The power to impose such a measure is often discretionary to the local 
prison governors, meaning that such measures bypass the policies and standards on 
solitary confinement. Moreover, some international standards and instruments suggest 
that such measures can indeed be used for protective reasons and in the best interests of 
transgender and other ‘sexual minority’ prisoners.875 Hence, ‘protective measures’ often 
last for months or even a year, during which time the prisoner is stripped of all rights, 
and without human contact, or contact with the outside world. For example, research 
from the US suggests that ‘85 percent of nearly 1,200 LGBTIQ prisoner respondents had 
spent time in solitary confinement. Almost half of them had been placed in the ‘box’ for 
two years or more.876 
 
The compounded example below magnifies the extent of abuses faced by transgender 
prisoners when isolated from the rest of the population. Though written in 1984, this 
story from the ‘Experiences of a Transsexual Prisoner’ interview still resonates with 
prison practices in many countries today as they relate to transgender prisoners:  
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Council of Europe, Rec R(87)3 (12 February 1987) ("European Prison Rules 1987") and Revised European Prison Rules, 2006, 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Rec(2006)2 (11 January 2006) (European Prison Rules 2006) 60.  
876 Aviva Stahl (n 864) ; Jason Lydon, Kamaria Carrington, Hana Low, Reed Miller and Mahsa Yazdy, ‘Black and Pink’ (2015). At 
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The first day was very hard. I was at Bathurst only 12 months because of not 
being able to understand me. They kept me in what they called the Back Yard 
where no-one else could see me, and this kind of treatment I couldn't stand 
because I was by myself. It was a yard 20 by 10; I was there all day and back to 
my cell at night time. I had no company and it actually drove me mad, so I 
became a little suicidal. I told them if they didn't shift me I would probably end 
up a lunatic or something. And eventually I ended up attacking one of their prison 
officers, and was given 28 days for assault.877  
 
Such experiences of transgender prisoners indicate that no international standard is 
applied when considering ‘protective custody’ measures for the transgender prisoners.  
 
The absence of specifically worded safeguards has meant putting transgender prisoners 
in and out of safeguards, but more specifically in the legal limbo where protection is and 
is not available at the same time. Furthermore, decision-making practices by the prison 
administration do not consider the needs of individual transgender prisoners. The lack of 
guidance and wide discretionary powers of the local prison administration to ‘handle’ the 
gender expression of prisoners serves as a precursor for the abuse, violence and direct 
discrimination of the transgender prison population.  
 
3.3. Medical treatment 
 
Earlier in this thesis, the medical treatment of transgender persons and the medical model 
of transgender recognition was discussed alongside issues surrounding health of 
transgender persons and the WHO-ICD classification. A traditional framework of 
medical care for transgender persons consists of three elements: hormone therapy, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
877 Chris Sanderson, 'Experiences of a Transsexual Prisoner' (1984) 9 Legal Service Bulletin 183, 184. Quoted in Keep me Safe From 
Harm. 
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period of time living as the opposite gender, and sex-reassignment surgery. Human rights 
law asserts that healthcare should be equal to the care available in society – often referred 
to as equality of care.878 The transgender theory and lived experiences of non-binary 
people have shown that not all transgender and/or non-binary persons desire to transgress 
permanently from one gender to another, which is an expected understanding that can 
present a dilemma to the prison administration health system at different levels: resources 
and the intellectual capacity to deal with the issue.  
 
A major concern for many transgender prisoners is whether appropriate health care can 
be provided while incarcerated. Often decisions about the medical treatment of 
transgender persons are based on whether the person is in the process of hormonal 
treatment already, or would like to initiate such treatment in the prison system, whether 
the person was already ‘living like the opposite sex’, or would like to initiate such 
practice in the prison, and finally, whether the person was about to undergo surgery, or 
would like to initiate such surgery in the prison system. In practice, such a right is often 
contested in national courts and it has been argued that the denial of hormone therapy, as 
well as the denial of gender confirmation surgery, amounts to deliberate indifference to 
the medical needs of transgender inmates.879 At the same time, prison reality varies from 
what is available as an equal standard for all, and particularly when it comes to 
transgender persons.  
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A testimony of a transgender prisoner from Israel outlines problems of healthcare in 
prisons: 
Most prisons do not provide hormones, and some go to great lengths to avoid 
providing any treatment to transsexual inmates. Most transsexual inmates are not 
receiving appropriate medical and psychological care. Many repeatedly seek 
medical treatment, often for years, while enduring administrative harassment and 
difficult court battles in the pursuit of basic medical and civil rights. Prisons that 
do provide frequently have policies, which allow for the treatment of those who 
were treated prior to incarceration, but fail to address the medical needs of those 
who develop GID during incarceration or who have no documented proof of their 
pre-incarceration transsexualism. Officials often claim that only those inmates 
who were diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder and placed on hormones 
before incarceration are eligible for hormones in prison. They sometimes 
maintain that the prison does not afford the opportunity for the real life 
experience... conveniently ignoring the fact that many MTF transsexual inmates 
consistently maintain their female identity year after year in an all-male 
facility.880  
 
A long history of pathologization of transgender persons and communities has meant that 
medical care has earned the meaning of more than just the health of transgender people. 
In some cases, it is even part of identity. The refusal of prison administrations to provide 
hormonal treatment may result in multiple violations, including leading to the person’s 
death. A recent case from the UK, HMP Doncaster in South Yorkshire, highlighted a 
deep-rooted problem that medical services in prisons have when it came to the provision 
of the right treatment for transgender persons. Jenny Swift was a male to female 
transgender person who was sentenced to imprisonment. The media reported that she had 
asked ‘to be placed in a women’s prison and had become miserable, sad and ill after 
being refused female hormones in HMP Doncaster’. She was found dead in her cell 
within five weeks from her placement in a male prison. She had been taking female 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
880 Gianna Israel, ‘Transsexual Inmates Treatment Issues’ (2002) 97 Transgender Tapestry 1, 4., inserted in Richard Edney, 'To Keep 
Me Safe From Harm? Transgender Prisoners And The Experience Of Imprisonment' (2004) 9 Deakin Law Review. 
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hormones for three years before imprisonment as part of her transitioning; however, once 
in prison she was refused this treatment.881 A next of kin had described the suffering 
Jenny Swift went through since she was denied hormone treatment in prison:  
She [Jenny Swift] kept asking for the hormones and they said she would get them 
but she never did. I phoned up and explained that she needed them too... Jenny 
said that not having them was making her legs shake, making her feel sad and ill 
– she said it was like coming off drugs. It made her miserable… She had been 
trying her best to keep her feminine side but she mentioned in prison that she 
could feel the testosterone in her body and she felt sick. It was making her cringe 
inside.882 
 
The lack of attention to medical care for transgender prisoners also has led to some 
individuals castrating themselves,883 as well as creating an opening of the black market 
for hormone trade in prisons, thereby making transgender prisoners more vulnerable and 
exposed to violence.884 In Ireland, recent research found that delays in, or the denial of, 
appropriate treatment for transgender prisoners was common and even the withholding of 
medications as a form of disciplinary sanction was also practised. Such behaviour 
suggested an approach that considered gender-related treatment as a luxury or a privilege 
rather than a right and necessity.885  
 
A recent publication by transgender prisoners depicting their personal stories, shows how 
desperate some of the accounts are and deserve attention:  
I carried out bilateral orchiectomy upon myself (the removal of both testicles in 
other words, complete self-castration). The self-administered medical procedure 
that I performed upon my own body was only done after extensive research. It 
was not an act of brutal self-harm that was random or driven by any personality 
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882 ibid. 
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884 See for example Travis Wright Colopy, ‘Setting Gender Identity Free: Expanding Treatment For Transsexual Inmates’ (2012) 22 
Health Matrix. 
885 Carr, McAlister, Siobhan (n 817) 20. 
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disorder or narcissist trait. I don’t regret performing bilateral orchiectomy upon 
my own body. At the time and in a dark place, I believed rightly or wrongly that 
with the system denying me a diagnosis and treatment my only option was to sit 
in my cell and use a prison razor to perform the operation upon myself.886  
 
The CoE Commissioner on Human Rights report in 2009 found that transgender people 
in prison faced periods of time without hormone therapy, which may have resulted in a 
long time without treatment and could cause serious health problems, such as the 
development of osteoporosis in ‘transsexual’ men, and irreversible physiological changes 
taking place such as the development of baldness in ‘transsexual’ women.887 The 
Commissioner also highlighted general problems such as difficulties for transsexual 
people in accessing assessment, hormone therapies, or surgery, noting that many prisons 
or prison systems feel they do not have the facilities to manage ‘transsexual’ prisoners, or 
in some cases they (transgender prisoners) are seen as forgoing their (transgender 
prisoners) right to such treatments because of their conviction.888 
 
Such ignorance of transgender medical care in prisons is not new. The absence of the 
best medical practices or practice guidelines and the lack of quality supervision all have 
been historic features of transgender people’s lives in prison environments. However, to 
have a fuller understanding of the modern concept of non-binary gender in the prison 
context and the suffering of transgender prisoners, one should look into the rarely 
documented experiences of gender fluidity in early prisons as well as analyse the 
concepts of sex, gender and sexuality in the prison context. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
By illustrating transgender persons’ lives in the prison environment and providing 
personal accounts, this chapter attempted to unveil the nature of egregious violations that 
take place in closed institutions against transgender prisoners. These lived experiences 
highlight a particular vulnerability of transgender prisoners.  
 
Indeed, as argued earlier, abuse is not unique to transgender prisoners, and prisons are 
not favourable places for any people. However, the intensity of violations and the 
systematic nature of negligence against not only the transgender but wider ‘sexual 
minority’ groups indicate that there are specific reasons as to why transgender people are 
targets of violent behaviour, or why these people are outlaws when it comes to the 
protection mechanisms in detention.  
 
To further explore the limitations of the available framework of protection mechanisms 
in the prison context, the next chapter will explore the general human rights norms 
applicable to prisons. Tensions between the social construction of gender and the binary 
nature of prisons reinforced by gender identity–based claims for human rights will be 
further addressed to analyse the limitations of such an approach in the prison context.  
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Chapter VI 
 
The Treatment of Transgender Prisoners Under International Human Rights Law: 
Addressing Limitations  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapters provided theoretical and legal background on the applicability and 
limitations of international human rights law to the protection of transgender persons, 
briefly surveyed the progression of the law and policy to accommodate fluid genders, and 
described and analysed norms of international human rights law. This, in particular, 
concerns with the legal recognition of non-binary genders and possible limitations of 
international human rights law in providing a relevant protection frame.  
 
This chapter draws on the preceding chapters to examine the models of legal recognition 
of transgender identity in the prison context while applying the protection frameworks 
developed under international human rights law discussed in Chapters Three and Four. It 
suggests that while prisons are characterised by strict binary models of the sexes, the 
underlying principles of human rights cut across the various rights and could serve as an 
overall framework for developing the safeguards for transgender prisoners. In assessing 
the limitations in the application of human rights law to transgender prisoners, this 
chapter pays particular attention as to how non-binary genders can be accommodated in 
the prison context as well as examining the available options for that. Furthermore, it 
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serves as a space for comparative analysis for the application and limitations of human 
rights standards and norms, both outside and inside closed institutions. 
  
To address the issues, this chapter will start by examining the current international 
human rights law framework by surveying the common standards of human rights 
protection and how they apply to transgender prisoners. It will then employ the same 
structure as in Chapter Five to have a closer look at the underlying principles of human 
rights: equality, non-discrimination and dignity. While reflecting on the substantive 
rights, privacy and right to personhood will be analysed in this chapter to bring a new 
dimension into the discussion.  
 
In search of some answers about international legal obligations in relation to the 
treatment of transgender prisoners, this chapter surveys the limitations of the application 
of current human rights framework to non-binary genders in strictly single-sex 
institutions. 
 
2. Treatment of Transgender Prisoners Under International Human Rights Law 
2.1. Relevant international human rights instruments  
 
Civilised legal systems recognise that all human beings have certain basic rights. This 
means that prisoners too are entitled to human rights. Some rights, however, can be 
restricted due to the restrictive nature of the detention, in which cases such restrictions 
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are outlined in the law.889 During the 20th century, the international protection of human 
rights increased dramatically. Within the last few decades too, international human rights 
law developed with particular relevance to the treatment of prisoners, including 
safeguards from torture and other cruel, inhumane treatment or punishment (torture and 
other ill-treatment).890 These safeguards are developed with particular relevance and 
equal treatment for all, including for transgender and non-binary persons. 
 
A number of international human rights conventions have addressed the treatment of 
detainees in the penal system. The bill of rights provides core human rights standards, 
including in the context of criminal justice. The general human rights norms of these 
instruments were already discussed in Chapters Three and Four, and therefore only 
important highlights relevant to prisons will be made here. In particular, the ICCPR is of 
particular relevance for persons who are deprived of their liberty as it prohibits torture 
and other ill-treatment under Article 7 and provides wider protection guarantees in 
criminal proceedings. The ICCPR in Article 9 guarantees inter alia the right to liberty 
and security of persons, and Article 10 deals specifically with the treatment of persons 
deprived of their liberty. 891  The ICCPR has created a comprehensive normative 
framework for the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. In particular, it seeks to 
ensure the application of basic principles of human rights in the prison context including 
equality, non-discrimination and respect for the inherent dignity of the human being.892 
Moreover, the HRCttee has interpreted Article 10 (humane conditions of detention) as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
889 Dirk van Zyl Smit and Sonja Snacken, Principles of European Prison Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2009) 66  
890 Nigel Rodley with Matt Pollard, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (3 edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 5 
891 UNGA, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966 Art. 10. 
892 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 26 
November 1987, ETS 126.  
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the main provision through which UN soft law standards can be applied in the prison 
context. The Committee has consistently encouraged countries to apply the relevant UN 
standards to the treatment of prisoners to ensure the protection of prisoners and detainees 
against torture and other ill-treatment.893 
 
Specific declarations and treaties started to develop within the UN from the early 1970s, 
culminating in the adoption of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Torture and Other Ill-treatment. The Declaration on the ‘Protection of All Persons Being 
Subjected to Torture or Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ 
was adopted in 1975, and was later codified as the UN Convention on Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the CAT).894  
 
Other instruments that are of a general human rights nature but have a relevance to the 
humane treatment of prisoners include the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),895 the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (ICEDAW),896 the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC),897 and relatively recent instruments, such as International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families,898 the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
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895 UNGA International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965. 
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Enforced Disappearance 899  and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.900 
 
Regional human rights instruments that also have a direct relevance to the protection of 
human rights of prisoners and humane treatment standards include the Banjul Charter,901 
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR), 902  the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,903 the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons,904 and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women.905 In the European context, the 
human rights instruments included the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and906 the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.907 The Arab Charter on Human Rights (Articles 14, 20-21) 
applies to the countries of OIC.908 
 
Other developments were also recorded, including the emergence of multiple human 
rights monitoring mechanisms under the treaties noted above, as well as the development 
of new jurisprudence on human rights. The first authoritative General Comments of the 
HRCttee on the scope of the provisions on prisons in the 1980s also opened up the 
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opportunity to develop specific jurisprudence on the substantive rights enshrined in the 
Convention. The UN treaty bodies established under the conventions, particularly the 
CAT Committee, the CEDAW, and the CRC Committee, all contributed to the 
development of group-specific human rights jurisprudence in the prison context. SPs 
mechanisms also started developing in the early 1980s. Namely, the Working Group on 
Enforced Disappearances was introduced in 1980 and the UNSR on Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions was established in 1982. The UNSR on Torture was also 
established in 1985, and since it has helped to bring the issues of the prevention of torture 
and other ill-treatment to light. The Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture 
(OPCAT) was adopted later, in 2002, to assist in preventing torture and other ill-
treatment both from an international and national perspective.909 The OPCAT established 
a two-level prevention mechanism, the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture 
(SPT) and the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) at country levels.910 Although this 
thesis does not consider monitoring mechanisms and public monitoring bodies, their 
importance in preventing torture and other ill-treatment should be highlighted. In 
particular, the SPT has recently issued reports that describe the challenges of transgender 
prisoners and recommendations.911 Similarly, regional bodies, namely the CoE, also 
established a prison monitoring body – the CPT, under the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – which 
conducts prison monitoring visits with the aim to prevent torture and other ill-treatment 
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in all places of detention.912 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also 
adopted a Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and created the mandate of the 
Rapporteur to allow prison monitoring.913 The ACHPR also has established a special 
mandate on prisons and conditions of detentions and regularly issues recommendations 
on various areas of prison life.914 In addition, a Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
was created within the ACHPR to specifically promote the Robben Island Guidelines.915 
These guidelines carry historic importance, as they were the first regional standard to 
prohibit and prevent torture (adopted by the ACHPR in 2002). 
 
Other international standards, such as the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment916 and the Basic Principles for 
the Treatment of Prisoners917 together with the long-standing UN Standard Minimum 
Rules (SMR), create specific norms as to how international human rights law shall be 
applied to prisons.918 Gradually, new prison standards were also developed to address 
specific groups of detainees, including children, and women. First, the UN Standard 
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17-19), food (rule 20), exercise and sport (rule 21), medical services (rules – 22-26), discipline and punishment (rules 27-34), 
instruments of restraint (rules 33-34), information to and complaints by prisoners (rules 35-36), contact with the outside world (rules 
37-39), access to books (rule 40), religion (rules 41-42), retention of prisoner’s property (43), notification of death, illness, transfer, 
etc. (rule 44), removal of prisoners (rule 45), institutional personnel (rules 46-54), and inspection (rule 55). The SMR also 
encompasses rules on treatment specific categories. These include dealing with prisoners under sentence (rules 56-81), ‘insane and 
mentally abnormal prisoners’ (82-83), prisoners under arrest or awaiting trial (rules 84-93), and civil prisoners (rule 94).  
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Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules)919 were 
adopted in 1985, and more recently, the UNGA adopted Rules for the Treatment of 
Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok 
Rules).920 While both of these instruments aimed at protecting specific groups under 
international human rights law, the Bangkok Rules for the first time brought the gender 
element into the international standards of criminal justice and human rights with specific 
focus on gender specific treatment of women prisoners.  
 
At the regional level, these standards are complemented by region-specific prison 
standards. In Europe, European Prison Rules (EPR) created a foundation for the 
treatment of prisoners,921 in the Americas, the Principles and Best Practices on the 
Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas.922 The ACHPR also recently 
adopted the Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial 
Detention in Africa (the Luanda Guidelines), which spell out the importance of gender 
identity and the need for special measures to avoid discrimination in prisons.923  
 
The Bangkok Rules and Beijing Rules provide group-specific norms for women and 
juveniles, respectively. These instruments and the SMR in particular have played a 
significant role in establishing basic standards for the treatment of prisoners in custodial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
919 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (‘The Beijing Rules’) Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 40/33 of 29 November 1985. 
920 UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders, negotiated within the UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 December 2010 
(A/RES/65/229) (Bangkok Rules). 
921 European Prison Rules (2006).  
922 Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (2008). 
923 The Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa (the Luanda Guidelines) were 
adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) during its 55th Ordinary Session in Luanda, 
Angola, from 28 April to 12 May 2014 (Luanda Guidelines). 30. 
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settings and have acted as a roadmap in setting up prison policies and the protection of 
the rights of prisoners,924 with an impact on developing safeguards for the detainees. 
When the SMR were drafted and adopted in the 1950s, the gender aspect was not taken 
into consideration, nor were LGBTIQ prisoners included in the discussion (as noted in 
Chapter One). The SMR lasted for over 50 years as standard-setting guidelines without 
amendments and were largely incorporated into the jurisprudence of the UN human 
rights mechanisms. A few adjustments were made in the human rights law to 
accommodate gender in the prison system, focusing on the rights and specific needs of 
women in prisons. In 2010, when the Bangkok Rules were adopted by UNGA, they were 
conceived as supplementary to the SMR. This means that these rules, in addition to the 
minimum standard of treatment for general prison population, also provide specific 
guarantees and norms for women prisoners according to their needs. It is important to 
highlight that such a binary approach to standards on the treatment of prisoners is 
understood to have contributed to reinforcing the binary understanding of gender in 
international law.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the outdated nature of the SMR was often criticized, eventually 
leading to its revision between 2010 - 2015.925 The process of drafting the update of the 
SMR is outside the scope of this thesis, although it is important to highlight the main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 The history of designing the SMR began before 20th century. Nonetheless, critics note that relatively early effort was made to 
articulate guidelines for the treatment of prisoners in 1870, with the ‘Declaration of Principles’ outlined at the inaugural National 
Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline. International meetings to discuss penal developments were held 
‘quinquennially’ or every five years, since 1885, sponsored by the UN predecessor League of Nations and the International Penal and 
Penitentiary Commission (IPPC). The SMR as the principles of prison reform were promulgated in 1926 by the IPPC and 
subsequently revised in 1933 and 1951. The latest version of the principles was then presented to the UN for further revision. (Todd 
R. Clear and George F. Cole, American Correction 24 (6th ed. 2003); Edward M. Peters, ‘Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and 
Medieval Worlds’ in Norval Morris and David J. Rothman (eds), The Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in 
Western Society (1998). 
925 See for example, UNGA Res 67/188 on Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, UN Doc. A/RES/67/188 (2012)  
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developments of the revision process. Between 2010 and 2015, four inter-governmental 
expert group meetings took place, which collectively focused on updating the selected 
themes. 926 The revision concerned the following areas of prison life: legislating the 
underlying principles of human rights, including respect for prisoners’ inherent dignity 
and value as human beings; medical and health services; disciplinary action and 
punishment, including the role of medical staff, solitary confinement and reduction of 
diet; investigation of all deaths in custody, as well as any signs or allegations of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners; protection and special needs 
of vulnerable groups deprived of their liberty; the right of access to legal representation; 
complaints and independent inspection; the replacement of outdated terminology; 
training of relevant staff to implement the SMR; and special consideration to be given to 
the prisoners with disabilities.927 The updated rules were approved by the UNGA in 
December 2015 and were named after Nelson Mandela (‘Nelson Mandela Rules’).928  
 
Yet although these new safeguards are applicable to transgender persons, the review 
process was once again characterised by gender-binary debates on a strict division of 
discussions about men and women prisoners.929 Despite some encouragement of states to 
consider the question of ‘sexual minorities’ in the new rules for the treatment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
926 It is important to note that, during the preparatory meeting in Santa Domingo, lesbian, gay or transgender persons were discussed 
under the framework of vulnerable categories in prisons alongside with women, young persons and older persons, foreign nationals, 
those who are ill and those from minority groups. It was also particularly noted that these are the ‘special categories’ of prisoners that 
need specific safeguards to ensure that the pain of their imprisonment is not increased. Para 34, Report on the High Level Expert 
Group Meeting on the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners held in Santo Domingo from 3 to 5 
August 2011, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Reports/Report_High_Level_EGM_Santo_Domingo_3-
5_August_2011_English.pdf accessed 3 March 2014. 
927 Report on the meeting of the Expert Group on the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners held in Vienna from 31 
January to 2 February 2012 (16 February 2012), UN Doc UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2012/1. : https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V12/509/54/PDF/V1250954.pdf?OpenElement.  
928 ibid. 
929 UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Notes and comments on the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (2012) E/CN.15/2012/CRP.1.,11. At: 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ_Sessions/CCPCJ_21/E-CN15-2012-CRP1/E-CN15-2012-
CRP1_E.pdf; accessed on 2 March 2016 
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prisoners, it seemed politically sensitive for states to even debate the issue.930 For 
example, records show that China strongly opposed the acknowledgement of SOGI in the 
revision. China further explained its position by stating that the revision process had to 
‘respect the practices and provisions of countries in that regard.’931 It also contended that 
mentioning LGBTIQ persons as vulnerable population alongside foreign prisoners would 
make the list over-prescriptive.932 China was outweighed by a number of countries 
supporting the explicit language in the new treatment standards for prisoners. Countries 
such as Norway, Brazil and South Africa933 specifically recommended inclusion of the 
language of Yogyakarta Principle 9 to address the special needs of vulnerable groups 
deprived of their liberty, particularly LGBTIQ prisoners.934 In addition, Finland,935 
Norway, 936  Brazil, 937  Mexico, 938  South Africa, 939  Romania, 940  and Germany 941  made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930 See for example, the “Background Note” drafted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for preparatory expert 
meetings, listed Yogyakarta Principles as a newly developed standard.;  Background note, Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert 
Group Meeting on the UN Standards Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Vienna, 31 January-2 February 2012; available 
from https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/AGMs/Background_note.pdf; accessed on 5 April 2016.  
931 Response of the Governemnt of China (2016) UN Doc. CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.19, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/CHINA-E-VMTG.pdf, accessed from 3 April 2016.   
932 Response of the Government of China (2013) UN Doc. CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.19, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/CHINA-E-VMTG.pdf, accessed from 3 April 2016.   
933 Response of the Government of South Africa (2013) UN Doc. CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.17, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/SOUTH-AFRICA-VMTG.pdf, accessed on 4 April 2016. 
934 Response of the Government of Norway (2013) UN Doc. CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.8, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/NORWAY-VMTG.pdf; accessed on 4 April 2016.  
935 Finland comments on SMR (2013) UN Doc. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.7, At http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-
prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-2014/FINLAND-VMTG.pdf.   
936 Response of the Government of Norway (2013)  UN Doc. CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.8. At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/NORWAY-VMTG.pdf; accessed on 4 April 2016. 
937 Response of the Government of Brazil (2013) CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.12, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/BRAZIL-E-VMTG.pdf; accessed on 7 April 2016.  
938 Response of the Government of Mexico (2013) UN Doc. CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.16, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/MEXICO-E-VMTG.pdf, accessed on 4 April 2016. 
939 Response of the Government of South Africa (2013) CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.17, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/SOUTH-AFRICA-VMTG.pdf, accessed on 4 April 2016. 
940 Response of the Government of Romania (2013) UN Doc. CU 2013/129/DO/JS, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.30, At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
2014/ROMANIA-VMTG.pdf, accessed on 6 April 2016.   
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specific calls for including SOGI as a prohibited ground for discrimination in prisons.942 
Despite these active attempts, a compromise was made against including the language of 
SOGI or LGBTIQ persons as a specific group under the Nelson Mandela Rules. 
However, to conclude whether international standards on prisons can be specifically 
applied to the transgender prisoners’ experiences, it is useful to consider the wider 
context in which the discussions described above took place, as well as what other 
human rights bodies have considered so far. Moreover, although this thesis does not 
analyse the implementation of these standards in practice, the reality is that much of the 
general prison standards remain unimplemented in many countries. As this chapter 
continues to provide analysis of the application of the broader human rights safeguards to 
transgender prisoners, it is important to note that there are different implicit ways in 
which ‘sexual minorities’ have been incorporated into the revised SMR. Among them are 
prohibited grounds of discrimination that include a non-exhaustive list of grounds, as 
well as basic principles of human rights and Rule 7(a), which speaks about unique 
gender. However, to specifically examine the standards on the treatment of transgender 
prisoners, a closer look at the human rights mechanisms is needed. In particular, the 
international human rights bodies shall devote a significant amount of time and energy to 
develop jurisprudence on transgender prisoners’ rights and recommended standards for 
consideration. Following the themes of the lived experiences of transgender prisoners in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
941 See German Position Paper on the Revision of the UN Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners (2014) UN Doc. 
UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/Gov.33, At http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-
Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-2014/GERMANY.pdf; accessed on 4 April 2016. 
942 Later on, another joint statement was made by Argentina, Brasil, South Africa, Uruguay, United States of America and Venezuela 
to include sexual orientation and gender identity as a prohibited ground for discrimination. Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, 22nd session, 22-26 April 2013: Proposal of the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Uruguay, United 
States of America and Venezuela (2013) UN Doc.  E/CN.15/2013/CRP.6, At http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-
reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/ECN15-2013-CRP6_e_.pdf; accessed on 7 April 2016. 
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Chapter Five, this chapter will continue to offer a critical analysis of the existing 
standards, their application to transgender prisoners and possible limitations.  
 
2.2. Yogyakarta Principles and treatment of transgender prisoners 
 
The Yogyakarta Principles more broadly were discussed in Chapter Three, where it was 
highlighted that although these principles are not officially part of the soft or hard law, 
they occupy a special place in the international human rights standards in applying a 
general human rights framework to LGBTIQ. Even though they are not officially 
adopted by the UN bodies, they have been endorsed by a number of UN agencies and 
have been part of recommendations made by human rights treaty bodies, the SPs 
Mechanisms and even the UN HRC, including through UPR. Principle 9 particularly 
deserves to be considered for the purpose of this chapter. That principle will serve as a 
framework for the application of human rights standards to the treatment of transgender 
persons in detention. 
 
Principle 9 of the Yogyakarta Principles provides that in order to guarantee the protection 
of human rights of ‘sexual minorities’, comprehensive measures should be taken. It 
outlines specific human rights measures that need to be put in place to guarantee 
safeguards for the LGBTIQ people in detention: the prevention of torture and other ill-
treatment, medical care, issues related to segregation and protective measures and the 
participation in decision-making on these measures, equality and non-discrimination.  
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More specifically, the Yogyakarta Principles state that measures for the protection of 
LGBTIQ persons in prisons should include the:  
prevention of violence, ill-treatment including physical, mental or sexual abuse, 
adequate access to medical care, information on health and access to therapy 
including gender-reassignment treatment, participation in decision making 
regarding the place of detention appropriate to their SOGI, applying protective 
measures for all prisoners vulnerable to violence or abuse on the basis of their 
SOGI, and so that such protective measures involve no greater restrictions of their 
rights, than it is experienced by the general prison population, provision of 
conjugal visits, where permitted to be granted on equal basis, regardless of the 
gender of the partner in prison, independent monitoring of detention facilities 
with particular experience in working in the area of SOGI, and special 
programmes for awareness raising for prison personnel and all other officials 
regarding international human rights standards and principles of equality and non-
discrimination, including in relation to SOGI.943   
 
Notably, the Yogyakarta Principles have been undergoing redrafting in the framework of 
Yogyakarta Principles + 10 process. The updated rules will be published later in 2017, 
and it is important to note that the standards established in Principle 9 are unlikely to 
reduce.  
 
The Yogyakarta Principles are comprehensive in providing the structure as to how to 
treat LGBTIQ prisoners. While measures listed in Principle 9 are very much part of the 
international human rights law, the actual application of these measures in practice is still 
lacking. Moreover, the Yogyakarta Principles were drafted and endorsed in 2006, when 
no country had adopted the gender self-determination model of transgender recognition, 
and international forums still had to widen their knowledge on the diversity of gender 
and sexuality. This means that although these principles create a framework for the 
treatment of LGBTIQ prisoners, they do not provide a comprehensive view as to how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
943 Yogyakarta Principles (2006) 9. 
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non-binary genders can be accommodated in the fixed identity-based prison or other 
places of detention. This latter point is particularly important as increasing numbers of 
countries adopt a gender self-determination model of transgender legal recognition and 
the challenges of implementing such a model in the prison also becomes acutely 
apparent. 
 
3. The Enjoyment of Human Rights and Transgender Persons in Prisons 
 
The HRCttee has interpreted Article 10 (humane treatment) of the ICCPR as ‘persons 
deprived of their liberty enjoy all the rights set forth in the Covenant, subject to the 
restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed environment’.944 Moreover, the newly 
adopted General Commentary by HRCttee imposes a positive obligation towards persons 
who are particularly vulnerable due to their status of imprisonment, thereby providing 
greater protection for them under the ban on torture and other ill-treatment contained in 
Article 7 of the ICCPR.945 Furthermore, the Basic Principles for the Treatment of 
Prisoners also emphasise:  
all prisoners shall retain the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and, where the State concerned is a 
party, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.946  
 
This has been further expanded in the newly updated SMR that for the first time 
incorporates the principle of respect for dignity and suggests that:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
944 UN Committee on Human Rights, ‘General Comment No. 21 on Article 10 (Humane treatment of persons deprived of their 
liberty)’ (1992). 
945 ibid. para 3. 
946 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, 5. 
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all prisoners shall be treated with respect due to their inherent dignity and value 
as human beings. No prisoner shall be subjected to, and all prisoners shall be 
protected from, torture and other ill-treatment, for which no circumstances 
whatsoever may be invoked as a justification’.947 In fact, the principle of respect 
for dignity has become an overarching principle in the revised SMR expanding its 
application into variety of aspects of prison life.948 
 
The group-specific instruments – the Bangkok Rules and the UN Rules for the Protection 
of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty – highlight the requirement of treating prisoners 
with dignity and non-discrimination.  
 
Regional human rights instruments all emphasize the importance of human rights in the 
prison context. For example, as outlined in the section above on relevant human rights 
instruments, they continue to have effects subject to the possible restrictions inherent to 
the deprivation of liberty, although such limitations should not infringe the inherent 
dignity of a prisoner. To this effect, for example, the EPR state that ‘life in prison shall 
approximate as closely as possible the positive aspects of life in the community’.949 In 
addition, the ECtHR also stipulates in its case law that prisoners continue to enjoy all the 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR, except for the right to 
liberty, where lawfully imposed detention expressly fell within the scope of Article 5 
(right to liberty and security).’950 Similarly, the IACtHR also has indicated that:  
Deprivation of liberty generally causes, as its unavoidable consequence, the 
impairment of other human rights, besides the right to personal liberty. However, 
said impairment of rights arising from the deprivation of liberty or as its collateral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
947 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 1. 
948 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), A/RES/70/175., 17 
December 2015.; Also Huber, McGregor, Rodley, ‘Updating the UN Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners’ in For 
the Sake of Present and Future Generations, (Suzannah Linton, Gerry Simpson, William A. Schabas Eds.), Brill Nijhoff, 2015.; also, 
Penal Reform International, and Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex: Essex paper 3 Initial guidance on the interpretation 
and implementation of the UN Nelson Mandela Rules, 2017. 
949 European Prison Rules (2006) 5. 
950 Hirst v The United Kingdom App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005). 
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effect, must be strictly minimized. Furthermore, the state must ensure that the 
manner and method of any deprivation of liberty do not exceed the unavoidable 
level of surfing inherent in detention, and that given the practical requirements of 
incarceration; the detainee’s health and welfare are adequately warranted.951 
 
In addition, the Robben Island Guidelines (more formally, the Guidelines and Measures 
for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment in Africa) also urge states to take ‘steps to ensure that the treatment of all 
persons deprived of their liberty are in conformity with international standards.’952 
 
Academic commentators have articulated that the mere fact that prisoners are deprived of 
their liberty does not mean they are stripped of their fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Prisoners’ rights commentators, such as Nowak and Rodley, both of whom served as 
UNSRs on Torture, have also argued that prisoners maintain their basic rights and in 
particular the right to humane treatment.953 The SR on Torture, Manfred Nowak, in 2009 
developed three categories of human rights in prisons, namely: rights, which detainees 
have forfeited as a result of their lawful deprivation of liberty; relative rights, which may 
be restricted for justified reasons; and absolute rights, which detainees enjoy in full 
equality with other human beings.954 In this construct, absolute rights such as freedom 
from torture and ill-treatment are discussed alongside relative, or contested, rights under 
the framework of right to private life in prison, right to gender expression, and right to 
health. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
951 IACtHR, Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v Venezuela (n 36) para 86; IAmCtHR, L6pez-Alvarez v Honduras, 
Series No 141 (1 February 2006) paras 104-105; IACtHR, Case of the "Juvenile Reeducation Institute" v Paraguay (n 30) para 154-
155. Inserted in Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Amaya Ubeda de Torres, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case Law and 
Commentary’,  490. 
952 Robin Island Guidelines (2002) 33. 
953 Rodley with Pollard (n 890); Nowak (n 626) 
954 UNGA Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2009) UN Doc. A/64/215,  para 49-60.  
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Negligence and violence experienced by transgender prisoners mostly take place in a 
single-sex environment, where no deviation from the binary sex model is allowed. This 
matches with the description of the biological model of transgender recognition, which as 
seen in Chapter Two disregards the fluidity of gender. While it is important not to 
exclude the possibility of such violations taking place in other models of transgender 
recognition (the medical model, the gender self-determination model), it is important to 
acknowledge that such a context (biological model of transgender legal recognition) 
creates susceptible grounds for abuse, including sexual abuse, and other types of 
violations of human rights. In the words of the CPT ‘prisoners who are in a situation of 
vulnerability... should never be accommodated under material conditions which are 
inferior to those prevailing on normal location’.955 This chapter analyses the human 
rights standards that are most relevant to transgender prisoners and are subject to some 
limitations.  
 
3.1 The right of transgender prisoners to be treated humanely and with respect to 
human dignity 
 
The first mention at the UN level of transgender people in prisons was not until early 
2000. In 2001, the UNSR on Torture, in his report to the GA, highlighted that LGBTIQ 
prisoners were denied medical treatment for gender dysphoria, such as hormone therapy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
955 Council of Europe: CPT Report on the visit to Armenia (2004) CPT/Inf(2004)25, para.74. inserted in Penal Reform International 
and Essex University Second report of Essex Expert Group on the Review of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (2014) UN Doc. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/NGO.7. Available from 
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and that prison violence including sexual violence and rape particularly against 
‘transsexual’ inmates in all men’s prisons was common.956 Although this report did not 
go into details, it illuminated core challenges in the treatment of the transgender prison 
community. Since 2001, the UNSR on Torture has reported on human rights abuses 
against transgender prisoners, 957  consistently arguing that existing human rights 
standards should be applicable to transgender and other prisoners who are experiencing 
particular situations of vulnerability in prisons.958 Indeed, in parallel to trying to link the 
human rights law with the general SOGI framework, it was important that attention was 
also paid to the treatment of ‘sexual minority’ prison population. Chapter Five addressed 
some of the specific concerns expressed by the UN experts over the treatment of 
transgender prisoners in particular. To further argue direct applicability of international 
human rights law and the experiences of LGBTIQ prisoners, the UNSR on Torture 
asserted that ‘members of sexual minorities are disproportionately subjected to torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment, because they fail to conform to socially constructed 
gender expectations’.959 The UN experts on the prevention of torture have consistently 
argued that discrimination on grounds of SOGI is the main contributing factor in 
dehumanising the victim, which is often a necessary pre-condition for torture and other 
ill-treatment to take place.960 Dehumanisation as an ill-treatment and wide practices of 
discrimination against ‘sexual minorities’ in prisons have encouraged the UNSRs to link 
dignity and torture in further highlighting the ‘sexual minorities’ situation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156., 21-24.  
957 UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) E/CN.4/2002/76.; UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture (2001) E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2.; UN HRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2000) E/CN.4/2000/9.; UN HRC 
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958 ibid. 
959 UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156,; UNGA Interim report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Torture (2009) UN Doc. A/64/215., para 19.   
960 UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156, para 19.  
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vulnerability in prison facilities, often caused by a strong, and invisible criminal 
hierarchy.961  
 
To further describe prison culture and criminal hierarchy within prisons, as well as the 
positioning of LGBTIQ prisoners and their right to dignified treatment and non-
discrimination, the UNSR on Torture has noted that ‘in detention facilities, there is 
usually a strict hierarchy and those at the bottom of the hierarchy, such as LGBTIQ 
persons, typically suffer double or triple discrimination’.962 Indeed, such hierarchical 
positioning of transgender prisoners further contributes to human rights violations against 
transgender persons. In other words, being at the bottom of the prison hierarchy can 
include beatings, sexual assault, isolation and targeted forms of violence, the so-called 
corrective rape of lesbian women, and the intentional beatings of the breasts and 
cheekbones of transgender women to burst implants and release toxins.963 Such targeted 
ill-treatment against transgender and other ‘sexual minority’ prisoners prompted UN 
experts to argue for specific measures for protecting ‘the rights and address the specific 
needs of LGBTIQ prisoners’.964 At the same time, it was argued that such special 
measures put in place for the protection of transgender prisoners could not be regarded as 
discriminatory.965  
 
By linking targeted ill-treatment against LGBTIQ prisoners and their heightened 
vulnerability to abuse and violence, the UNSR on Torture created a framework for not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
961  UNGA Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2001) UN Doc. A/56/156, para 17-25. 
962 UN HRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of 
violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity (2011) UN Doc. A/HRC/19/41, para. 34. 
963 UNCAT 8th annual report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (2015) CAT/C/54/2. 
964 UNHRC Report of the UN Special Rapporteur Torture (2016) A/HRC/31/57., para 13. 
965 ibid. 
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only reporting the abuses that are taking place, but also creating grounds for the 
application of a human rights protection framework in specific situations. At the same 
time, recommendations for special measures tailored to the vulnerability of transgender 
and LGBIQ prisoners mean that the SR saw the need to consider ‘sexual minorities’ a 
special category that requires special measures of protection. 
 
A number of other UN SPs mechanisms followed the SR on Torture to report on 
violations of human rights of LGBTIQ persons in detention. Many have been highlighted 
in Chapter Five. In addition, other UN experts, such as the SR on Extrajudicial, Summary 
or Arbitrary Executions in early 2002, have highlighted prison violence and inter-
prisoner killings in Jamaican prisons based on a ‘presumed homosexuality of the 
victims’.966 In addition, the UNSR on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in the 
report from 2011 emphasized the need to address the plight and extreme vulnerability of 
transgender women prisoners who, ‘in most circumstances, are imprisoned in male 
detention facilities, even though they identify with the female gender’, and recommended 
that states should consider taking appropriate measures to avert further victimization of 
transgender persons in detention. 967  
 
The mandate of the UNSR on Torture, Juan Méndez, has included a focus on the 
application of SOGI in the prison context. He has argued that there is an apparent gap in 
the law when it comes to the treatment of ‘sexual minorities’ in prison. In 2016, the SR 
called on states to ‘develop international jurisprudence on the issues of SOGI in prisons 
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and LGBTIQ prisoners’ rights’.968 The UNSR is right to argue that the mere application 
of international human rights law in prisons does not create sufficient guarantees for the 
protection of human rights of transgender prisoners or the wider LGBIQ groups in 
prisons.969 What this meant for the transgender prisoners was that existing safeguards 
‘failed to address gendered and intersectional lens, to account adequately for the impact 
of entrenched discrimination, patriarchal, heteronormative and discriminatory power 
structures and socialized gender stereotypes’.970 Important in this is his arguments about 
the heteronormative and homogenous nature of criminal justice systems and their 
inability and limitations to respond to ‘gender and intersectional lens’.971 Indeed, such an 
analysis and, even more, the application of queer theory in the international human rights 
law on prisons, had not been done before. Thus, it is important to understand the new 
framework that the UNSR proposed. While acknowledging a gap in the protection 
framework, he noted that ‘LGBT persons are at a particular risk of torture and other ill-
treatment when deprived of liberty, both within criminal justice systems and other, non-
penal settings’. 972  This suggests that not only are there structural and systemic 
shortcomings in the criminal justice systems, but that these shortcomings also have a 
particularly negative impact on marginalized groups or groups in particularly vulnerable 
situations, such as transgender prisoners. 
 
To address the void in the human rights safeguards for transgender and other LGBIQ 
prisoners, the UNSR developed a framework in which he argued that two indisputable 
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principles in international human rights law should be considered when debating the 
rights of transgender prisoners: the principle of the non-discrimination on the grounds of 
SOGI and the principle of the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. The SR 
points out that since both of these principles have achieved some degree of non-
derogability, they should be applied without distinction. He asserts that a principle of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of gender is acquiring a status of customary 
international norm973 and the prohibition of torture has achieved a jus cogens norm and 
cannot be derogated.974 This means that in order to extend the existing human rights 
protection framework to transgender prisoners, it is important to link these principles and 
apply them to a specific context (i.e., places of detention).975  
 
Application of basic principle of human rights has also been reinforced in the new SMR 
as outlined above. The updated rules stress the overriding principle to treat prisoners with 
respect due to their inherent dignity by virtue of being humans. The new Rule 2 also 
suggests that no discrimination shall be allowed on any grounds, for which the ‘prison 
administrations shall take account of the individual needs of prisoners, in particular the 
most vulnerable categories in prison settings.’976 The SR on Torture suggests that in the 
case of LGBTIQ, prisoners are such vulnerable categories that they are in need of special 
consideration to spare them from ill-treatment in the prison.977  
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All three major UN human rights mechanisms – the CAT Committee on Torture, the SR 
on Torture, and the SPT – have argued that there are direct links between non-
discrimination and the prevention of torture and other ill-treatment.978 As illustrated by 
the experiences of transgender prisoners highlighted earlier in this thesis, gender 
stereotypes play a significant role in downplaying the pain and suffering that certain 
practices inflict on them. To ensure appropriate safeguards in place for the prison 
context, a torture protection framework must be interpreted against the background of the 
human rights norms that have been developed to combat discrimination and violence in 
the context of prisons. 979  This means that, for example, the states that have 
discriminatory laws in place (e.g., laws that criminalise LGBTIQ persons) – have a 
heightened responsibility to protect LGBTIQ prisoners due to the fact that it is the laws 
that lead heighten these groups’ vulnerability and their exposure to abusive 
circumstances.980 In other words, by criminalising the conduct, specific groups are 
marginalised through the legal means, which begs to further investigate the question of 
legitimacy of such imprisonment. The question of legitimacy of imprisoning transgender 
and other ‘sexual minorities’ will not be addressed in this thesis. However, it should be 
noted that such discriminatory laws have a greater impact on the lives of LGBTIQ 
people, including their marginalisation. Often, LGBTIQ’s experience of ill-treatment is a 
direct consequence of existing legal norms.981 Moreover, if such discriminatory laws are 
the legal structure within which ‘sexual minorities’ are imprisoned, it creates practical 
barriers for treating these groups humanely. 
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All three UN torture prevention bodies (the CAT Committee, the SPT, and the SR on 
Torture) have strongly supported that a general non-discrimination clause should be 
applied to LGBTIQ prisoners.982 As outlined above, rather than relying on the basic 
principles of human rights though, they link non-discrimination with the prohibition of 
torture and other ill-treatment, both prohibitions that are already in place. The CAT 
Committee in particular over the years has taken a proactive approach by imposing a 
positive obligation on states to protect transgender prisoners and other vulnerable 
individuals from inter-prisoner violence.983 The SPT also argues that strengthening the 
protection of people deprived of their liberty and the full respect for their human rights is 
fundamental for identifying forms of discrimination and the necessary legislative, 
administrative and judicial measures to address the root causes.984 The SPT states that  
the principle of equality and non-discrimination not only results in the prohibition 
of different treatment, but also implies the obligation to establish differentiated 
measures when those are reasonable, necessary and proportional, precisely in 
order to guarantee human rights.985  
 
The SPT has encouraged states in cases where LGBTIQ persons are deprived of their 
liberty to identify specific risks and vulnerable situations in order to provide protection in 
ways that do not leave this group isolated.986 The CAT Committee, having acknowledged 
LGBTIQ-specific risks to torture and other ill-treatment as a result of discriminatory 
practices and attitudes, has also recommended that states take necessary measures to 
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eliminate any form of violence or discrimination against detainees based on SOGI.987 
Notably, the UNSR on Torture has suggested that the practice of Brazil to have adopted a 
national resolution on protecting transgender prisoners against exclusion and isolation 
should be considered a good practice. The SR further recommended the states to follow 
such practice.988 
 
3.2. Violence 
  
Transgender prisoners’ experiences of violence, including interpersonal and state, were 
discussed in Chapter Five. The same chapter highlighted the forms of violence faced by 
transgender prisoners, including sexual violence, rape and beating. Here, the legal 
background and prohibition of these acts will be highlighted with specific linkages to the 
transgender prisoners and protection of their rights.  
 
Deprivation of liberty, prison conditions and the unequal power relations between the 
state and those in imprisonment often create vulnerability among prisoners, and often 
more so among transgender prisoners. Whether sexual harassment (including rape), is 
committed by a state official or an inmate special emphasis should be given to the 
circumstances of the victim. This is partly because prisons, as state institutions, are under 
state control and governance of state officials. While these officials are obliged to 
maintain the order and humane treatment in prisons, the vulnerability of the victim 
[prisoner] can be easily exploited. Moreover, vulnerability of imprisonment can be 
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heightened by the specific needs and vulnerabilities of the various categories of 
individuals detained. For some groups, additional risk factors, including sexual 
orientation and gender identity, can also compound vulnerability to sexual harassment 
and rape.  
 
In recent years, a number of specific human rights instruments have been adopted that 
include sexual violence and provide ways to combat it in the prison context. These 
included the Bangkok Rules, which require that women entering prison should be 
assessed for mental health care needs and experience of sexual abuse, and be informed of 
their right to seek redress for sexual abuse or other violence suffered.989 Rule 31 also 
provides that ‘clear policies and regulations on the conduct of prison staff aimed at 
providing maximum protection for women prisoners from any gender-based physical or 
verbal violence, abuse and sexual harassment shall be developed and implemented.’990 
The same is not requested under either the old or a revised SMR.  
 
International human rights law has been interpreted to define sexual abuse and rape as a 
form of torture. Although explicitly prohibited under international humanitarian law, rape 
is only implicitly covered by international human rights law.991 It is only recently that 
rape and sexual violence started to receive significant international attention, including in 
the judicial bodies. UN human rights bodies have also considered cases, though mainly 
in relation to women and not in connection with criminal justice. In addition, in its 
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Recommendation 19, the CEDAW also included rape as a prohibited act against 
women.992 
 
As outlined above, rape, by definition, falls under the prohibition of torture and other ill-
treatment. States have an obligation to prevent sexual violence in prisons. This includes 
having a necessary legal and administrative framework in place to control, regulate, 
investigate and prosecute.993 In addition to the general prohibition policies in place, the 
CAT Committee has argued that states are obligated to protect all persons from torture or 
other ill-treatment regardless of their sexual orientation or transgender identity.994 The 
Committee has made numerous calls for actions to eliminate any form of violence or 
discrimination against detainees based on SOGI in prisons.995 Evolving from the CAT 
Committee jurisprudence, the SPT held that specifically in cases of LGBTIQ persons 
deprived of their liberty, state authorities ‘must recognise specific risks, identify those 
who are in a vulnerable situation and protect them in ways that do not leave them 
isolated’.996  
 
The ECtHR in Aydin v Turkey held that rape in custody constituted torture. The Court 
noted that rape of a detainee by State official is an abhorrent form of ill-treatment. It 
further noted that State officials, by raping a detainee, had exploited the vulnerability and 
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UNHRC Report of the UN Special Rapporteur Torture (2016) A/HRC/31/57., para 6.; UN CAT 9th annual report of the Subcommittee 
on Prevention of Torture (2016) CAT/C/57/4., 71.  
995 See Concluding Observations of CAT: Armenia (2012) UN Doc. CAT/C/ARM/CO/3, para 19. See also UNHRC Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/22/53., 61-62, 71-82.  
996  UN CAT 9th annual report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (2016) CAT/C/57/4, para. 76.  
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weakened resistance of the victim.997 The Court also made a note of physical and mental 
violence inflicted on the claimant and stated that ‘rape leaves deep psychological scars 
on the victim which do not respond to the passage of time as quickly as other forms of 
physical and mental violence.’998 The Aydin v Turkey case was ground-breaking in that 
rape was elevated to the level of torture. A short time earlier, the IACtHR also had found 
that rape could amount to torture.999  
 
Furthermore, in the European context, the ECtHR has found that States have a duty to 
‘do everything that could reasonably [be] expected . . . to prevent the occurrence of a 
definite and immediate risk to [a prisoner’s] physical integrity, of which [the authorities] 
knew or should have known’.1000 More specifically, in the case of rape, the Court has 
found that states have an obligation under Article 3 of the European Convention to 
penalize and effectively prosecute any non-consensual sexual act and to enact criminal-
law provisions effectively punishing rape and apply them in practice through effective 
investigation and prosecution. 1001  The IACtHR has also established guidelines on 
investigating cases of sexual violence. While almost all these cases involve sexual 
violence against women, the Court has recommended that: 
authorities charged with investigating an act of sexual violence must conduct the 
investigation with a sense of resolve and in an effective manner, taking into 
account society’s obligation to reject violence against women and the States’ 
obligations to eliminate it and to give victims confidence in the State agencies 
charged with protecting them.1002   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
997 Aydin v Turkey App no 57/1996/676/866 (ECtHR, 25 September 1997) para. 83. 
998 ibid. 
999 Raquel Martí de Mejía v Perú, Case 10.970, Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 Doc. 7 at 157 (IACtHR, 1996). 
1000 Pantea v Romania App no  33343/96 (ECtHR 2005) para 189. 
1001 MC v Bulgaria App no 39272/98 (ECtHR 2003) para 153, 166, 187.  
1002 Fernández Ortega et al. v Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. (IACtHR, 2010) Series C No. 215; I/A 
Court H.R., Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. (IACtHR 2010). Series C 
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As also highlighted in Chapter Five, another area where sexual violence and harassment 
is detected is prison searches. Often such searches take place without the prior 
knowledge of the prisoner, which might also contribute to the increase of the risk of 
harassment. The new Nelson Mandela Rules addressed the gap in international standards 
by stating,  ‘Searches shall be conducted in a manner that is respectful of the inherent 
human dignity and privacy of the individual being searched, as well as the principles of 
proportionality, legality and necessity.’1003 The Nelson Mandela Rules further requires 
that a search is not used as a way of harassment, intimidation, or an intrusion upon 
prisoners’ privacy. The same provisions are contained in the EPR, which note that 
prisoners ‘shall not be humiliated by the searching process’.1004 Principles and Best 
Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas also request 
that body searches are conducted ‘with human dignity and respect for fundamental 
rights’, and they forbid ‘intrusive vaginal or anal searches’.1005 In the same vein, Luanda 
Guidelines prescribe, ‘Searches must be carried out in accordance with the law, and in a 
manner consistent with the inherent dignity of the person and the right to privacy.’1006  
 
These standards unequivocally apply to transgender prisoners. However, there has been a 
disproportionate number of transgender, lesbian and gay prisoners who have complained 
about sexual harassment or rape during searches and intake. On this, the UNSR on 
Torture notes that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1003 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 50. 
1004 European Prison Rules (2006) 54. 
1005 OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1/08 ‘Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons 
Deprived of Liberty in the Americas’ (2008) XXI. 
1006 Luanda Guidelines (2014) 3. 
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specific policies must be developed in relation to searches, intake and 
interrogation. Proper screening for all incoming detainees to identify risk of 
sexual assault will help support procedures and decisions on housing, which 
should be done on a case-by-case basis and to the extent possible with the 
informed consent of the detainee.1007  
 
International human rights law rarely refers to ‘acquiescence’ in violence. The CAT 
Committee in its second General Comment published in November 2007 also provides 
some explanations. According to the Committee, the terms ‘consenting to’ or 
‘acquiescing in’ imply state party obligation to prevent violence by non-State actors (this 
is inter-prisoner violence).1008 The CAT Committee has used country-specific concluding 
observations to recommend States preventing the sexual abuse of gay and transgender 
prisoners and the failure to investigate cases of prisoner rape in a prompt and transparent 
manner.1009  
 
The responsibility of prison officials to provide adequate medical treatment to prisoners 
has been established in the US. In the case of Estelle v Gamble, the US Supreme 
reviewed a case of deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner’s serious 
illness or injury, which as argued by the complainant, contravened the Eighth 
Amendment of the US Constitution (cruel or unusual punishment). The court in this case 
while rejecting any causal link between the harm inflicted to the prisoner and the actions 
of the prison staff (court established that complaint was grounded in malpractice, not 
deliberate indifference), reasoned that prison officials have a legal obligation to be aware 
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1008 UN Committee Against Torture, ‘General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties’ (2008) UN Doc. 
CAT/C/GC/2. 
1009  UN Committee against Torture Conclusions and recommendations to the United States (2006) UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2  
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of serious medical needs of prisoners and attend them accordingly.1010  The court 
concluded  
‘that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain (quoting Gregg 
v. Georgia) regardless such indifference being manifested by prison 
doctors or prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to 
medical.’1011  
 
While with this reasoning the Court imposed an obligation on prison staff to attend the 
serious medical needs of inmates, it also established a rather narrow scope for 
accountability of prison staff’s ‘deliberate indifference’ including imposing a burden of 
proof onto the complainant. The question of ‘deliberate indifference’ requires further 
research on its own and exceeds the cope of this thesis, however, it is important to 
highlight that despite such difficult nature of ‘deliberate indifference’ test, it has been 
used to argue for the protection of transgender prisoners’ safety.  In Farmer v Brennan, a 
young transgender woman named Dean Farmer sued Indiana correctional officers after 
she was placed in a men’s prison and was raped there. The Supreme Court heard 
Farmer’s case and unanimously decided in 1994 that the officers’ ‘deliberate 
indifference’ to her safety violated the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual 
punishment). It held the state representative is accountable for the inaction, for 
deliberately not taking action to prevent the abuse.1012 Based on this, ruling the Supreme 
Court declared the rape to be torture and other ill-treatment in 1998. Within five years, 
the US Congress adopted the Prison Rape Elimination Act 2003. In 2012, the US 
Department of Justice also published a final guidance on the implementation of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1010 Gamble v Estelle 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
1011 Gamble v Estelle 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
1012 Farmer v Brennan 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). 
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Act.1013   
 
To avoid sexual abuse and rape between inmates and particularly against LGBTIQ 
persons, often the only option used is to place them either in solitary confinement or 
‘protective custody’ as outlined in Chapter Five. The justification found in these cases is 
the special vulnerability of transgender prisoners. In fact, transgender people are often 
automatically considered vulnerable, which means that decisions are made for them 
rather than involving them in the process of decision-making.  
 
3.3. Solitary confinement  
 
Chapter Five described the ways in which protective custody and solitary confinement 
inflict ill-treatment on transgender prisoners. International standards are scarce on what 
‘protective custody’ means; however, due to its great resemblance to solitary 
confinement, this chapter will attempt to analyse it. At the same time, as also noted in 
Chapter Five, despite the fact that such a measure is meant for protection and is called 
protective custody, at its core it is the same thing as solitary confinement. Hence, these 
two terms will be used interchangeably. The issue of solitary confinement itself is much 
broader and cannot be exhausted in this chapter. However, for the purposes of this 
chapter, solitary confinement vis-à-vis transgender prisoners will be analysed to assess 
the impact of such ‘protective custody’. 
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The definition of solitary confinement has evolved over time. The latest definition, which 
is adopted in this thesis, is from the latest standards on prisons – the Nelson Mandela 
Rules, which suggest that ‘solitary confinement shall refer to the confinement of 
prisoners for 22 hours or more a day without meaningful human contact. Prolonged 
solitary confinement shall refer to solitary confinement for a time period in excess of 15 
consecutive days.’ 1014  The Nelson Mandela Rules introduced more clarity on the 
procedure of the solitary confinement and its use. In particular, it regulated the measure 
from the point of view of disciplinary proceedings. While these new rules are detailed 
and clear, the regional mechanisms that were adopted a little earlier do not have such 
rigor. For example, the EPR suggest that such measure should be imposed in exceptional 
cases and for as short a period as possible.1015 The Luanda Guidelines also require that 
the use of solitary confinement is restricted.1016 The Principles and Best Practices on the 
Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas also describe that solitary 
confinement should be used as a last resort and for a limited term.1017 Because of its 
harsh nature, the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners suggested in 1990 that 
‘Efforts addressed to the abolition of solitary confinement as a punishment, or to the 
restriction of its use, should be undertaken and encouraged.’1018 The Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty strictly prohibit the application of 
solitary confinement on juvenile prisoners.1019 The rules indicate that such disciplinary 
punishment constitutes ill-treatment and may the physical or mental health of the juvenile 
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1015 European Prison Rules (2006) 60.5. 
1016 European Prison Rules (2006) 25(F). 
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1018 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990) 7. 
1019 UN GA, United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, (1991) UN Doc. A/RES/45/113, 67. 
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concerned.1020  
 
Solitary confinement as a concept is the harshest disciplinary measure that can be 
imposed on a prisoner. Over time the range and scope of its use have changed. The 
Istanbul Statement on the Use and Effects of Solitary Confinement outlines four common 
and lawful uses of this measure: a) as disciplinary punishment; b) to isolate a defendant 
during criminal investigations; c) as an administrative measure to control particular 
groups of inmates; and d) as a court‐imposed sentence.1021 This list has grown. The CPT 
now includes an option of solitary confinement to be used for protection purposes.1022 At 
the same time, based on the ECtHR jurisprudence and its own standards, the CPT has 
developed a formula of five principles to observe in applying the solitary confinement. 
These are proportionality, lawfulness, accountability, necessity and non-discrimination. 
These principles can provide an insightful view in to the violations of the rights of 
transgender prisoners when putting them in to protective custody. 
 
The Nelson Mandela Rules as well as other international standards attempted to subject 
these measures and their application to a regulatory framework.1023 The human rights 
mechanisms try to link solitary confinement with the prohibition of torture and other ill-
treatment. In 1992, the HRCttee in its general comment highlighted that prolonged 
solitary confinement of the detained or imprisoned person might amount to torture and 
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1021 As inserted in Sharon Shalev, ‘A Sourcebook On Solitary Confinement’ [2008] SSRN Electronic Journal. 
1022 Council of Europe: Extract from the 21st General Report of the CPT, (CPT/Inf(2011) 28-part 2):  Solitary confinement of 
prisoners (2011).  
1023 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 43-45. 
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other ill-treatment.1024 At the same time, in its earlier case law the HRCttee argued that 
keeping a person in solitary confinement for several months in conditions that failed to 
respect the inherent dignity of the human-being was a violation of Article 10 of the 
ICCPR (conditions of detention).1025 Similarly, in another case concerning solitary 
confinement, the Committee established the violation of Articles 7 and 10 for holding a 
complainant in an underground cell and denied the medical attention his condition 
required.1026 The Committee further recommended that the use of solitary confinement be 
abolished, particularly during pre-trial detention, or at least be strictly and specifically 
regulated by law (maximum duration, etc.) and exercised under judicial supervision, and 
used only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the safety of persons or property is 
involved.1027   
 
The CPT and the UNSR on Torture both have taken a similar route over the years.1028 
They have made connections between solitary confinement and protective custody to 
argue for state obligation in ensuring the respect to basic human rights principles and the 
safeguards for those subjected to protective custody. For example, the UNSR on Torture 
in his recent report argued that in situations when solitary confinement is applied as a 
‘protection’, authorities have a responsibility to take reasonable measures to prevent and 
combat violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender detainees by other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1024 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) (1992).  
1025 T. Gómez de Voituret v Uruguay, Communication No. 109/1981 (1984) UN Doc. A/39/40;  R. S. Antonaccio v Uruguay, 
Communication No. 63/1979 (1981) UN Doc. A/37/40.  
1026 R. S. Antonaccio v Uruguay, Communication No. 63/1979 (1981) UN Doc. A/37/40. 
1027 ibid. 
1028 UNGA Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2011) UN Doc. A/66/268., para 31. 
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detainees1029 and must not solely rely on solitary confinement. The SR emphasized that 
although special protection for the groups of LGBTIQ prisoners may be necessary and 
some form of segregation may be used for their safety, their status should not justify 
limitations on their social regime, access to recreation, reading materials, legal counsel or 
medical doctors, which often is the case in solitary confinement due to the nature of such 
a measure.1030  
 
Regardless of the reasons for imposing solitary confinement, it [solitary confinement] 
still has an extremely damaging effect on the mental, somatic and social health of those 
concerned.1031 The comparison between solitary confinement and protective custody was 
made earlier, but it is worth noting that the CPT suggests that the reasons for using 
solitary as a protection often varies, and depends on, amongst others, the general 
vulnerability of the person.1032 The CPT also indicates that once under protective 
isolation, ‘it can be very difficult for a prisoner to come off protection for the rest of the 
sentence – and maybe even for subsequent sentences.’1033 Possibly this is the reason why 
the CPT has stated that ‘solitary confinement can, in certain circumstances, amount to 
inhuman and degrading treatment; in any event, all forms of solitary confinement should 
be as short as possible.’1034  
 
The use of solitary confinement for the protection of vulnerable detainees is allowing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1029 UNHRC Report of the UN Special Rapporteur Torture (2016) A/HRC/31/57., 35.   
1030 UNGA Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2015) A/66/268, para 69. 
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justifications used by the state.1035 Accordingly, transgender prisoners as well as other 
LGBIQ persons in detention end up in solitary confinement as a form of protection.1036 In 
a situation when only two choices are available – to place transgender prisoners with 
prisoners of their birth sex, which can put them at risk of violence,1037 or place them 
under ‘protective custody’ – effectively in solitary confinement – the decision is often 
made in favour of the latter option. Human rights experts argue that measures that appear 
to be ‘protective’, particularly such as placement in solitary confinement or 
administrative segregation, can themselves constitute a violation of the principle of 
prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment.1038 Notably, the UNSR on Torture has 
noted: 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals are often subjected to solitary 
confinement as a form of “protective custody”. Although segregation of such 
individuals may be necessary for their safety, lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender status does not justify limitations on their social regime, e.g., access 
to recreation, reading materials, legal counsel or medical doctors.1039  
 
The choices presented to the local prisons often are inherently limited due to the binary 
prison laws. Particularly if a protective custody is imposed in a male, single-sex prison, 
the only realistic options as outlined earlier are either solitary confinement or as part of 
the general prison population. Questions such as to the alternatives, the nature of the 
offence committed and legitimacy will also follow to widen the scope of possibilities to 
contest the imprisonment, however that is beyond the objective of discussion here.    
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The case law on solitary confinement is dominated by justifications of ‘special 
supervision’ and ‘special protection’ and is imposed for long periods. In this regard, the 
ECtHR has a rich jurisprudence that explains that subhuman prison conditions, repeated 
transfers from prison to prison, lengthy solitary confinement without having a record on 
it used as a disciplinary measure could not be justified under ‘prisoner requiring special 
supervision.’ 1040  In another case the ECtHR found a breach of Article 3 of the 
Convention in the case of a mentally disabled person who was handcuffed in solitary 
confinement and kept in inadequate conditions of detention and medical care. 
Establishing a violation of Article 3 and noting a special vulnerability of the complainant, 
the Court stated that handcuffing a mentally disabled prisoner for a period of seven days, 
without psychiatric justification or medical treatment had to be regarded as constituting 
inhuman and degrading treatment.1041 Similarly, to outlaw the lengthy retention of 
prisoners in the solitary, the HRCttee has found that holding a detainee for one month in 
a cell where ‘rainwater filtered in and one lives in the midst of human excrement’ 
violated the ICCPR (Article 10).1042 The IACtHR too has stated that prolonged solitary 
confinement constitutes a form of ill-treatment prohibited under Article 5 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.1043  
 
Use of solitary confinement as a ‘protective custody’ was found in breach of freedom 
from torture and other ill-treatment in conjunction with non-discrimination principle by 
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1041 Kucheruk v Ukraine App no 2570/04 (ECtHR, 6 September 2007). 
1042 Leopoldo Buffo Carballal v Uruguay, Communication No. 33/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984). 
1043 Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v Peru, petition (No. 11,319)(IACtHR 30 May 1999). 
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the ECtHR. In a case X v Turkey, a gay man argued that his isolation from the rest of the 
prison population was discriminatory and amounted to a breach of Article 3 under the 
Convention. The ECtHR in its decision indicated that solitary confinement of a gay man, 
while it [solitary confinement] was not being recognised as a punishment, imposed 
substantial material limitations on the applicant’s rights.1044 The Court held that even 
though the prison authorities’ concerns that the applicant would be at risk of being 
physically abused if he remained in a standard shared cell are not entirely unfounded, 
even though those fears made it necessary to take certain safety measures to protect the 
applicant, they do not suffice to justify a measure totally segregating him from the prison 
community.1045 The Court noted that the reason for keeping a prisoner in isolation was 
his sexuality, and there had therefore been a violation of Article 14 [prohibition of 
discrimination] taken together with Article 3 [prohibition of torture and other ill-
treatment].1046 This reasoning is a departure from the ECtHR’s previous decision in Stasi 
v France, where the Court did not find any violation of the prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment. The complainant in this case had argued that he was ill-treated by 
inmates because of his homosexuality. The Court held that the prison authorities could 
not have been aware of the acts of violence committed against him, therefore there was 
no ‘deliberate indifference’ or complicity by prison staff. Thus, the ECtHR established 
that there was no breach of the Convention.1047  
 
The long-term solitary confinement was contested in relation to a transgender prisoner in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1044 X v Turkey App no 24626/09 (ECtHR 9 October 2012) para 42-43. 
1045 ibid. para 51. 
1046 ibid. 
1047 Stasi v France App no 25001/07 (ECtHR, 20 October 2011). 
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the Israeli Supreme Court, where Justices Neal Hendel, Noam Solberg and Salim Joubran 
decided to take the unique vulnerability of a transgender detainee into consideration.1048 
In particular, following an appeal from a transgender woman, the Court reduced her 
sentence from 15 months to 10 months, stating that the unusually harsh prison conditions 
constituted a mitigating factor for a transgender detainee. The Court held that transgender 
woman would have to serve the sentence in solitary confinement to protect him/her from 
fellow prisoners.1049 It further stated that the defendant’s situation was unusual, and 
thereby it was appropriate for additional leniency when it came to [her] sentence.1050 
 
A number of issues should be highlighted about this judgment. First, Israel Prisoner 
Service regulations require transgender prisoners be kept apart from the rest of the prison 
population to prevent harm to themselves or other prisoners. The defendant therefore 
appealed to the Supreme Court that such isolation from the rest of the prison population 
harshened the conditions of his incarceration, and should be taken into consideration 
during sentencing. Though the term ‘solitary confinement’ is not used in the appeal or in 
the judgment, the references to the isolation make it clear that the transgender prisoners 
seem to be sent to solitary confinement by virtue of being transgender.1051 Indeed, this 
raises a bigger question of the Israeli Prison Services’ widespread practices in relation to 
‘sexual minorities’ and its compliance with wider torture protection standards, which are 
beyond the objectives of this thesis. The second point relates to the judgment as a short-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1048  Revital Hovel, ‘Transgender Convicts Deserve Leniency, Supreme Court Says’ Haaretz (2013). 
<https://genderidentitywatch.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/transgender-convicts-deserve-leniency-supreme-court-says-national-israel-
news-_-haaretz.pdf> accessed 16 April 2015. 
1049 ibid. 
1050 Stuart Winer, ‘Supreme Court Rules Leniency For Transgender Prisoner’ Times of Israel (2013) 
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/supreme-court-rules-leniency-for-transgender-prisoner/> accessed 6 August 2015. 
1051 Revital Hovel, ‘Transgender Convicts Deserve Leniency, Supreme Court Says’ Haaretz (2013) 
<https://genderidentitywatch.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/transgender-convicts-deserve-leniency-supreme-court-says-national-israel-
news-_-haaretz.pdf> accessed 16 April 2015. 
286 
 
term solution. The Supreme Court originally proposed that the transgender women had to 
go to female prison. However, the prison services indicated that they do not support the 
possibility of crossing genders in the prison system that used sex as a category for 
segregating women and men. Thus, to spare possible violence to the transgender 
prisoner, the Court came up with a solution to shorten the prison sentence. This 
‘shortened period’ was from 15 months to 10 months in solitary confinement. The Court 
seems to have deliberately avoided the term ‘solitary confinement’ to possibly spare the 
breach of the principle of prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. It is clear that in 
the legal infrastructure available to the Court, a short-term solution to the problem was 
found. However, the decision did not address the likely need for a broader, longer term 
policy specific transgender prisoners and will likely remain unaddressed for a foreseeable 
future.  
 
Juxtaposition of the protective custody and the solitary confinement shows an apparent 
limitation of the law in protecting the rights of transgender prisoners. There is an obvious 
gap in international human rights law as defining the protective custody. There is enough 
jurisprudential evidence to argue that solitary confinement cannot be applied as 
protection, due to its deeply traumatic effects. However, in an environment that is based 
on a binary understanding of the sexes, the options found in international standards, 
recommendations or the case law almost automatically suggest some form of segregation 
of transgender prisoners’ because of their vulnerability.1052 Indeed, as noted above, some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1052 Inserted in the Submission of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning the revision of the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (2014) UN Doc. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/INF/3. At 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/EGM-Uploads/IEGM_Brazil_Jan_2014/IEGM_Vienna_25-28-March-
287 
 
form of segregation of detainees in situations of vulnerability for protective purposes can 
be legitimate, though such a measure should only be used in consultation with the 
detainee and it should follow a clear protocol, and not constitute punishment or lead to 
limitations on accessing activities beneficial to prisoners (e.g., access to recreation, 
reading materials, legal counsel or health care), and should be only undertaken for as 
short a time as possible.1053 At the moment such clarity is absent from international 
standards.  
 
3.4. Right to gender expression  
 
The limitations of international human rights law are evident when considering the right 
to gender expression. The human rights instruments do not recognise the right to gender 
expression in lucid terms. In fact, in single-sex prisons, gender expression is rarely 
discussed. The Nelson Mandela Rules contain a provision stipulating the basics for 
maintaining a good appearance for men. In particular, Rule 18 states that ‘In order that 
prisoners may maintain a good appearance compatible with their self-respect, facilities 
shall be provided for the proper care of the hair and beard, and men shall be able to shave 
regularly.’1054 In relation to clothing, the Nelson Mandela Rules require that prisoners 
wear suitable clothing, which ‘shall in no manner be degrading or humiliating.’1055 
Importantly, the Bangkok Rules that are complementary to the SMR also contain a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2014/OHCR.pdf; accessed on 7 April 2016; Also, UNGA Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2011) A/66/268., para. 
69. 
1053 Submission of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning the revision of the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (2014) UN Doc. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2014/INF/3. At 
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1054 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015)19.  
1055 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015)19.  
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specific provision on personal hygiene, but misses the aspect of ‘good appearance’. 
Specifically, Rule 5 stipulates that ‘The accommodation of women prisoners shall have 
facilities and materials required to meet women’s specific hygiene needs, including 
sanitary towels provided free of charge and a regular supply of water to be made 
available for the personal care of children and women, in particular women involved in 
cooking and those who are pregnant, breastfeeding or menstruating.’  
 
The regional instruments, EPR and Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of 
Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas both emphasise personal hygiene and 
privacy. The EPR even require prison authorities to provide prisoners with the means of 
toiletries and general cleaning implements and materials.1056 The Luanda Guidelines 
specifically emphasise the hygiene of women and require that care is provided in 
accordance to respect of dignity.1057 The CPT has issued a number of recommendations 
on hygiene and sanitary conditions of prisons, mainly highlighting minimum sanitary and 
basic hygiene standards.1058  
 
There is, however, a clear gap in international standards as to what constitutes gender 
expression in the prison context. The standards outlined above, either international or 
regional, have been developed through the heteronormative lens. This means that gender 
expression in broad terms outside the man and woman dichotomy was never a part of the 
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(2006) 19. 
1057 Luanda Guidelines (2014) 32.  
1058 Council of Europe: 24th General Report of the CPT (1 August 2013 - 31 December 2014), 21 January 2015, CPT/Inf (2015), para 
105.; Council of Europe: 10th General Report of the (covering the period 1 January to 31 December 1999) CPT [CPT/Inf (2000) 13] 3 
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discussion. However, the specific hygiene and sanitary standards as seen above are 
contained in international human rights law.  
 
Of note is that personal hygiene is a part of private life, which is one of the most 
contested areas as it falls under the relative rights group.1059 The UNSR on Torture for 
example comments that ‘detainees cannot enjoy the same degree of privacy, including 
the protection of their family life, sexuality, home and correspondence, as persons living 
in liberty.’1060 The SR does not elaborate, however, as to what is meant by  limitations on 
sexuality, or what sexuality in prison might mean in general. In the report, published in 
2009, he emphasises that ‘the protection of a certain minimum space of privacy is 
necessary for an individual’s autonomy, which is at the heart of human dignity.’1061  
 
A brief survey of international instruments here shows that due to the fact that prisons are 
constructed around single-sex spaces, gender expression or expression of sex is 
understood rigidly and is therefore strictly monitored. The concepts of individual 
autonomy and human dignity play an important role when it comes to transgender and 
non-binary gender expression in prisons.1062 As argued above, absence of specific norms 
generally creates a gap in the policy, often addressed at the local, prison level. In 
practice, however, as also discussed earlier, the research shows widespread use of 
incorrect pronouns, performing unnecessary searches for the purpose of exposing 
transgender inmates’ genitalia and denying gender-appropriate clothing and grooming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1059 UNGA Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2009) UN Doc. A/64/215. 
1060 ibid. para 52. 
1061 Carr, McAlister and Serisier (n 822), Lamble (n 817) 20. 
1062 Carr, McAlister and Serisier (n 822), Lamble (n 817).  
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items.1063 As it is, the right to gender expression is not considered alongside that of 
placement, including when an individual’s gender expression does not match the 
institutional remit.1064 The housing and prison allocation is discussed below, but what is 
important to highlight here is a clear lack of comprehensive knowledge on what gender 
expression means in closed settings and the need to address the issue. 
 
Despite such an incoherent approach, the right to gender expression is finding an 
assertion in the human rights law, although slowly. For example, a recent case in the UK 
specifically considered a transgender person’s right to gender expression, dress code, and 
representation of selfhood through clothing. The case R (on the application of Green) v 
Secretary of State for Justice was brought in a domestic court, where the claimant argued 
that she was not allowed to express her gender in the prison system.1065 The appellant 
contested the prison governor’s decision on denying her from accessing hormone 
treatment, denial to access to wigs (as she was bald), denial to access certain prosthetic 
devices (the judge stated ‘this was designed to aid the intimate appearance of a woman – 
it is unnecessary to be more graphic than that’, avoiding reference to a ‘vaginoplasty’), 
no hair removal products, no separate changing facilities for the gym and no privacy 
screens, with an expectation that male urinals would be used for drug testing purposes 
and others.1066  
 
In this case, the Court relied heavily on the medical model for transgender recognition, 
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291 
 
which the UK had adopted under the ‘Gender Recognition Act 2004’.1067 And despite the 
fact that the court in this case established that the person concerned was indeed a 
transgender person, it applied security risks to justify the denial of the claimant’s right to 
selfhood and gender expression. The Court argued that despite the fact that the claimant 
had a protected characteristic – gender reassignment – the claimant regardless of such a 
characteristic is, however, male. Therefore, ‘the only possible comparator is to a male 
prisoner who is not undergoing gender reassignment’.1068 This meant that the Court 
found no discrimination on the basis of sex. No further continuation of this case has been 
found. 
 
The case of R (on the application of Green) v Secretary of State for Justice highlights a 
number of points that are important for a discussion in the context of national legal 
systems. It also exemplifies a wider challenge in recognizing transgender persons in law, 
whether outside or inside prisons. As argued above, there seems to be a lack of general 
knowledge on the possible options and how queer theory can be better accommodated in 
the legal system and in prisons in particular. The judge in the Green case was clearly 
troubled by the encounter of a transgender person with long established binary norms and 
standards. The tension between the law and queer theory discussed earlier in Chapters 
One to Four, becomes more evident in the prison system as the prison law is based on 
strict binary sexed identities.  
 
In countries that have progressive laws, particularly based on the medical model of 
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transgender legal recognition, deeper issues of the right to personhood seem under-
explored. Non-binary gender identity in the strictly regulated identity systems seems a 
utopian idea that has yet to be developed. This was indeed acknowledged in R (on the 
application of Green) v Secretary of State for Justice, where the judge stated that ‘the 
issues of the present case shall be regulated at a policy level’.1069 This and other cases 
(i.e., AB case) brought against the HM Prison Service of the UK instigated a reform, 
including opening up a consultation process with the public. HM Prison and Probation 
Service published new rules ‘Prison Service Instructions’ in November 2016, which 
focus on the participation of transgender prisoners in the decision-making regarding the 
allocation of transgender prisoners.1070 Prior to this, the Scottish prison services had 
published policy guidelines that note, for example: ‘People in custody should be allowed 
access to items such as clothing, prosthetics, chest-binders, hair-pieces/wigs and other 
equipment needed to facilitate their gender reassignment and express their gender 
identity.’1071 Notably, both the UK countrywide and the Scottish prison policies are 
developed with the binary prison structures in mind. This means that the new policies 
also are of a heteronormative nature with some consideration towards non-binary gender 
identities. 
 
Notably, in Malta, after the introduction of a gender self-determination model of 
transgender legal recognition, a number of transgender prisoners took it to the Court to 
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1071 Scottish Prison Services, ‘Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy’, 12 March 2014, available at 
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claim that their gender expression was not allowed in prisons.1072 The Court ordered the 
government of Malta to produce prison policy on the treatment of transgender prisoners, 
which was published recently.1073 The policies put robust policy safeguards in place for 
the protection of transgender prisoners and suggest that a suitable access to gender 
expression items or services, necessary for gender expression should be provided to all 
transgender and non-binary inmates.1074 As in the case of the UK and Scottish cases, 
Maltese prison policy is also developed to fit the existing structures. 
 
The right to gender expression is intrinsically intertwined with right to privacy and 
personal hygiene, but most importantly with self-identity and the right to personhood. 
This is how transgender and non-binary identities have been argued in courts across the 
world and analysed in Chapter Four. What is important for the prison context though is to 
unpack the concept not in isolation, but in connection with other rights of transgender 
and non-binary gender identified persons, as well as international instruments on human 
rights and the treatment of prisoners. More attention is also needed from the policy 
guidance perspective to posit gender expression in the set of rights prescribed for 
prisoners in general.  
 
3.5. The right to family visitations and contact with the outside world 
 
Visitations and contact with the outside world are generally restricted in prisons as part 
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of limitations imposed on rights to private life.1075 Contact with the outside world is 
usually allowed in different forms, mostly via family visits, corresponding via phone or 
internet, consular contacts if the person is of a foreign nationality and access to 
information either via print or digital media. In this thesis, only the right to family 
visitations are discussed as the most relevant aspect of transgender prisoners that is often 
contested by the local prisons. 
 
The international human rights law is abundantly clear on the importance of family 
visitation rights for the prisoners. The Nelson Mandela Rules now allow a wider circle of 
individuals who can pay visits to prisoners. Family and friends can communicate with the 
person in prison under necessary supervision and at regular intervals. This includes 
correspondents as well as the physical visits in prisons.1076 The Nelson Mandela Rules 
specifically suggest that: 
where conjugal visits are allowed, this right shall be applied without 
discrimination, and women prisoners shall be able to exercise this right on an 
equal basis with men. Procedures shall be in place and premises shall be made 
available to ensure fair and equal access with due regard to safety and dignity.1077 
 
Similarly, the Bangkok Rules stipulate that women prisoners shall enjoy the right to 
contact with the outside world equal to men prisoners.1078 The general framework for this 
right is also provided in the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,1079 and the UN Rules for the Protection of 
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1077 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 58. 
1078 Bangkok Rules (2010), 27. 
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Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty.1080 Notably, regional instruments such as EPR,1081 
the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the 
Americas,1082 the Robben Island Guidelines for the prevention of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Africa,1083 and Guidelines on the 
Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa1084 all contain 
specific provisions on the contact with the outside world. Moreover, various torture 
prevention mechanisms have made specific recommendations on prisoners’ 
communication with the outside world, noting that such practice should be encouraged. 
In particular, the CPT has noted, ‘The concept of family should be interpreted liberally’ 
for the purpose of social integration of prisoners.1085 This is an important provision for 
‘sexual minority’ in prisons and their social integration. 
 
Almost all international instruments encourage family visits as a means of contact with 
the outside world. Accordingly, in many parts of the world a practice of family visits is 
also known as conjugal visits. Such visits often last from a few hours to a day or two 
depending on the specific regulations in a given jurisdiction aimed at maintaining and 
strengthening of the family links.1086 
 
The right to family visits is a right that is often deprived to transgender or non-binary 
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1086 See for example, Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz and Aaron Littman, ‘Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey’(2013) 32 (1) 
Yale Law and Policy Review, 149. 
296 
 
gender prisoners by virtue of being transgender or non-binary. This is largely related to 
policies both inside a prison and laws outside, which often criminalize transgender 
individuals or at least discriminates against them in the civil law (e.g., marriage, non-
recognition in law, etc.). Despite the fact that the Yogyakarta Principles recommend that 
‘conjugal visits, where permitted, are granted on an equal basis to all prisoners and 
detainees, regardless of the gender of their partner,’1087 the practice shows that ‘sexual 
minorities’ in prison face discrimination due to the laws that do not recognize same-sex 
relationships, marriage or pursue a biological model of transgender legal recognition as 
analysed in Chapter Two.   
 
Again, transgender and other ‘sexual minorities’ in prisons are left out of policies that 
prescribe specific rights for communication with the outside world. The problem often 
lies with the discretionary nature of decision making by a prison administration at a local 
level as to who can enjoy the right to a visit. The absence in the policy guidance yet 
again seems to result in practices that are discriminatory against LGBTIQ persons.  
 
A specific and relatively early case that challenged conjugal visitation rights was in 1999 
in Colombia. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reviewed a case of 
Martha Lucia Alvarez v Colombia in 1999 where the complainant was arguing that she 
because she was denied visitations because of her homosexuality, her personal integrity, 
honour and equality were violated. To counteract these arguments, the Colombia 
government stated that prisons would not allow homosexuals to receive intimate visits, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1087 Yogyakarta Principles (2006) 9. 
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it could affect the prison disciplinary regime. And even though the government 
acknowledged the discriminatory nature of such a ban, it noted that ‘American culture 
has little tolerance towards homosexual practices in general’.1088 Even though the case 
was viewed admissible to the court, it did not progress to the final judgment. Instead, the 
Commission agreed to oversee negotiations between the Colombian government and Ms. 
Alvarez and her lawyer in granting conjugal rights for lesbian prisoners. Meanwhile, the 
Colombia Supreme Court undertook a decision in Alba Nelly Montoya Castrillión that 
depriving lesbian inmates of conjugal visits constitutes a violation of their rights to 
privacy, freedom from discrimination based on sex, and to equality before the law. 
Importantly, the Supreme Court of Colombia addressed some of the statements the 
government had made in 1999 when the Alvarez case was at the Commission. In 
particular, the judges stated that there was no threat to the prison regime or to the well-
being of other inmates or visitors, including children in allowing conjugal visits to 
lesbian prisoners under the same conditions required for heterosexual visits.1089  
 
A similar case was considered a few years later in Argentina, when another lesbian 
couple complained that conjugal visitation rights were not granted to them. Judge Jose 
Perez Villalobo at the Federal Oral Court in Cordoba City (Tribunal Oral en lo 
Criminal Federal No. 5), in granting the right to visitations in prison to the couple, 
ordered the prison administration to allow the couple the same rights and conditions as 
offered to the rest of the prison population. The Court further commented that there was 
no valid security risk of HIV (argued by the prison administration) that should influence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1088 Case Martha Lucia Alvarez v Colombia, (IACtHR 1999) Alba Nelly Montoya Castrillión (Expediente No. 6600122100002001-
0012-01, October 11 2001). 
1089 ibid. 
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allowing same-sex couples a visitation right.1090 Similarly, attempts to appeal the prison 
policy on conjugal visits in Israel in 2009 resulted in the change of prison services 
decision to allow conjugal visits for all on equal basis.1091 
 
Of course, the right to contact with the outside world is not limited to visits in the prison. 
However, this is a specific area where the generalist approach of international policies 
and instruments on the treatment of prisoners seems to omit the interests and rights of 
transgender and other ‘sexual minority’ prisoners. Thus, further guidance as in the earlier 
case of gender expression is important to ensure that the treatment of transgender and 
other ‘sexual minority’ prisoners are conducted on equal basis.  
 
3.6. Right to health 
 
Discussion about transgender prisoners’ rights to health cannot be taken in isolation from 
transgender health outside prisons or general prion health. Prison health on its own is a 
subject of a bigger research and exceeds the aims of this thesis. Only health standards 
specific to the transgender person’s health will be highlighted here.  
 
Pathologization of transgender people under biological and medical models of 
transgender legal recognition has largely characterised the ways in which discussions 
about right to health for transgender prisoners are conducted. Chapter Two has shown 
that the de-pathologization strategy led by transgender activists and human rights groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1090  Federal Oral Court No 2 in Cordoba City (Argentina 2005). 
1091  Haaretz, 'Gay Israeli Prisoners Win Right To Conjugal Visits' Haaretz (2013) <http://forward.com/news/breaking-
news/179785/gay-israeli-prisoners-win-right-to-conjugal-visits/> accessed 30 October 2015. 
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at the WHO are having a significant impact on the shaping of policy and law in 
recognising transgender persons in law.1092  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is important to establish the legal grounds 
for a transgender person’s right to health in order to argue for equal access to health in 
prisons. Internationally, the right to health is recognised by all major international human 
rights instruments. Article 12 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights provides that ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.’1093 Similarly, the African Charter,1094 
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights1095 and the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights1096 all contain specific right to health in the regional context. The European Social 
Charter also outlines right to health.1097 Furthermore, the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
specifically spells out that ‘anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention 
shall have the right to request a medical examination and must be informed of that 
right.’1098  
 
The right to health is translated into all main international instruments on treatment to 
prisoners. In recent years, in particular with the adoption of Bangkok Rules and the 
revision of the SMR, general frameworks of right to health in prisons have scaled up 
significantly. For example, the Nelson Mandela Rules now recognize that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1092 Chapter Two. 
1093 Rick Lines, ‘The right to health of prisoners in international human rights law’ (4) International Journal of Prisoner Health 3.  
1094 African Charter on Human Rights, Article 16.  
1095 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, Article 10.  
1096 Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 39. 
1097 1996 Revised European Social Charter, 163 CETS, entered into force 1 July 1999, para 11 of Part I.  
1098 Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 4. 
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the provision of health care for prisoners is a State responsibility. Prisoners 
should enjoy the same standards of health care that are available in the 
community, and should have access to necessary health-care services free of 
charge without discrimination on the grounds of their legal status.1099  
 
In addition, Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners,1100 the Bangkok Rules,1101 
the EPR,1102 the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of 
Liberty in the Americas,1103 and the Luanda Guidelines1104 all emphasise the importance 
of minimum standard of health in prisons. In addition, Article 6 of the UN Code of 
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials requires that law enforcement officials shall 
ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody.1105 Equal standard of 
health in and outside prison is required by human rights monitoring mechanisms. The 
HRCttee, for example, has reviewed a number of cases under Article 10 of the ICCPR 
and concluded that ‘States parties are under an obligation to observe certain minimum 
standards of detention, which include provision of medical care and treatment.’1106 The 
CPT in its recommendations repeatedly emphasise that ‘prisoners should be able to have 
access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime.’1107 The CESCR in 
its General Comments stipulates that the countries shall provide equal access to 
healthcare in prisons.1108 Moreover, the right to health is one of the most contested rights 
under Article 3 of the ECHR. The ECtHR has in a number of cases stated that a prisoners 
‘health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1099 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 24. 
1100 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990) 9. 
1101 Bangkok Rules (2010) 12-18. 
1102 European Prison Rules (2006) part 3. 
1103  Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (2008)10 
1104 Luanda Guidelines (2014) 25 
1105 United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 1979, UNGA Res 34/169, (17 December 1979), Article 6. 
1106 Mikhail Marinich v Belarus, Comm. No. 1502/2006 (2010) UN Doc. CCPR/C/99/D/1502/2006. 
1107 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), ‘3rd General 
Report on the CPT's Activities Covering the Period 1 January to 31 December 1992’ [CPT/Inf (93) 12] (1993) para 34. 
1108 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), (2000) E/C.12/2000/4 
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with the requisite medical assistance.’1109 The Court has also noted that ‘failure to 
provide requisite medical assistance in detention could be incompatible with Article 3 of 
the Convention even if it did not lead to a medical emergency or otherwise cause severe 
or prolonged pain.1110 Similarly, the IACtHR established the right to health standards in 
Americas region.1111 In the minors’ case the Court noted that:  
the act of imprisonment carries with it a specific and material commitment to 
protect the prisoner's human dignity so long as that individual is in the custody of 
the State, which includes protecting him from possible circumstances that could 
imperil his life, health and personal integrity, among other rights.1112  
 
Right to health in prisons is part of overall health standards contained in international 
human rights instruments. Furthermore, healthcare standards in prisons are required to be 
equal to the those available outside prisons. 1113  At the same time, due to the 
particularities of health of transgender or non-binary persons, additional measures might 
be necessary. For example, as noted in Chapter Five, transgender prisoners often require 
access to hormone or specialised psychological therapy to which they may or may not 
have had access when outside prison. If hormone therapy was started prior to 
imprisonment, it is important to continue on the basis of a general framework of prison 
health standards. 
 
Generally, transgender health rights have been emphasised by the UN human rights 
bodies noting that ‘the specific health needs of LGBTIQ persons, including hormone and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1109 Kudla v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR, 20 October 2000) para 94.  
1110 Ashot Harutyunyan v Armenia App no 34334/04  (ECtHR, 15 June 2010)  
1111 Cabrera‐García and Montiel‐Flores v Mexico. Series C No. 220, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs (IACtHR, 
Judgment of 26 November, 2010). para. 135. In this regard, the Court followed the paragraphs 56, 60, 65, 66 and 76 of the Istanbul 
Protocol.  
1112 IACHR, ‘Special Report on the Human Rights Situation at the Challapalca prison in Peru’ (IACHR 2003) para 113.; Also, 
IACHR, Report No. 41/99, Merits, Minors in Detention (Honduras 1999) para 135.  
1113 See for example Rick Lines (n 1093).  
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other treatment associated with gender transition for transgender persons’1114 is important 
to be provided. However, there still remains a gap as to how transgender prisoners’ right 
to health is interpreted in practice.  
 
The findings of international monitoring bodies reinforce the idea that even in countries 
where the concept of equality and non-discrimination is relatively well-respected, and 
provide safeguards against ill-treatment for the protection including in prisons, 
discrepancy to extend equal and affordable medical care to transgender prisoners remains 
high. No case on transgender medical care in prisons has been considered by or 
submitted to the UN human rights treaty bodies so far, and no guidelines exist by 
international human rights mechanisms and policy bodies on how to organise transgender 
health in a prison system. It is also important to note that, at the European level, there 
were two cases admitted by the ECtHR that are yet to be reviewed by the Court. In both 
cases, G.G. v Turkey1115 and Bogdanova v Russia,1116 the applicants demanded that 
medical services in prisons be provided (surgery and hormone therapy respectively). In 
the latter case, however, the applicant additionally argued that the state had an obligation 
to take measures to address LGBTIQ prisoners’ vulnerability in prison. No judgment has 
been issued on either case at the time of writing this thesis. However, it is expected that 
when published, these decisions will have a great impact on how the right to health for 
transgender prisoners is attended in the prison context.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1114 UN CAT, Ninth Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (2016) UN Doc. CAT/C/57/4., para 77; UN HRC 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Health (2003) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58, para 60.; UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
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1116 ibid. 
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In acknowledging the complex nature of transgender health, and arguing for the equality 
of care, a parallel should be drawn with similar cases reviewed by the ECtHR. Two cases 
in particular deserve attention; in both, the Court reviewed cases concerning drug user 
prisoners. The first case was McGlinchey and others v the UK,1117 in which adequate 
medical care for a heroin addict suffering withdrawal symptoms was discussed. The 
complainant was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment and later in prison manifested 
heroin-withdrawal symptoms (frequent vomiting, significantly lost weight). Though she 
was treated by a doctor, her condition worsened after one week in prison. Eventually she 
was admitted to a hospital, where she died in January 1999. The Court reviewed the case 
under Article 3 of the Convention and concluded that the prison authorities had failed to 
comply with their duty to provide her with the requisite medical care, in violation of 
Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention.1118 A 
similar case was reviewed by the ECtHR 13 years later. In Wenner v Germany, the 
complainant was a long-term heroin addict who had been denied drug substitution 
therapy in prison.1119 The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention and emphasised that the authorities, despite their obligation, had failed to 
provide the applicant with medical treatment, which the therapy was to be considered 
appropriate. The state also failed to seek the help of specialist medical expert advice and 
examine available options for treatment.1120  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1117 McGlinchey and Others v the United Kingdom App no 50390/99 (ECtHR 29 April 2003). 
1118 ibid. 
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Both of these cases are important in that they describe a particular condition of drug 
dependency. This issue is highly contested as states often refuse to provide treatment for 
the drug use in the prison environment.1121 Though transgender prisoners health cannot 
be directly compared to these two cases described above, these cases should be used as a 
guidance in deciding the cases of transgender prisoners’ right to health. In fact, some 
national courts have already made similar linkages. For example, in the landmark case 
Estelle v Gamble, which was discussed earlier, the US Supreme Court established a 
criteria that could be used in courts to argue for transgender prisoners’ right to health.1122 
Due to the subjective nature of ‘deliberate indifference’ test, courts across the US 
developed unsystematic practices as to what constitutes ‘deliberate indifference’, and 
inmates have struggled to prove ‘a serious medical need’ too. Subsequently, in most of 
the transgender prisoners’ health care cases in the US, the prison administrations argue 
that treatment that is considered experimental or cosmetic is mostly ‘an elective 
procedure’. 1123  Possibly this was the rationale behind another case, Kosilek v 
Maloney,1124 where a decision was made against the complainant to access gender-
reassignment surgery while in prison. In the case, Michelle Kosilek sued prison officials 
for not providing sex-reassignment surgery after over a decade of her requests. The 
complainant had made numerous requests for gender-confirming medical or 
psychological care, though in vain. While in prison she tried to kill herself and to castrate 
herself. At first, the Court held that Kosilek had been denied necessary medical care 
because her rejection was based on a rigid prison policy, not on a doctor’s individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1121 See for example, UN HRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture on Greece (2011) A/HRC/16/52/Add.4.; UNHRC Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the right to Health (2010) A/HRC/14/20. 
1122 Gamble v Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).  
1123 Gamble v Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
1124 Kosilek v Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002). 
305 
 
examination. Although the Court found that Kosilek had not satisfied the ‘deliberate 
indifference’ requirement, it ruled that the prison administration had to provide her with 
relevant care. Kosilek sued again in 2005, complaining that the treatment she was 
receiving, including psychotherapy, hormone treatment, and laser hair removal, were not 
enough to relieve her anxiety or depression.1125 Kosilek’s case continued until the 
Supreme Court decided not to hear the case in 2015 and by default the decision of the US 
First Circuit Court of Appeals, was upheld.1126 Kosilek’s case raises a wider debate about 
pathologization of transgender individuals and the state responsibility to provide 
treatment. These issues were discussed in the medical model of legal recognition of 
transgender persons. However, for the prison context, state responsibility to provide 
health for those kept in detention is imperative.1127  
 
The failure of governments to address transgender prisoners’ right to health by putting a 
comprehensive policy in place has implications beyond prisons. Indeed, prison health 
cannot be isolated from broader healthcare concerns in society, particularly when 
discussing the groups with special health care needs. The provision of health services 
sufficient to meet these needs is not only a matter of pressing concern for persons in 
detention, it is also integrally linked to state obligations to fulfil the right to health within 
the population as a whole. Governments have a further legal and ethical obligation to 
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1126 GLAD Legal Advocates ad Defenders, ‘U.S. Supreme Court Will Not Hear Case Concerning Medical Care for Transgender 
Woman in Prison’, May 4, 2015.; also Kosilek v. O'Brien (formerly Spencer), 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015). 
1127 See for example, ECtHR, ‘the authorities are under an obligation to protect the health of persons deprived of liberty and the lack 
of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to article 3’ (Rohde v Denmark App no 69332/01 (ECtHR, 21 July 
2005); Kudla v Poland App no 30210/96 ( ECtHR, 20 October 2000); Melnik v Ukraine App no 72286/01 (ECtHR, 28 March 2006).  
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provide a standard of health care greater than that available in the community in order to 
meet an equal outcome of care.1128 
 
4. Opportunities and Ways Forward for Achieving the Protection of Transgender 
Prisoners’ Rights 
4.1. Vulnerability as a framework for protecting transgender prisoners’ rights 
a. Concept of vulnerability, human rights and transgender persons 
 
This sub-chapter emphases the concept of vulnerability, which is highly important to the 
broader group of ‘sexual minorities’ and to transgender persons in particular. It, however, 
does not provide a theoretical analysis of the concept itself. The theory of vulnerability is 
a subject of study that exceeds the objectives of this thesis. Also, in order to establish 
vulnerability of transgender prisoners, this section looks at the understanding of 
vulnerability in relation to sexual minorities and transgender persons in general and 
employs the learning for prison context. 
 
It is argued that human rights are inherently constructed to protect the most 
vulnerable.1129 However, as witnessed throughout history, many groups such as women, 
people of colour, asylum seekers, ethnic minorities and sexual minorities have fallen out 
of the universal protection framework of human rights.1130 To address the pitfalls of the 
universal protection mechanism, group-specific instruments have been designed that can 
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1129 Alexandra Timmer, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights’, in Martha Fineman and Anna 
Grear (Eds.), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (Ashgate 2013) 147-170.  
1130  Anna Grear, ‘Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity’ (2017) 16 A Journal of Modern 
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also be understood as a continuous critique to the ‘abstract universal’ and outcome of the 
‘quazi-disembodiment.’1131 This criticism is important in the context of transgender and 
wider ‘sexual minority’ groups. Indeed, the rationale behind asserting the SOGI rights as 
part of the international human rights framework is that the existing framework as it 
stands does not guarantee the meaningful protection of LGBTIQ individuals as also 
highlighted by the SR on Torture. Chapters Three and Four in this thesis have also tried 
to address the gap and provided analysis of the gradual shift that has been taking place in 
human rights law, whether at national, regional or international levels to ensure the 
development of group-specific norms that can also help strengthen the protection 
framework. Notably, the framework of vulnerability that has been used in courts for a 
number of groups to assert the legal framework of human rights protection has not been 
tested in the context of transgender persons.  
 
The policy documents and UN human rights experts and treaty bodies have emphasised 
the particular vulnerability of transgender and other LGBIQ persons, but their specific 
vulnerability has not been examined in the courts. Both the ECtHR and the IACtHR have 
employed international and regional human rights instruments to argue that the 
fundamental requirement of respect for human dignity should be guaranteed for lesbian 
and gay prisoners.1132 Furthermore, the ECtHR has developed a wide framework of 
vulnerable categories, including Roma, people with mental disabilities, people living 
with HIV, and asylum seekers. The Court recently gave a clarification about its 
application of term vulnerable to a specific individual or a group of people. In particular, 
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in a partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, one judge stated: ‘The concept of a 
vulnerable group has a specific meaning in the jurisprudence of the Court. True, if a 
restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society who 
have suffered considerable discrimination in the past….’1133 The judge then continued to 
list the preconditions that make the group vulnerable and suggests action, noting: ‘Such 
prejudice may entail legislative stereotyping which prohibits the individualised 
evaluation of their capacities and needs. Where a group is vulnerable, special 
consideration should be given to their needs.’1134 In making a point about the failure of 
protection of such vulnerable groups, the judge observed:  
Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect 
for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish 
or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it 
may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article 
3.1135  
 
The IACtHR has also applied the concept of vulnerability in its case law. It, however, 
differentiates between vulnerable groups and situations of vulnerability, thereby giving 
the Court a flexibility in its reasoning.1136 In a case of Villagrán Morales and Others v 
Guatemala, concerning a group of street children, the Court argued that ‘vulnerability of 
children and their incapacity to personally ensure the respect of their rights’ – hence the 
group were to be recognised as a vulnerable.1137  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1133 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011), Partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of 
Judge Sajo. 
1134 ibid. 
1135 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011). 
1136 Mary Beloff and Laura Clérico, ‘The Right to Dignified Living Conditions and the Position of Vulnerability in the Jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American Court’ at: https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/SELA14_BeloffClerico_CV_Eng.pdf, accessed on 
12 April 2015. 
1137 Street Children (Villagran-Morales et al.) v Guatemala, judgment on merits (19 November, 1999) para 184. 
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The vulnerability framework has been applied to transgender persons and ‘sexual 
minorities’ in general to argue for specific protection mechanisms.1138 However, until 
recently vulnerability has not been mentioned in the context of LGBTIQ persons - 
although there had been hints to special measures associated with vulnerability that 
needed to be applied to achieve protection from discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. For example in two recent cases on non-discrimination and sexual 
orientation, Kozak v Poland and Genderdoc-M v Moldova, the ECtHR suggested that 
‘particularly weighty reasons’ needed to be advanced before the Court to justify a 
measure against a homosexual, because such a measure ‘operates in this intimate and 
vulnerable sphere of an individual’s private life.’1139 Another area where the ECtHR 
attempted the idea of vulnerability specifically in relation to transgender came with I and 
Goodwin cases, in both of which the ECtHR found that the legal system had placed 
‘transsexuals’ in an ‘anomalous position in which they could experience feelings of 
vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety.’1140 However, specific terms such as transgender 
vulnerability were not employed.   
 
The breakthrough of assigning vulnerability to a group of LGBT came with the ECtHR 
reviewing a case of a gay asylum seeker from Iran, who was detained in immigration 
detention facilities in Hungary. In 2014, the complainant, O.M. arrived in Hungary and 
applied for asylum upon his arrest. He was originally detained by the immigration 
services, though later on re-arrested by the police due to risks of the applicant escaping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1138 For example, the initiative for drafting the Yogyakarta Principles was also developed with this spirit.  
1139 Kozak v Poland App no 13102/02 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010) para 92.; Genderdoc-M v Moldova App no. 9106/06 (ECtHR, 12 June 
2012); para 51-52. 
1140 I v the United Kingdom App no 25680/94 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002).; Goodwin v United Kingdom (n 295). 
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the country. O.M. then was kept in detention for 58 days. While the Court criticized 
Hungary for generally not observing the principles on the humane conditions of 
detention, it paid particular attention to the circumstances of the applicant. The Court 
went to argue that the complainant was a ‘member of a vulnerable group by virtue of 
belonging to a sexual minority in Iran.’1141 Although the Court did not elaborate on the 
concept of vulnerability vis-a-vis ‘sexual minority’, it has made it clear that vulnerability 
should have been used as a condition for demanding legal protection for asylum 
seekers.1142   
 
Vulnerability has been also highlighted by the CRC Committee in its General Comment 
on ‘The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence’, which addresses non-
discrimination of vulnerable or marginalized groups such as lesbian, gay or transgender 
persons.1143 The CESCR in its General Comment on non-discrimination also addressed 
the concept of marginalization and vulnerability to emphasise the inclusion of LGBTIQ 
persons under ‘the other’ prohibited ground for discrimination.1144 The Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women differing from previous two bodies, 
employs a concept of vulnerability rather often to underline the disadvantaged position of 
women vis-à-vis men.1145 A number of SPs mechanisms have also employed the concept 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1141 O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR, 5 July 2016) para 53.; also Alajos Kiss v Hungary App no 38832/06 ECtHR 20 May 
2010) para 42. 
1142 O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR, 5 July 2016) para 53.  
1143 UN CRC General comment No. 13 (2011): The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence (2011) CRC/C/GC/13 
(The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence), para 60 and 72(g) (stressing that States parties must address 
discrimination against vulnerable or marginalized groups of children including children who are lesbian, gay, transgender or 
transsexual). 
1144 UN CESCR, General comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2) (2009) UN Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/20  para 27. 
1145 See for example UN CEDAW General Recommendation No 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general 
recommendation No 19 (2017) CEDAW/C/GC/35.; CEDAW General Recommendations No. 18 on disabled women, adopted at the 
Tenth Session, (1991) (contained in Document A/46/38), (1991) A/46/38.;  UN CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24: Article 
12 of the Convention (Women and Health), (1999) A/54/38/Rev.1. 
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of vulnerability, most recently the UN Independent Expert on SOGI, which emphasized, 
‘Transgender persons’ vulnerability to discrimination and right to equality does not and 
should not, depend on medical transition.’1146 
 
b. Vulnerability and transgender prisoners 
 
Analysis of vulnerability in the prison context slightly differs from how this is 
understood in society. In literature, places of detention are discussed as places of 
vulnerability 1147  that require heightened safeguards to protect prisoners from ill-
treatment. International standards such as Nelson Mandela Rules state that in order for 
the principle of non-discrimination to be put in practice, the most vulnerable categories in 
prison settings should be taken into account.1148 The Bangkok Rules specifically state 
that ‘women prisoners are one of the vulnerable groups that have specific needs and 
requirements’ and requires that adequate attention is be paid to them due to their 
particular vulnerability.1149 The Bangkok Rules emphasise the vulnerability of the group, 
which is similar to Rule 13 of the EPR, which state, ‘Protection for vulnerable groups is 
not discrimination, nor is treatment that is tailored to the special needs of individual 
prisoners unacceptable.’1150 Special attention to ‘vulnerable groups’ is also required in 
the Luanda Guidelines1151 and Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1146 UNGA Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity (2017) A/72/172, Para 53.; also UN HRC: Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (2017) A/HRC/35/36. 
1147 Chember v Russia App no. 7188/03 (ECtHR, 3 July 2008) para 50; Sarban v Moldova App no 3456/05, ECtHR, 4 October 2005) 
para 77; Jalloh v Germany [GC] App no 54810/00 (ECtHR 2006) para 69, and Mouisel v Franc App no. 67263/01 (ECtHR 2002) para 
40. 
1148 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 2.  
1149 Bangkok Rules (2010) 2. 
1150 European Prison Rules (2006) 13. 
1151 Luanda Guidelines (2014, 29-34. 
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Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, which underlines ‘particular situation of 
vulnerability’1152 of person deprived of their liberty.1153 The CAT Committee in its recent 
General Comment on Effective Remedy for Torture and Ill-treatment (Article 14) 
specifically emphasises the principle of non-discrimination, among which is listed 
gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity. The Committee also further notes the 
‘groups vulnerable on the basis of identities’… and asks to ‘exercise sensitivity’ towards 
such groups.1154 Similarly, the ECtHR in Florea v Romania has established the position 
that in a case where a prisoner complained of overcrowding, poor hygiene conditions, 
having been forced to share a cell with smokers in the prison hospital and being given a 
diet unsuited to his various medical conditions, the State had an obligation for ‘enhanced 
protection of vulnerable individuals’.1155 The Court indicated that the complainant, 
Gheorghe Florea in this case, was regarded vulnerable to ill-treatment and Romania was 
found in breach of Article 3. In underlining the obligation of the state to protect prisoners 
from torture and ill-treatment, the Court further requested that prisoners should not be 
subject to distress or hardship that exceed the level of suffering inherent to their 
imprisonment.1156 The ECtHR used the ‘particular vulnerability’ argument to emphasise 
protection of specific groups from ill-treatment. For example, in the cases of Keenan v 
the UK and Price v the UK the Court found violations of Article 3 due to the unique 
vulnerabilities of the applicants in question (mental illness and physical disability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1152 Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (2008), Preambular Paragraphs. 
1153 As noted above, the Inter-American human rights system seems to have developed its own approach on vulnerability which will 
not be discussed here, though is important to mention. 
1154 UN CAT, General comment No. 3, CAT/C/GC/3  (2012). 
1155 Florea v Romania App No 37186/03 (ECtHR 4 September 2010). 
1156 ibid. 
313 
 
respectively).1157 The ECtHR established that these specific vulnerabilities heightened 
the obligation of the state party to provide adequate conditions of confinement (including 
health services) so as to prevent the occurrence of ill-treatment.1158 Similarly, the 
IACtHR established that in relation to children in prison (already regarded category of 
vulnerable group), it was important that ‘the minimal conditions’ were established as 
‘necessary for the preservation of dignity during their stay in detention centers.’1159  
 
Reasoning that suffering from torture and other ill-treatment may be aggravated by the 
marginalization or discrimination of particular individuals or groups of individuals within 
a society or prisons1160 means that there need to be safeguards in place. As further 
highlighted by the CAT Committee, the protection of minority or marginalized 
individuals or groups should be a core part of the obligation to prevent torture and other 
ill-treatment.1161  
 
Recommendations on how to treat transgender prisoners seem scattered without 
comprehensive form. This means that, for example, even if there is a recommendation 
that transgender persons are a vulnerable category and they are more vulnerable when 
they are in prisons, the policies to regulate such situations still do not reflect the lived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1157 Price v the United Kingdom App no 33394/96, (ECtHR, 0 Jul 2001) 53; Keenan v the United Kingdom App no 27229/95 (ECtHR, 
4 March 2001) 38. 
1158 In McGlinchey v United Kingdom the Court found the failure to provide adequate medical services to an imprisoned heroin user—
a failure that resulted in her death was also a violation of Article 3. (McGlinchey and Others v the United Kingdom App no 50390/99  
(ECtHR, 29 April 2003). 
1159 IACtHR, in the case of The Institute for the Reeducation of Minors v Paraguay, cited in article The Right to Dignified Living 
Conditions and the Position of Vulnerability in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, Mary Beloff and Laura Clérico.  
1160 UNHRC Report of the UN Special Rapporteur Torture (2016) A/HRC/31/57., 9; UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture (2013) UN Doc. A/HRC/22/53 (2013) para 26.; UN CAT, Ninth Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of 
Torture (2016) UN Doc. CAT/C/57/4., 48. 
1161 UN CAT, ‘General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties’ (2008) UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2, para 21; 
Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil, Inter-American Court (2006) para 103. See also UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture (2013) 
UN Doc. A/HRC/22/53.; para 26. 
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experiences of transgender prisoners, as demonstrated in Chapter Five. What seems 
important from the analysis of vulnerability and transgender prisoners is the importance 
of contextual the particular nature of lived experiences of vulnerability. Indeed, such an 
approach can allow study into the cumulative vulnerabilities and layers of 
intersectionalities that further affect the experiences of transgender prisoners. And if 
characteristics of such vulnerability are mobile and flexible as argued in literature and 
seen in the case law outlined above from European and Americas region, specific links 
should be made between imprisonment of transgender persons, their vulnerability vis-à-
vis the vulnerability of other prisoners and the context in which they are imprisoned. 
 
Vulnerability is applied to argue for either specific norms for protection or mechanisms 
in place to protect rights of particular person or a group. In the context of prisoners, 
vulnerability of the group determines the categorization of prisoners. For example, 
special vulnerability of women and children means that they should be kept separate 
from male prison population. A vulnerability of people with disabilities means that 
special measures are taken to address the illness. Often, these people are separated from 
the prison population and placed in special care units or hospitals respective to their 
health. In relation to transgender prisoners however, vulnerability is often a foundation 
for decisions to place them under ‘protective custody’, which as argued above is a 
euphemism for solitary confinement. If decisions to isolate transgender prisoners are 
justified by their vulnerability, it raises questions of whether vulnerability is two-faced 
and even a double-edged sword too, and whether a different approach should be taken to 
understand different sides of vulnerability: the group of transgender prisoners and 
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specific vulnerability that prison environment inherently entails. Answering such 
questions requires further research through the queer criminology studies discussed in 
Chapter One, as well as studies into the lived experiences of transgender prisoners, 
discussed in Chapter Five. To conclude though, it should be noted that the UN human 
rights bodies, and in particular the CAT Committee and the SR on Torture, have analysed 
types of vulnerabilities experienced by transgender persons and wider sexual minorities 
in prisons and have made special recommendations. In particular, both have argued that 
LGBTIQ prisoners should be included in the design, implementation and evaluation of 
measures adopted to prevent the use of these practices.1162 Though not comprehensive, 
such specific recommendations are important to guide the policies on humane treatment 
of transgender prisoners. 
 
4.2. Separation of categories of prisoners and transgender rights 
 
In modern prison theory, two major grounds for prison segregation can be identified: sex 
and age. This sub-chapter only looks at segregation by sex. The assumption of 
heterosexuality remains one of the basic reasons behind the sex segregation of prisons, as 
men must be kept from women because men are heterosexual and will seek out sex with 
women, either consensually or non-consensually. 1163  Such an assumption of 
heterosexuality plays an important role in forming prison policies that are different for 
men and women. This also means that sex-based segregation is limiting in protecting the 
less masculine from the more aggressive and predatory male prisoners in male prisons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1162 UN CAT, Ninth Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (2016) UN Doc. CAT/C/57/4., para 71.  
1163 Cohen (n 843). 
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This is particularly true with regards to transgender persons, many of whom display 
distinct female characteristics, including wearing make-up, dress or long hair and are 
treated particularly poorly in sex-segregated prisons by both inmates and prison 
guards.1164  
 
Prison segregation may take place at various stages of the imprisonment. However, the 
most common forms are housing (or the allocation to prisons) and administrative 
segregation (protective custody or solitary confinement discussed earlier in this chapter). 
Different categories of prisoners are kept in separate institutions or parts of institutions, 
taking into account their sex with specific assumptions of male and female, age, criminal 
record, the legal reason for their detention and the necessities of their treatment. As noted 
earlier, international principles such as the Nelson Mandela Rules provide special norms 
on the treatment of each of these groups and their protection.1165 In particular, Rule 11  
stipulates that ‘the different categories of prisoners shall be kept in separate institutions 
or parts of institutions, taking account of their sex…’ Moreover, it continues to note, 
‘Men and women shall so far as possible be detained in separate institutions; in an 
institution which receives both men and women, the whole of the premises allocated to 
women shall be entirely separate.’1166 Principle 19 of the Principles and Best Practices on 
the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas also prescribes that 
‘different categories of persons deprived of freedom shall be kept in separate places of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1164 Cohen (n 843). 
1165 For example, the SMR provides that (a) Men and women shall so far as possible be detained in separate institutions; in an 
institution which receives both men and women, the whole of the premises allocated to women shall be entirely separate; (b) Untried 
prisoners shall be kept separate from convicted prisoners; (c) Persons imprisoned for debt and other civil prisoners shall be kept 
separate from persons imprisoned by reason of a criminal offence; (d) Young prisoners shall be kept separate from adults. 
1166 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 11. 
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deprivation of liberty… taking account of their sex.’1167 In addition, the EPR also 
provide, ‘in deciding to accommodate prisoners in particular prisons or in particular 
sections of a prison due account shall be taken of the need to detain… male prisoners 
separately from females.’1168 All these standards apply biological-model definitions of 
men and women and make no specific reference to gender, or non-binary gender identity. 
The Bangkok Rules and the Beijing Rules also provide special rules on allocation and 
housing of respective prisoners. The Luanda Guidelines also contain provisions on 
separation of categories of detainees, though it mainly highlights the context of pre-trial 
and conviction stages of criminal proceedings.1169  
 
There is a new provision in the Nelson Mandela Rules that suggests that information 
about person’s unique identity shall be obtained to determine the gender of a newly 
arrived person.1170 In particular, Rule 7 suggests that at the arrival, prison officials shall 
collect ‘precise information enabling determination of his or her unique identity, 
respecting his or her self-perceived gender.’1171 This clause is defined to specifically 
relate to transgender persons. And while this can be a step forward in recognizing 
transgender and non-binary persons in prisons, it should be treated with caution, as the 
rules demand that such information is entered into a prisoner’s files under the prison 
management system. While the Nelson Mandela Rules have made a big step toward 
greater progress in asserting the gender identity concept within international prison 
standards for the first time in the history, it is also important that such a provision is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1167 Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (2008) 19.  
1168 European Prison Rules (2006) 18.8  
1169 Luanda Guidelines (2014), 26  
1170 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 7 
1171 Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) 7(a)  
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applied in the best interest of a transgender prisoner concerned. For this, commentary 
published by the University of Essex on the issue of dignity recommends that this 
provision [respect for dignity] was specifically included in the Nelson Mandela Rules to 
protect LGBTIQ prisoners in conjunction with Rule 2 on the prohibition of 
discrimination based on ‘other status’. It suggests that the recording of information about 
self-perceived gender in Rule 7 should provide an opportunity to facilitate the placement 
of transgender prisoners to the appropriate facilities, and this should be done without 
stigmatising LGBTIQ prisoners, discriminating them or imposing disadvantageous 
conditions on them.1172 The paper further recommends that prison files don’t mention the 
SOGI of a person unless the person expressly wants such information to appear, in which 
case, it shall not be used against them. 
 
Risks remain, however, about how to interpret the Nelson Mandela Rules in the best 
interest of a transgender prisoner when it comes to the implementation of these norms. It 
is in this context that the Essex group further elaborates that information about gender 
identity should not be based solely on the biological sex of the persons concerned.1173 
Furthermore, information about person’s unique gender should not mean automatic 
separation of a prisoner or rights being restricted. The Essex group makes a specific 
reference that ‘for transgender people, information contained in the records concerning 
gender identity should not be based solely on the biological sex of the persons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1172 Penal Reform International and Essex Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, 'Initial Guidance On The Interpretation 
And Implementation Of The UN Nelson Mandela Rules' (Penal Reform International and Essex Human Rights Centre at the 
University of Essex 2017) 
1173 ‘APT Detention Focus’ (Association for the Prevention of Torture 2017) <http://www.apt.ch/detention-
focus/en/vulnerable_groups/6/> accessed 19 August 2017.; Also, Penal Reform International and Essex Human Rights Centre (n 
1172) 31. 
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concerned’ 1174 These recommendations, though authoritative and much needed in 
defining the Rule 7 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, have a very little standing. Despite 
this, can be used as an authoritative guidance document in implementing the best 
practice.  
 
Some reforms have taken place in countries that have adopted the gender self-
determination model in general. Despite this, it would be an overstatement to say that 
these norms are still recent and yet to be implemented in prisons. For example, the 
Scottish prison service has a transgender custody policy that recognizes gender self-
determination.1175 To fully apply such a declaration in practice, the prison services have 
issued a policy in which it expects a case management conference that plays a crucial 
role in determining the transgender persons’ placement. The transgender prisoner also 
enjoys the right to participate in these conferences, also accessible and open for 
participation from civil society.1176 In the case of Malta, it fully embraces the gender self-
determination model, and attempted to translate these policies into prison policy. It has 
issued a ‘Trans, Gender Variant and Intersex Inmates Policy’, which regulates the 
placement of prisoners, as well as aspects of respect to dignity.1177 The policy, however, 
does not clarify if Malta follows the Scottish practice in making decisions with regard to 
the allocation to prisons via case management conference.1178  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1174 Penal Reform International and Essex Human Rights Centre (n 1172). 
1175 Scottish Prison Services (n 1071). 
1176  Ulrika Westerlund and Richard Köhler (n 825). 
1177 Malta Prison Policy (n 825). 
1178 Ulrika Westerlund and Richard Köhler (825). 
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Most prisons around the world apply a strictly biological sex determinant to house 
prisoners, automatically placing transgender women in men’s prisons and transgender 
men in women’s prisons.1179 The exceptions are made gradually, as shown above in the 
case of Malta, the UK including Scotland and some others. Transgender prisoners’ sex-
based placement draws an arbitrary line over the complex issue of gender identity.1180 In 
the binary prison context, it [sex-based placement] can offer a short-term solution of 
avoiding the question as to what makes someone male or female, however, in the long 
term, it creates serious safety issues and increases the prison’s liability.1181 Researchers 
and human rights campaigners have long argued that by adopting such binary, strictly 
sex-based housing policies in prisons, the government is by de facto harming them 
because it has a prior knowledge of potential physical harm to them.1182 
 
Segregation of transgender inmates may reduce the risk of sexual assault in the short 
term. However, there are many reasons to reject segregation as a long-term solution to 
the problems created by genitalia-based classification. 1183  According to empirical 
research from the US, conditions in protective custody units often do not differ 
significantly from those in disciplinary segregation units.1184 Notably, Gabriel Arkles 
argues that the segregation of transgender inmates is actually counter-productive by 
causing further violence and unrest.1185 He contends that by isolating victims of sexual 
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1180 Benish A. Shah, ‘Lost In The Gender Maze: Placement Of Transgender Inmates In The Prison System’ (2010) 5 Journal of Race, 
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1182 Christine Peek, ‘Breaking out of the Prison Hierarchy: Transgender Prisoners, Rape, and the Eighth Amendment’ (2004) 44 Santa 
Clara Law Review 1211. 
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1184 ibid. 
1185 Gabriel Arkles, ‘Safety And Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation Of Transgender People In Detention’ (2009) 
6 Political and Civil Rights Law Review. 
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abuse (as transgender prisoners often are) in ‘protective custody’, prison officials deter 
other victims of violence from reporting incidents, and are punishing the victims, rather 
than the perpetrators,1186 though it might be ‘for their own good’.1187 
 
Accommodating transgender prisoners in the prison system is possible, however, with 
the caveat that such non-binary gender will have to align with the binary model of the 
sexes offered by prisons. Due to the fact that most transgender prisoners will end up in 
prisons that do not correspond with their self-perceived gender,1188 transgender prisoners 
will be held in solitary confinement on ‘security’ or ‘protective custody’ grounds as a 
response to the dilemmas posed by sex-segregation as already examined earlier.1189 This 
ultimately means that such practices effectively treat transgender people as ‘the 
problem’, rather than addressing the underlying issues in prison or rethinking existing 
policies around sex-segregation.1190 
 
4.3. Ways forward: specialised LGBTIQ prisons and units? 
 
Another type of administrative segregation applied in the prison context is creating units, 
or special ‘wings’, for vulnerable prisoners. This is an arrangement that many prison 
administrations apply to ensure the segregation of ‘sexual minority’ prisoners from the 
rest of the prison population, with the aim of safeguarding them from torture and other 
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ill-treatment. Such units are particularly common in male prisons, and measures creating 
them are understood as being prompted in large part by a need to protect transgender 
women and gay male prisoners. An American researcher, Russel K. Robinson, conducted 
a study on so-called K6G, a ‘homosexual inmate unit’ at the Los Angeles jail in 2010–
2011 and came up with the conclusion that K6G prisoners were not adequately protected 
from ‘predators’. He exposed the impact of prison policy with regards to segregation of 
transgender and gay prisoners: gay men must identify as gay in a public space in prison 
and to the special board of the prison administration and then satisfactorily answer a 
series of cultural questions designed to determine whether they really are gay, he 
wrote.1191 While segregation from the general prison population to a special wing can be 
considered as a protective measure (and currently it is overwhelmingly applied in the 
case of transgender, gay, bisexual prisoners), it is also true that such a policy creates 
harm for those who are excluded, including vulnerable heterosexual and bisexual men, 
men who have sex with men but do not embrace the gay identity, and gay-identified men 
who do not mimic the white, affluent gay culture.1192 Although writing about American 
prison culture, like Kunzel, Robinson incorporates some of the criticisms that specifically 
apply to the American criminal justice and to its prison system in particular when he goes 
further to argue that the jail’s screening process to identify transgender, gay, and bisexual 
prisoners implicates the right to privacy as it pressures prisoners to ‘come out’ and 
further comply with the vision of gay identity prison institutions have put forward.1193  
 
Robinson argues that establishing a special unit of this sort within a prison, which visibly 
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and in the knowledge of the entire prison population screens prisoners’ sexuality and 
forces them into identifying gay or straight, is a clear indication of state enforcement of 
dominant notions of male identities, including gay identity. In human rights terms, it 
could also be understood as ill-treatment. Robinson goes further to argue that the 
segregation policy practiced in the K6G, put in place by a prison administration, reduces 
the list of possible vulnerability factors down to sexual orientation (more specifically, 
gay identity) and transgender identity in a narrow, stereotypical fashion and excludes 
some of the most vulnerable inmates.1194 This also relates back to the analysis above in 
relation to vulnerability as a double-edged sword concept that may be used to justify 
certain types of ill-treatment and in this case isolation of ‘sexual minorities’. Robinson 
raises an important point here. A special arrangement for gay, bisexual, and transgender 
identities reveals the hegemony among people who often are thought to constitute a 
singular, cohesive LGBTIQ community. Such treatment in the words of Robinson 
‘reveals a state culpability in producing homosexuality, with stigma, discrimination and 
vulnerability.’1195 This resonates with the argument that segregation of men and women 
prisoners, though thought to have a protective character for women,1196 also has been 
understood to mean that sex segregation is intended to maintain hegemonic masculinity 
and contribute to the hegemony of men.1197 This thesis does not argue that separation of 
categories is not important, but it is worth noting that separation of prisoners is embodied 
in the vulnerability of specific subjects. For example, women and children as already 
argued elsewhere in this thesis are commonly separated categories of prisoners due to 
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their special vulnerability. And if the concept of particular vulnerability is the main 
feature for separation of prisoners, and it is argued that transgender prisoners and wider 
‘sexual minorities’ in prisons do have an inherent and particular vulnerability, their 
separation from general prison population might be justified. However, this is 
complicated by various factors. For one thing, transgender or non-binary gender persons 
do not necessarily meet either of the binary sexes or genders. And if a third gender or 
non-binary gender penal institutions were established, would still be governed under 
binary rules and principles aimed at two main biological sexes: men and women.  In the 
current context, when the majority of the world’s prisons operate in strictly biological sex 
model of transgender recognition (see Chapter Two), administrative segregation is often 
the best alternative to place ‘sexual minorities’ under the protection but within the 
general population. Often such measures are regarded the best solution to deter abuse or 
ill-treatment from other prisons and prison staff. Analysing such segregation from a 
theoretical perspective, it could represent protection from the hazards of the general 
population. This however does not exclude the problematic nature of the measure itself.  
 
The idea of ‘sexual minority’ prisons in fact has been entertained by number of countries 
so far. The first country to open a special prison to house transgender prisoners only was 
Italy, in 2010 – a development that occurred despite the obstructive environment for 
transgender legal recognition in the country, it opened a special prison to house 
transgender prisoners only.1198 Other countries in Latin America, Europe and North 
America have all tried to separate LGBTIQ inmates with varying degrees of success. 
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Some forms of such segregation were outlined above. Heightened discrimination and 
violence against LGBTIQ prisoners also instigated authorities in Thailand to open a new 
building – a prison on the outskirts of Bangkok to house only LGBTIQ inmates.1199 
Turkey is due to open a new prison of what may be the world’s first stand-alone LGBT 
penitentiary. Interestingly, discussions about the so-called ‘pink prison’ were spurred by 
the ECtHR case of X v Turkey in which the Court held that solitary confinement for a gay 
person was not suited and constituted a breach of human rights. As noted in Chapter 
Five, the prison authorities often force those inmates who may display vague feminine 
characteristics in male prisons to undergo medical examination, after which they are 
either subjected to ‘medical treatment’ or put in isolation.1200 The Turkish government 
sees LGBTIQ prisoners as a group that has an inherent vulnerability and a problem; 
therefore, it decided to build a prison just for LGBTIQ individuals.1201 Although the 
original idea was to release such prison in operation by the beginning of 2017, it is 
unclear whether this has occurred.  
 
 It might be misleading to believe that a specific LGBTIQ prison would resolve most or 
even many problems. A number of considerations should be taken into consideration – 
for example, international standards on prisoners’ allocation to prisons close to their 
families and access to social and rehabilitation programmes .1202  
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The state of Ceará on the northeast of Brazil has opened a special prison that 
accommodates 200 gays, bisexuals and transvestites.1203 These prisoners reportedly 
continuously suffered from violence and prejudice in the Brazilian prison system; 
therefore, separating them in a special prison seemed a way for the government to enable 
‘sexual minority prisoners’ to serve their terms in a separate facility.1204 The overall 
group of eligible participants excludes the lesbian category, however, which may reflect 
the narrative outlined in Chapter Five that women’s prisons are not considered dangerous 
for non-binary genders identity prisoners, creating a combination of hegemony and non-
binary environment at the same time. This practice is just one single prison, though, and 
cannot be generalized for the entire country. In other facilities, Brazil reportedly also has 
units where it accommodates LGBTIQ prisoners to spare them from potential inter-
prisoner violence. 
 
The Brazilian government’s explanation about the decision to devote a special prison to 
gay, bisexual and transgender prisoners is that it is ‘because this part of population is 
usually vulnerable and they are not cared for properly in the framework of the prison 
system... Typically, the gay, bisexual and transgender population isolates itself from all 
the other inmates. In prisons, gay, bisexual and transgender often become victims 
of violence and they are always under threat.’1205 
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This motivation of the government emphasises two main points. One is that group 
vulnerability is a deciding factor in making a decision for separating ‘sexual minority’ 
prisoners from general prison population; the second point is that the state almost 
justifies its decision by saying that these ‘sexual minorities’ do not mingle with the rest 
of the prison population, and therefore it is almost natural we separate them. In other 
words, the state once again sees the ‘sexual minority’ as a problem to the general prison 
life and sees isolating them to be a solution.  
 
The states argue that segregated prisons could curb an enormous problem of sexual abuse 
behind bars, as LGBTIQ inmates tend to suffer higher rates of victimization. While such 
separation has been presented as a victory for ‘gay rights’, an offer of refuge for a 
vulnerable population, there has also been a critique as to how such a separation is 
conducted and what the motives are. Despite some international well-meaning 
instruments that stipulate general rules and principles on how to treat transgender and 
non-binary persons in and out of prisons, often decisions are made at a micro-level of 
prison management, which often leaves too much room for interpretation. Particularly 
when a power of decision making on housing, allocation of prisoners and protection or 
solitary confinement is broadly vested within the prison governor at a micro-level, other 
mechanisms are important to be put in place to ensure humane treatment of transgender 
and other ‘sexual minority’ prisoners. 
 
Segregation if designed and executed in the right order can be the right policy. For this to 
be true, however, a number of fundamental principles need to be observed for making 
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decisions, particularly at the initial stages of allocation. Literature suggests that such 
segregation should be of a voluntary character, meaning that transgender prisoners 
should choose to be in segregation, as well as consultations to be conducted with the 
respective transgender prisoners.1206 The latter is also recommended under Yogyakarta 
Principle 9, which suggests that the participation of the LGBTIQ person in decision-
making about inmates’ allocation within the prison institution is fundamental. For this to 
be applied fully, a particular vulnerability of the transgender prisoner and their risk to the 
human rights violations and abuses should be taken into account by the decision-making 
body at the micro level of prison management when making the final decision.1207 
 
5. Prison Abolition as a Framework to Challenge the Legitimacy of Transgender 
Imprisonment 
 
A few queer theorists have argued that instead of addressing issues in the prison system, 
one should look at alternative measures such as the prison abolitionist movement and 
what it can offer for the protection of transgender prisoners’ rights. Spade, who is a queer 
theorist and can be considered a leading author on writing on abolitionist and transgender 
imprisonment, suggests that the abolitionist movement should be a wider agenda for 
transgender rights and should address egregious violence experienced by transgender 
people both in the lead up to imprisonment but also in the prison environment. Spade 
questions the view of working with the prison system with the view of reforming it, and 
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suggests that the transgender movement should focus on the abolitionist strategies that 
weaken these binary sex-based institutions.1208  
 
Spade relies heavily on traditional abolitionist theory and rightly so questions the 
legitimacy of the imprisonment of transgender people. He considers that first, it is 
important to determine whether prison is the right place for them. He then continues to 
criticise the creation of the special unit K6G in the Los Angeles County Jail1209 for gay 
and transgender prisoners ,which in his view will consistently fail to address violence and 
will, in fact, become new sites for enforcing racialized gender and sexuality norms to the 
detriment of the most criminalized populations. Spade calls politics and analysis within 
prison abolition scholarship and activism to start developing solutions that can reduce or 
eliminate the ill-treatment faced by transgender and non-binary gender prisoners. Spade 
further argued that the abolition of policing, prisons, jails, and detention should not be 
just a narrow answer to ‘imprisonment’ and the abuses that occur within prisons, but also 
as a challenge to the rule of poverty, violence, racism, alienation, and disconnection that 
transgender community faces every day. He stated that ‘abolition is not just about closing 
the doors to violent institutions, but also about building up and recovering institutions 
and practices and relationships that nurture wholeness, self-determination, and 
transformation.’1210   
 
A similar concept of prison abolition has been taken on by younger queer researchers 
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who continue to build on Spade’s transgender abolitionist theory.1211 It is still early days, 
though: such theory has a long way to develop and grow into criminology literature that 
can be taken up for a discussion. Nevertheless, the prison abolition framework is a useful 
tool to challenge the underlying issues of transgender imprisonment, including issues of 
poverty and economic impoverishment, societal and institutional violence against 
transgender persons, discrimination and stigma which they face in their everyday lives 
and which are often the underlying reason for their imprisonment. Though this thesis is 
limited to unpack these intersectional issues, further research is required for 
conceptualising and addressing these problems.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The virtual absence of international standards specifically on the protection of LGBTIQ 
persons has been long accompanied by a lack of general or theoretical knowledge and the 
absence of both quantitative and qualitative data on sexual diversity both inside and 
outside places of detention. The absence of data does not mean that problem do not exist 
in practice, but quite the contrary – lack of awareness of the problems is often the cause 
of the abuse and violence against transgender prisoners. 
 
This chapter surveyed the international human rights law to analyse the existing 
safeguards and their relevance to protecting transgender prisoners. While contestation of 
binary nature of prisons proves difficult to allow self-gender determination, basic 
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principles of human rights law coupled with the specific norms, such as the prohibition 
of torture and others, are seen as the best tools to argue for the application of human 
rights law to transgender prisoners. The analysis of lived experiences of transgender 
prisoners vis-à-vis available international human rights law also confirms the intrinsic 
links between these two. At the same time, the aspects of the vulnerability of transgender 
prisoners as well as wider ‘sexual minority’ prisoners should be considered key to 
advance the arguments for norm specific policies and instruments.  
 
Lack of specific guidance and limitations within the existing legislative context pose 
opportunities for international lawmakers and civil society activists to address the gaps in 
human rights norms and standards, although tensions with the self-gender determination 
in prisons will remain a subject for debate. It is also an issue that has divided states in 
international debates both on the issues of SOGI rights and the instruments for the 
treatment of prisoners who have argued against the inclusion of SOGI in the formal 
normative framework as also outlined in this chapter. 
 
The available safeguards – including separation of categories in prison, whether 
protective or otherwise – are all based on the heteronormative nature of prisons. 
Transgender prisoners typically are regarded as vulnerable categories by default and 
allocated to ‘protective custody’, which as shown above is understood either as solitary 
confinement or otherwise in breach of freedom from torture. In fact, as argued, no 
international body has yet argued that transgender persons are a priori vulnerable 
category that would need to be separated from the rest of the prison population. What is 
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argued instead is the situational vulnerability and the need for special measures to be put 
in place to allow appropriate protection. 
 
In the current circumstances neither such vulnerable categorisation is applied, nor is the 
binary nature of prisons challenged either in policy of practice. This means that even 
though international human rights law is being applied to secure the rights and freedoms 
in the context of non-binary genders, in prisons categorisation will continue in practice. 
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis developed through legal, prison and queer analysis. As this analysis nears to 
the end, in this brief chapter, it is pertinent to offer some concluding observations, 
reflecting on the human rights protection frameworks and the legal models of recognising 
non-binary gender both outside and inside the prison systems. The conclusion 
particularly looks at the comparison as to how international human rights law has 
developed to provide protection in and out of prisons. A series of observations follow on 
how biological, medical and gender self-determination models interplay in the prison 
context, providing protection safeguards for the transgender prisoners.  
 
This thesis started by exploring the human rights protection framework for transgender 
persons, the legal recognition of transgender or non-binary identity, and the development 
of international human rights law. In the case study, this thesis also examined the 
treatment of transgender prisoners under international human rights instruments. As 
observed in the introduction, since the early 2000s there has been an overall trend 
towards the recognition of the history of violence and abuses committed against 
transgender and other LGBTIQ communities with limitations in some jurisdictions and 
within international bodies. 
 
The scale of violence against transgender persons, both in and outside prisons, 
discrimination, and ignorance of their rights in law and by society has spurred the global 
mobilisation of LGBTIQ persons to demand protection under international human rights 
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instruments. Such global grassroots movements have helped to increase the awareness on 
SOGI rights among states and internationally. Some questions, however, remain 
unanswered or unaddressed. The theoretical and practical mismatches of developments in 
the area of SOGI rights in international human rights law and transgender and non-binary 
persons’ rights, in particular, have resulted in diverse approaches to the legal recognition 
of transgender persons’ rights and freedoms both in society and in prisons and conflicts 
with clear binary rights. Still, a unified international framework on SOGI rights is 
missing. To address some of these gaps, a theoretical foundation was laid out, and legal 
models for the recognition of transgender identity explored. In particular, three different 
models of legal recognition of transgender persons in law – the biological model, medical 
model and gender self-determination models – were identified and discussed to 
demonstrate the intersection points of queer theory and law as it relates to transgender 
persons.  
 
Some explanations for some of the gaps in the protection framework are intrinsic to 
international human rights law. At the time of the drafting of the International Bill of 
Rights and other human rights instruments, the majority of the countries in the world had 
LGBTIQ people ostracised and outlawed both through medical and criminal laws. 
International human rights law developed without specific considerations to non-binary 
gender, gender identity or transgender. Therefore, making alternations to already 
established international norms, or advocating for norms that directly relate to the 
transgender people’s experience, has been challenging. Queer theory, and in particular 
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transgender studies that asserted the rights to personhood and gender identity for 
transgender persons, emerged in the 1990s and are still developing.  
 
Despite such a complicated journey of development, some steps have been taken 
internationally and at regional levels to address the gaps and incorporate lived 
experiences of transgender people into the norm making. First, studies and investigations 
of human right law both through national norms and international rights framework 
established that SOGI rights are indeed intrinsic to human rights.1212 In addition, decades 
of activism by LGBTIQ groups and human rights advocates have contributed to the 
establishment of the body of jurisprudence on SOGI rights. For example, three major 
resolutions by the UN HRC, as well as the establishment of the UN Independent Expert 
on the SOGI rights, should be regarded a success achieved by such global mobilisation 
and decades of increasing awareness of the violence faced by LGBTIQ communities, but 
also their human rights and freedoms. Recent assertions of the UN and other regional 
human rights bodies on the necessity of the protection of transgender persons’ rights in 
detention has also contributed to advancing and cementing the rights of transgender 
prisoners. However, the applicability of international human rights law to transgender 
individuals relies too heavily on the underpinning principles of human rights. Substantive 
rights, such as the right to personhood, right to privacy and right to medical care (vis-à-
vis pathologization) are the main areas of human rights argued.  
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A second general explanation with regards to the journey of the recognition of 
transgender rights in law relates to the historical dichotomy between feminist and queer 
studies, both of which are crucial theoretical frameworks for understanding the 
transgender concept. While the importance of feminist and queer theories cannot be 
underestimated in developing transgender studies and transgender persons’ rights, in 
particular, a constant tension between queer theory, transgender rights and law persists. 
The basic premise of the recognition of transgender persons’ rights seems to lack full 
legal protections of transgender persons in many jurisdictions, including at the 
international level, with WHO still keeping the ‘transgenderism’ on the ICD list.1213 
Among those challenging the rigid nature of the law, according to Butler’s detailed study 
on gender performativity and queer theory, is a view that instead of sex-based 
recognition in law, international human rights law, as well as national laws, should in 
principle have a legal recognition mechanism for those who identify with neither of the 
sexes, but a specific gender, or non-binary gender. Indeed, an evolution of the law and 
legal reasoning requires a full determination of a person’s gender, including the 
consideration of multiple factors, such as a person’s perception of his/her own gender.1214 
A key challenge to the enforcement of non-binary gender recognition, however, is a 
heteronormative framework of law, including human rights law. In this context, 
principles of respect to dignity, equality and non-discrimination are essential to the 
realisation of non-binary gender as well as to the access of human rights and freedoms. 
What remains important is to close the gaps between broad protection frameworks and 
lived experiences of transgender individuals.  
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While some theoretical progress on the recognition of SOGI rights is evident, a political 
consensus on gender self-determination and non-binary genders in practice remains a 
distant objective, particularly when it comes to the implementation of the legal 
recognition of transgender or non-binary gender identities. As outlined above, some 76 
countries still criminalise LGBTIQ persons, and many more openly resist the 
establishment of international standards on SOGI rights, suggesting a clear divide on the 
issue. The example of mobilised resistance to block the election and appointment of the 
UN Independent Expert on SOGI at the UN HRC in late 2016 is also a testament of 
hostile countries trying to undermine the integrity of international human rights law. 
Although such hostility was overcome at UN HRC and the GA level, it was only by a 
small margin of votes and with a considerable compromise among negotiating states. 
Therefore, despite some attempts to harmonize the protection standards via policy 
changes or judicial remedy, inconsistency as to how these standards are translated into 
practice varies; hence, the diverse national laws and legal models of transgender 
recognition in practice.  
  
The existing human rights protection framework has been interpreted to allow claims for 
the application of gender recognition rights, either under the right to private life or the 
right to be recognised before the law. Access to other rights that are specific to 
transgender people, however, seems to either depend on the realisation of these two 
rights (privacy or the right to be recognised before the law) or can be accessed through 
the framework of underpinning principles of human rights – equality, non-discrimination 
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and dignity. This suggests that no new rights of transgender people have been offered. 
On the contrary, transgender rights are at the very core of the international human rights 
law.  
 
Legal models of transgender and non-binary gender recognition have taken diverse 
approaches. For example, the biological model, which is the oldest, does not recognise 
any deviance from a binary concept of sex or gender. It therefore imposes a strict 
punishment for transgressing the sex/gender boundaries (i.e., right to personhood, 
justified societal and structural discrimination, state-orchestrated stigma). These flaws in 
the law are addressed through the medical model, which permits the transgression 
between genders with a particular condition attached to it. Transgenderism should be a 
recognised medical condition, and transgressors should undergo medical intervention to 
exercise the ‘privilege’ of belonging to the other sex or gender. In this case, too, sex and 
gender are understood as identical identitarian notions, and medical science plays a 
dominant role in enabling a legal recognition of transgender persons. The emerging 
notion of non-binary gender has unsettled the medical model of legal recognition, 
questioning the pathologization of transgender communities and its conformity with the 
biological model. Indeed, the medical model continues to align itself with the biological 
model by supporting the heteronormative character of the sexes, hence supporting the 
pathologization of transgender individuals. On the other hand, the gender self-
determination model allows legal recognition of the non-binary genders.  
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International human rights law has also developed through these three models. From the 
early stages of complete disregard, both at the international and regional levels, a wide 
margin of appreciation to the states in granting human rights to the transgender persons, 
to the recognition of gender self-determination, it underwent, and is still undergoing, 
modifications to achieve the full protection of transgender person’s rights. Moreover, 
with the WHO 2018 summit another milestone in recognising transgender rights will be 
achieved, as the WHO is expected to remove ‘transgenderism’ from the ICD books and 
largely depathologize transgender persons. Human rights and transgender activists 
believe this will be a full compliance with the core principles of human rights, the UDHR 
and the Yogyakarta Principles. 
 
As this thesis followed the developments in the prison environment, it is pertinent to 
make some comparisons between the developments in society and their application to the 
prison context. On many levels, the case of imprisonment represents the starkest example 
of the binary character of international human rights law and its potential limitations 
when applying human rights law to transgender prisoners. A disconnect between these 
two is common. It occurs even in countries where legal or political reforms have been 
successful in recognising transgender people in law either via medical or gender self-
determination models. A simple transition in the legal recognition models does not 
automatically translate into the practice of a strict binary system, such as a prison. This is 
best illustrated in the example of the human rights law debates around SOGI rights 
within UN HRC and SOGI debates that took place during the drafting of the SMR, the 
Bangkok Rules and the revision process of the SMR. Even if international human rights 
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law, including the general comments of the treaty bodies, the concluding observations, 
the individual country viewpoints, and other recommendations and court judgments have 
made some progress to extend the protection to transgender prisoners, such discussions 
have lagged behind when it comes to transgender prisoners. Debates on the revision of 
the SMR were overshadowed by constant compromises between the states and a concern 
for the possible lowering of the standards, which has meant that although discussed in the 
open government negotiations, the SOGI as a wider concept, and the LGBTIQ persons in 
particular, are absent from Nelson Mandela Rules and the Bangkok Rules – specific 
instruments that provide standards on the treatment of prisoners. Notably, the Nelson 
Mandela Rules contain the language of ‘unique gender’ though it remains to be seen how 
this translates into the practice. 
 
Prisons continue to function as single-sex spaces, segregated strictly by biological sex 
recorded on the birth certificate. This means that currently, most prisons are pursuing 
biological model of transgender recognition, trying to fit the transgender persons into the 
pre-defined sexes. Underlying principles of human rights, equality, non-discrimination 
and respect for dignity remain the bases for the treatment of transgender persons in 
prisons. Humane treatment and protection from ill-treatment, vulnerability and protection 
from violence as well as housing remain the main intersection points for transgender 
persons in prison. The prison context creates a particular situation of vulnerability for 
transgender population that demands heightened attention from the state officials. As the 
regulations relating to prison conditions are part of domestic legislation, local prison 
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administration have an obligation to consider individual risks and vulnerabilities of the 
group in determining the prison conditions in a particular society.1215  
 
The analysis of models of recognition in the prison context allows us to pose a question 
as to whether the current human rights protection framework is applicable to the 
treatment of transgender prisoners. The gender self-determination model is indeed a 
challenge for prisons, particularly if the prisons remain single-sex and segregated spaces. 
This is evident from the policies of those countries that already claim to have adopted the 
self-determination model of gender legal recognition. This further means that even if the 
legal gender self-determination model works in society, in the prison context it is forced 
to fit the heteronormative framework of the system. Hence, whether transgender persons 
are allocated to special prisons, or allocated to prisons of their self-perceived gender, 
they [transgender or non-binary persons] will have to fit the heteronormative nature of 
the prison environment. In such a case, the recognition of self-determination of one’s 
gender for prison context becomes irrelevant because the law prevails within structured 
and sexed bodies. This relates specifically to prison policies on the separation of 
categories and housing of transgender prisoners in the prison. However, transgender 
prisoners’ rights that remain unattended, including in the international human rights 
instruments, are the right to gender expression, legal recognition of vulnerability and 
what it means in relation to transgender prisoners, ‘protective custody’ versus solitary 
confinement, medical care and the wider aspects of prevention of torture and ill-
treatment.  
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In strictly sex-segregated spaces transgender prisoners do and will continue their struggle 
to freely express their gender. As it stands now, gender expression for transgender 
prisoners is an unexplored area by human rights instruments and enforcement 
mechanisms. In situations where human rights should be applied to all, in reality they are 
available only for the majority rather than for everyone concerned. As a judge in the 
Green case highlighted, if human rights have no specific application to those concerned, 
they ‘become a pious list of worthy hopes with no practical application’.1216 In such a 
case, it remains of utmost importance that specific guidance from the UN and other 
regional human rights and torture prevention monitoring bodies is provided to help 
determine how to approach the issue. The urgency is highlighted by the fact that gender 
expression has wider importance for the recognition of non-binary gender and the 
selfhood of the person, which should not be underestimated.  
 
Participation at an early stage of decision-making will ensure that transgender offenders 
are kept fully informed of the processes and have the opportunity to present their views 
to those in charge of decision-making, as well as understanding the implications of their 
decisions. However, considering the lack of awareness that often attends the subject of 
criminal justice systems and the purposes of prisons, such an approach can be difficult to 
implement. Another difficulty is that prison governance in most countries in the world, 
and the real invisible hierarchy and informal structure of inmate society, can make a 
participatory approach difficult to implement. Moreover, any such measure leaves an 
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opportunity for the segregation of transgender or other LGBIQ prisoners from the rest of 
the prison population. 
 
Prisons, as argued above, are decentralised institutions where governors often enjoy a 
wide discretion in setting local policies for implementing orders. This often means that 
they can refuse access to gender-affirming items, or even medical care, based on 
supposed risk and economic factors, and security and operational factors. Prison 
governors also make decisions about housing and the segregation of transgender 
prisoners from the rest of the inmates, often as a form of ‘protective measure’. The 
situations of vulnerability and the high probability that transgender prisoners might be 
subjected to violence and abuse contributes to the decision to separate them from the rest 
of the prison population. However, leaving such an area without specific guidance has 
meant turning ‘protective custody’ into the ‘solitary confinement’, often in a 
discriminatory fashion against transgender prisoners. Providing guidance based on the 
principles of non-discrimination and prevention of ill-treatment should be a leitmotif in 
undertaking decisions about putting transgender prisoners in ‘protective custody’. 
 
Full conformity between gender self-determination and current prison systems cannot be 
achieved if these two have no intersecting point. However, to ensure the relative 
safeguards and protection for transgender prisoners, it is important that international 
bodies, including the UN torture prevention mechanisms, the UN SR, the CAT 
Committee and the SPT, as well as regional human rights mechanisms, should take the 
lead in providing guidance on the specific policies on the treatment of transgender 
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prisoners and the application of human rights to the specific needs of transgender person 
in prisons.  
 
So far, queer literature has not provided any guidance on how to implement the gender 
self-determination model in the prison context. Two options have been identified, 
although both lack a deeper understanding and have not been supported by research into 
their applicability to the non-binary gender in prisons. Option one relates to the argument 
that prisons may need to cease operating as single-space establishments, to allow gender 
fluidity (or at least some of them, depending on the general prison management and risk 
assessment procedures). A second option uses an abolitionist approach and suggests that 
instead of trying to solve the problem from within the context, society as a whole should 
abolish prisons, or should use them only for really risky people. The first argument 
brings up a question of the history of the invention of prisons and the philosophical 
reasoning for separating men and women in closed institutions. More research, however, 
is needed into the prison abolition movement and its potential use for the benefit of 
transgender prisoners’ rights, as well as the ways in which transgender imprisonment can 
be challenged. And even if the gender self-determination model is understood to provide 
the most comprehensive protection of transgender persons and respect to dignity, in the 
prison context such a model simply seems redundant in the absence of more global 
changes in prison management such as wider issues of legitimacy of transgender 
imprisonment and governance of justice systems, which concerns not only transgender 
prisoners but the ways prisons are governed, structured, planned and utilized.1217  
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These explanations contribute to the development of the body of rules and jurisprudence 
establishing broader human rights of transgender persons, both outside and inside 
prisons. This should, however, be considered a success of the LGBTIQ community, 
which managed to organise as a group to advocate for their recognition in human rights 
law. The underlying principles of human rights, equality, non-discrimination and dignity 
played and will continue to play a central role in discourses about application of 
international human rights law to transgender persons and assertion of basic rules: first, 
an imperative need of human rights to reach all, and second, an emphasis on general 
rights with specific considerations of the lived experiences of vulnerable categories of 
people, in this case transgender individuals.  
 
These features of the application of human rights law to transgender persons also help us 
to understand the general application of SOGI rights in the prison context, where 
transgender prisoners retain their ordinary rights, excepting those that are limited under 
the law. However, non-conformity with the set rules and norms of the sex/gender 
dichotomy does put transgender and other non-binary prisoners in a precarious situation 
from the very beginning. At the same time, the limitations of the present research must 
be acknowledged. The desk-based nature of the research has meant no engaged effort of 
documenting the implementation of either of the legal models of transgender recognition, 
nor was any field research conducted to observe the treatment of transgender prisoners in 
practice. This is not only an important question for further research, but it is also of 
utmost importance to document and gather evidence on the lived experiences of 
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transgender persons, both in and outside prisons. It is particularly important in the 
context of prisons in order to help to draw on the experiences of transgender and other 
‘sexual minorities’ lived experiences for developing specific norms and standards on 
treatment. The ability then of the international human rights law to accommodate, cut 
across and apply to the specific experiences of the vulnerable groups while grounded in 
the principles of human rights and dignity, depends on the resilient actors of the LGBTIQ 
community and the broader public around the world. 
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